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Emotion recognition is a cognitive ability that has been demonstrated to decline with age. 
Older adults (aged over 60) are consistently poorer than young adults (aged 18-30) at 
recognising anger, fear, sadness, and happiness. However, it is possible that such age 
differences have been exaggerated by a phenomenon known as age-related stereotype 
threat, whereby raising negative stereotypes about aging leads older adults to perform 
worse on relevant tasks. For instance, reminding older adults of stereotypes about age-
related cognitive decline impairs their memory recall performance. There is reason to think 
that older adults’ recognition of emotions might be another cognitive ability that is 
compromised by stereotype threat. This idea was tested over three studies.  
In Study 1, young and older adults were exposed to a stereotype threat 
manipulation that implied either that 1) older adults or 2) young adults are expected to 
have inferior emotion recognition ability. A control condition (3) involved no allusion to 
age differences in emotion recognition. Participants completed a basic facial emotion 
recognition task and a task that involved identifying mental states expressed by eyes, in 
addition to measures of self-reported threat concerns and state anxiety. It was hypothesised 
that stereotype threat would lead older adults (but not young adults) to experience 
increased stereotype threat concerns and anxiety, which in turn, would impair older adults’ 
emotion recognition performance. Contrary to expectations, the stereotype threat 
manipulation did not lead older adults to experience increased threat concerns or state 
anxiety. Interestingly, young adults did report feeling more stereotype-threatened and 
anxious by the implication that their age group is typically worse at recognising emotions. 
Neither age group experienced impairments in their recognition of facial expressions or 
mental states. 
 iii 
These findings raised questions about whether or not lay people actually believe 
that emotion recognition declines with age. Study 2 aimed to explore the current 
stereotypes about young and older adults’ emotion recognition abilities, in addition to their 
cognitive and social competencies. The results showed that, contrary to empirical 
evidence, lay people believe that older adults are equal to, or even better, than young 
adults at recognising emotions. Further, whereas participants believe older adults’ social 
competency to be comparable to that of young adults, they believe older adults’ cognitive 
ability to be inferior. 
Consequently, Study 3 involved framing an emotion recognition task as assessing 
either cognitive ability (believed to decline with age), social ability (believed to remain 
stable with age), or general abilities. It was hypothesised that older adults (but not young 
adults) would experience the greatest threat concerns when the task was framed as 
assessing cognitive ability, which, in turn, would impair their emotion recognition 
accuracy. Indeed, there was no effect of condition on young adults’ threat concerns or 
emotion recognition. As expected, older adults reported significantly greater threat 
concerns when the emotion recognition task was framed as assessing cognitive ability, 
compared to the other conditions. However, older adults’ emotion recognition accuracy 
remained unchanged, suggesting that the recognition of emotions may be one cognitive 
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The ability to recognise and understand the emotions expressed by others is an 
important cognitive skill. However, research has reliably demonstrated that emotion 
recognition declines with age (Gonçalves et al., 2018; Ruffman, Henry, Livingstone, & 
Phillips, 2008). Older adults are worse than young adults at recognising fear, anger, 
sadness, and happiness expressed by faces, bodily poses, and tone of voice (Ruffman et al., 
2008). It is possible, though, that the age-related decline in emotion recognition ability 
demonstrated in the literature has been exaggerated by stereotype threat, a phenomenon 
first demonstrated by Steele and Aronson (1995). Stereotype threat refers to the feeling 
that one is at risk of confirming negative stereotypes about a group to which one belongs, 
which may lead one to performing poorly on stereotype-relevant tasks (Steele & Aronson, 
1995).  
Indeed, reminding minorities (e.g., African-Americans) of negative stereotypes 
about their group (e.g., that African-Americans are academically inferior than whites) has 
consistently been shown to impair stigmatised individuals’ task performance (e.g., on 
college tests; Nguyen & Ryan, 2008; Spencer, Logel, & Davies, 2016). Importantly for the 
current research question, a large body of literature indicates that reminding older adults 
about negative aging stereotypes worsens their performance on numerous different 
cognitive tasks (Lamont, Swift, & Abrams, 2015), including episodic and working 
memory tasks (Armstrong, Gallant, Li, Patel, & Wong, 2017), pre-dementia screening 
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tests (Mazerolle et al., 2017), and map learning (Meneghetti, Muffato, Suitner, de Beni, & 
Borella, 2015).  
However, despite age-related stereotype threat being shown to reliably impair a 
number of cognitive abilities in older adults, there has been no investigation into the 
possible effects of age-related stereotype threat on older adults’ ability to recognise 
emotions. It is possible that previous findings of age-related differences in emotion 
recognition have been exaggerated by stereotype threat. The current introductory chapter 
reviews the respective literature on the decline in emotion recognition with age, stereotype 
threat, and more specifically, age-related stereotype threat. In light of the reviewed 
literature, the overarching aims of the current research are subsequently described. 
  
Age-Related Differences in the Recognition of Emotions 
Expressing, perceiving, and recognising emotions are important capabilities that 
are integral in several areas of life, such as forming friendships, expressing and 
recognising one’s needs and desires, and establishing romantic connections (Zhang & 
Parmley, 2015). Without emotion, human social interaction and communication would be 
considerably limited. Indeed, individuals whose emotion recognition is compromised can 
experience diminished social functioning, dysfunctional social behaviour, and a lack of 
interest in social interactions (Ruffman et al., 2008; Shimokawa et al., 2001). An extreme 
example of this is evident in autism, a psychiatric disorder involving various deficits in 
social interaction and communication such as developmental delays in learning everyday 
social skills, failure to react appropriately to social cues, and an inability to make friends 
(Guastella et al., 2010). These deficits are believed to be partially caused by a reduced 
ability to recognise other people’s emotions – a theory that has been supported through 
numerous neurological and behavioural studies (Guastella et al., 2010). 
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While emotions are expressed in many ways, such as through body language, 
spoken language, and tone of voice, the expression and recognition of emotions primarily 
depends on the facial region (Russell, 1994). Ekman (1992) introduced the idea that there 
are at least five basic facial emotions that are universally recognised and distinguishable 
from one another (Russell, 1994). These basic emotions are anger, happiness, disgust, 
sadness, and fear, with surprise often being included too (Ekman, 1992; Russell, 1994). 
Each emotion is associated with distinct changes in muscle groups, such as the turning up 
of the corners of an individual’s mouth and the wrinkling of the skin surrounding their 
eyes when they are feeling happy (Ekman, Friesen, & Hager, 2002). As Ekman (1992) 
suggested, these fundamental emotions are almost certainly designed to aid social 
interactions, but interestingly also occur when one is alone and out of sight of anyone. He 
theorised that humans rely on basic emotions because they have been adaptive in the past 
(both our past as a species, and our own individual past) for inter-personal interactions, 
and thus have now become fundamental, instinctive reactions to various life events. 
However, some researchers have questioned the categorical, bottom-up nature of 
this basic emotion theory, instead suggesting that emotion perception might be more of a 
socially constructed concept determined by top-down processes, such as language and 
culture (e.g., Barrett, 2006; Lindquist & Gendron, 2013). Despite this controversy, there is 
a wealth of research supporting the idea that humans categorise facial expressions into 
specific emotion categories in order to facilitate an accurate and rapid response (for a 
review, see Brosch, Pourtois, & Sander, 2010). The categorisation of emotions likely 
stems from humans’ innate tendency to group and classify stimuli so that sense can be 
made of a complex world (Brosch et al., 2010).  
The recognition of emotions is a multifaceted cognitive ability that involves 
numerous psychological mechanisms and relies on particular regions of the brain 
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(Adolphs, 2002; Adolphs, Baron-Cohen, & Tranel, 2002; Pessoa, 2008; Vuilleumier & 
Pourtois, 2007). When recognising the emotion in another person’s face, one must first 
direct one’s attention to the face and its salient features (Phelps, Ling, & Carrasco, 2006). 
The ability to efficiently attend to emotional stimuli is important; for example, a rapid 
response to an angry face in an individual’s environment may help to avoid a possible 
threat (Phelps et al., 2006). It has been proposed that the amygdala is largely responsible 
for the rapid response to emotional stimuli (Ledoux, 2002; Phelps et al., 2006) and that this 
response occurs before the individual has any awareness of the stimuli (Whalen et al., 
1998). The amygdala may then provide feedback to the areas of the brain that subserve 
attention (Phelps et al., 2006). Once attending to a face, an individual must be able to 
perceive it and the expression that the face is portraying (Adolphs, 2002). Regions of the 
brain believed to be responsible for the visual perception and processing of emotional 
faces include the occipital cortex, fusiform cortex, amygdala, insula, and somatosensory 
cortex (Adolphs, 2002; Van de Riet, Grèzes, & de Gelder, 2009; Vuilleumier & Pourtois, 
2007).  
Over and above the perception of emotions, identifying and classifying the 
particular emotion being expressed must occur in order to establish how the other person is 
feeling and to subsequently react appropriately (Adolphs, 2002). This recognition process 
relies on a person’s memory for previously perceived emotions, and knowledge of the 
stimuli and situations with which that particular emotion has been associated in the past 
(Adolphs, 2002). By drawing from previous experiences and one’s concept of each 
emotion, one can then determine which of the basic emotions is being expressed by 
utilising one’s innate ability to categorise information (Adolphs, 2002; Brosch et al., 
2010). Through the integration of all of these cognitive processes, an individual may be 
able to successfully determine the emotion being expressed by another person. 
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The ability to recognise expressed emotions changes across one’s lifespan. Older 
adults are often believed to be wise (Etezadi & Pushkar, 2013), have had many years of 
experience with interpersonal relationships, and are usually focussed on maintaining 
positive relationships with others (Mather & Carstensen, 2005). Indeed, some 
sociocognitive researchers argue that people do become better with age at regulating their 
emotions (Phillips, MacLean, & Allen, 2002) and may become better at understanding and 
reacting to others’ emotions (Magai, 2001). However, despite this apparent increase in the 
ability to regulate emotions, research has demonstrated that the cognitive ability to 
accurately recognise emotions deteriorates with age (Gonçalves et al., 2018; Ruffman et 
al., 2008). Older adults have consistently been shown to be less accurate than young adults 
at recognising emotions across a number of modalities, including facial expressions, body 
language, and tone of voice (Gonçalves et al., 2018; Ruffman et al., 2008).  
Isaacowitz and colleagues (2007) found that older adults were poorer than young 
adults at recognising anger, fear, and happiness expressed by faces. Another study 
indicated that older adults were less accurate than young adults when recognising anger, 
sadness, and happiness from both voices and bodily expressions (Ruffman, Halberstadt, & 
Murray, 2009). Older adults were also worse at recognising disgust, but only from bodily 
expressions (Ruffman et al., 2009). This study also investigated young and older adults’ 
ability to accurately match emotions expressed vocally to emotional faces, as well as to 
body poses. The authors demonstrated that, when matching vocal expressions to faces, 
older adults were worse than young adults for anger, sadness, and happiness (Ruffman et 
al., 2009). When matching body poses to voices, older adults were worse than young 
adults for every emotion, highlighting that older adults may find this task particularly 
challenging (Ruffman et al., 2009). 
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A meta-analysis and review of age-related differences in emotion recognition 
revealed that older adults exhibit significantly poorer recognition of certain emotions, 
across all modalities (Ruffman et al., 2008). When recognising facially expressed 
emotions, older adults were found to be worse at recognising anger, fear, sadness – and to 
a lesser extent happiness and surprise – compared to young adults (Ruffman et al., 2008). 
However, interestingly, older adults appear to have little difficulty recognising disgust, and 
in some cases have actually been shown to perform slightly better than young adults at 
recognising disgust in faces (Calder et al., 2003; Ruffman et al., 2008), although this effect 
failed to reach statistical significance in Ruffman et al.’s (2008) meta-analysis. One decade 
later, another meta-analysis was published by Gonçalves and colleagues (2018) that 
analysed effects sizes from studies published since 2008. This meta-analysis provided 
further support for Ruffman et al.’s (2008) earlier findings that the recognition of fear, 
anger, sadness, and happiness declines with age (Gonçalves et al., 2018). 
Older adults’ difficulties in recognising emotions expressed by others may 
contribute to further social detriments. One study investigated young (aged 18-35) and 
older (aged 60-85) adults’ ability to discriminate appropriate and inappropriate behaviour 
(i.e., faux pas) exhibited by a popular television character, David Brent, from The Office 
(Halberstadt, Ruffman, Murray, Taumeoepeau, & Ryan, 2011). Participants rated the 
appropriateness of David’s behaviour from a number of video clips, and also completed a 
battery of emotion recognition tasks, where they labelled facial, vocal, and bodily 
expressions of emotion. As expected, older adults were worse than young adults at 
discriminating between appropriate behaviour and faux pas. Interestingly, this effect was 
completely mediated by performance on the emotion recognition tasks, implicating the 
recognition of emotions as an important contributor towards older adults’ social 
understanding. Further, compared to young adults, older adults also appear to have 
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lowered empathic accuracy, or the ability to infer what another person is truly feeling 
(Ruffman, Halberstadt, Murray, Jack, & Vater, 2019). Taken together, these findings 
suggest that older adults not only have reduced ability to recognise basic emotions, but 
also experience reduced social understanding with age. 
Research has supported this idea that older adults’ general social understanding 
may be less well developed than young adults (Henry, Phillips, Ruffman, & Bailey, 2013). 
One important aspect of social understanding is theory of mind (ToM), a term used to 
describe the capability of comprehending and appreciating another’s complex emotions, 
cognitions, mental state, and resulting behaviour, and understanding that these are distinct 
from our own (Henry et al., 2013; Phillips et al., 2002). In an early study comparing older 
and younger participants’ theory of mind, Happé, Winner, and Brownell (1998) found that 
older adults were better on a verbal theory of mind test than young adults. They suggested 
that this might be because social reasoning is preserved in aging whilst non-social 
reasoning deteriorates (Happé et al., 1998). However, other studies have found that ToM 
in fact deteriorates with age, and that Happé and colleagues’ (1998) study may have only 
found such results due to their older group being very high functioning (Maylor, Moulson, 
Muncer, & Taylor, 2002).  
One common paradigm for examining an individual’s theory of mind utilises the 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET; Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & 
Robertson, 1997; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001), which requires 
participants to select a mental state label from four options (e.g., “jealous”, “panicked”, 
“arrogant”, “hateful”) that accurately describes the mental state of people whose eyes only 
are displayed. This test was originally designed to detect differences in ToM in people 
with autism, but has since been used to compare young and older adults’ capability of 
understanding another person’s complex emotional state. Phillips and colleagues (2002) 
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conducted a study comparing older and young adults’ performance on the RMET, which 
demonstrated that older adults did exhibit poorer ToM than young adults. Additional 
studies lead to the same conclusion (e.g., Bailey, Henry, & Von Hippel, 2008; Pardini & 
Nichelli, 2009; Slessor, Phillips, & Bull, 2007), with researchers suggesting that age-
related declines in ToM may be partially caused by older adults’ lowered capacity to 
recognise negative emotions, or more generalised deterioration in social understanding 
(Moran, 2013). A meta-analytic review of 23 studies investigating age-related differences 
in ToM supported the idea that older adults are worse than younger adults at attributing 
complex mental states to others (Henry et al., 2013). 
Mechanisms Underlying Age-Related Decline in Emotion Recognition 
Although the exact causes of the apparent age-related decline in emotion 
recognition remains inconclusive, several theories have been proposed. One prominent 
idea is derived from the socioemotional selectivity theory, which posits that older adults 
may direct their attention to positive and emotionally meaningful pursuits and stimuli in 
order to regulate their emotions and obtain the most enjoyment from the time remaining in 
their lives (Carstensen, Fung, & Charles, 2003). This “positivity effect” may lead older 
adults to reappraise negative emotions expressed by another individual in a more positive 
light, in order to effectively regulate their own emotions (Mather & Carstensen, 2003; 
Ruffman et al., 2008). In doing so, they may incorrectly interpret and categorise negative 
emotions (Ruffman et al., 2008). However, if age-related declines in emotion recognition 
were fully explained by the positivity bias, one would expect older adults to be less 
accurate than young adults at recognising negative emotions but to be equally good at 
recognising positive emotions. Instead, research has demonstrated that older adults are 
sometimes worse than young adults at recognising happiness (although not always; e.g., 
Murphy, Lehrfeld, & Isaacowitz, 2010) and usually perform equally well at recognising 
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disgust (e.g., Gonçalves et al., 2018; Ruffman et al., 2008). Therefore, although the 
positivity bias may play some role in older adults’ emotion recognition (for instance, older 
adults are faster at recognising happy faces than angry faces; Di Domenico, Palumbo, 
Mammarella, & Fairfield, 2015), it is unlikely to fully explain the deficits older adults 
experience. 
Another prominent theory is that age-related declines in emotion recognition may 
result from the general cognitive decline that occurs with normal aging (Ruffman et al., 
2008). A number of cognitive abilities decline with age, such as memory, executive 
functioning, perceptual speed, inductive reasoning, and spatial orientation (Ruffman et al., 
2008; Schaie, 1994), although verbal abilities and crystallised knowledge appear to remain 
intact (Ruffman et al., 2008). Because emotion recognition may rely on a number of fluid 
cognitive abilities, normal age-related decline in cognition could be partially responsible 
for older adults’ poorer performance on emotion recognition tasks. Indeed, one study 
found that general cognitive functioning was related to emotion categorisation ability, such 
that older adults’ decreased accuracy when identifying negative facial expressions was 
positively related to their scores on a test of general cognitive ability (Liao, Wang, Lin, 
Chan, & Zhang, 2017). 
However, two large meta-analyses have demonstrated that, compared to young 
adults, older adults are equally (or more) accurate at recognising disgust (Gonçalves et al., 
2018; Ruffman et al., 2008), despite disgust being one of the most difficult emotions for 
young adults to identify (Ruffman et al., 2008). Conversely, older adults are significantly 
poorer than young adults at recognising sadness (Gonçalves et al., 2018), despite sadness 
being the easiest negative emotion to identify for young adults (Ruffman et al., 2008).  If 
age-related declines in emotion recognition were explained by general cognitive decline, 
one would expect older adults to perform worse when recognising the emotions they found 
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most difficult to recognise when they were younger, since age differences usually become 
more pronounced with task difficulty (Earles, Kersten, Mas & Miccio, 2004; Ruffman et 
al., 2008).  
Nevertheless, further evidence has pointed towards general cognitive decline as a 
determinant of reductions in emotion recognition ability. Suzuki and Akiyama (2013) 
suggested that general cognitive decline could preferentially affect the recognition of 
particular emotions, but not others. In line with previous research, the authors found that 
older adults were worse than young adults at recognising fear, sadness, happiness, surprise, 
and anger, but significantly better at recognising disgust. Whereas older adults’ reduced 
recognition of happiness, surprise, fear, and sadness was statistically explained by 
reductions in general cognitive ability, older adults’ reduced recognition of anger and 
increased recognition of disgust were not. Thus, general cognitive decline may account for 
age-related declines in the recognition of some – but not all – emotions.   
It is also possible that, over and above the general cognitive decline that occurs 
with normal aging, localised regions of the brain (predominantly within the frontal and 
temporal areas) that are involved in the recognition of facial expressions and emotions are 
subject to atrophy with age (Calder et al., 2003; Ruffman et al., 2008). Whereas general 
cognitive decline might be expected to cause a more uniform deterioration in the 
recognition of emotions (Ruffman et al., 2008; although see Suzuki & Akiyama, 2013), 
additional changes in particular cortical structures might lead to differential impairments in 
recognition of the emotions that rely on these structures (Calder et al., 2003; Ruffman et 
al., 2008). As such, age-related reductions in the recognition of sadness and fear might 
partially result from changes in the amygdala, whereas the ability to recognise disgust 
might be retained due to comparative preservation of the basal ganglia (Ruffman et al., 
2008). 
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 The idea that specific brain changes may be responsible for age-related emotion 
recognition decline is supported by evidence demonstrating that frontal and temporal 
regions of the brain deteriorate quickly in the later years of life (Bartzokis et al., 2001; 
Fjell et al., 2009; Raz et al., 2005), whereas some other areas undergo less change or are 
relatively preserved (Raz et al., 2005). However, some research appears to contradict the 
theory that emotion recognition declines as a result of specific neural changes. For 
instance, the insula (along with the basal ganglia) is one brain region that is thought to be 
highly specialised for the recognition of disgust (Calder, Keane, Manes, Antoun, & 
Young, 2000). Despite the insula being subject to deterioration with age (Persson et al., 
2014), the recognition of disgust is maintained (or even improved) across the lifespan 
(Mather, 2016; Ruffman et al., 2008). Thus, further research is necessary to determine the 
extent to which specific age-related brain changes might lead to emotion recognition 
deficits. 
In addition to the predominant theories attempting to explain age-related 
differences in emotion recognition, there are some further factors that may amplify or 
partially explain these differences. Research has demonstrated that an own-age bias may 
have played a partial role in older adults’ poorer performance on emotion recognition tasks 
in some studies (Holland, Ebner, Lin, & Samanez-Larkin, 2018). The own-age bias refers 
to the phenomenon that individuals find it easier to recognise faces from their own age 
group compared to other age groups (for a meta-analysis, see Rhodes & Anastasi, 2012). 
This is likely due to the fact that people usually spend most of their time with others their 
own age, leading to a higher degree of familiarity with faces of people from their own age 
group than people from other age groups (Bartlett & Fulton, 1991; Ebner, Riediger, & 
Lindenburger, 2010). Because of this own-age bias, older adults may be at a disadvantage 
when asked to label facial expressions portrayed by young actors. This is somewhat 
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problematic given that most emotion recognition paradigms only utilise young face stimuli 
(Holland et al., 2018).  
Researchers have since attempted to overcome this potential problem by including 
both young and older face stimuli. Ebner and colleagues (2010) created the FACES 
database, which is a set of facial stimuli that includes similar numbers of young, middle-
aged, and older faces expressing six emotions: neutrality, disgust, sadness, happiness, 
anger, and fear (Ebner et al., 2010). However, further studies using these stimuli have 
shown that older adults are still less accurate than young adults at recognising anger 
(Ebner & Johnson, 2009) and fear (Campbell, Murray, Atkinson, & Ruffman, 2017) in 
young and older faces, thus indicating that previous findings of an age-related decline in 
recognition of emotions in young faces may generalise to older face stimuli also. 
Another factor that may have led to the overestimation of age-related differences in 
emotion recognition is the fact that many emotion recognition experimental paradigms are 
almost devoid of context. The majority of these tasks simply utilise posed facial 
expressions without real-world contextual factors, which is problematic given evidence 
demonstrating that contextual information is integrated with facial expression when 
recognising emotions (Noh & Isaacowitz, 2013). This issue is especially relevant to 
research involving age-related differences, as research has shown that context may be 
more important to the processing of facial emotions for older adults than for younger 
adults (Noh & Isaacowitz, 2013; Richter, Dietzel, & Kunzmann, 2010). Perhaps this is 
because older adults depend on environmental and contextual cues to make up for 
cognitive decline due to aging (Isaacowitz & Stanley, 2011).  
In addition, these commonly used emotion recognition tasks have limited 
ecological validity (Schlegel, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2014), because in real-life social 
interactions, people do not have to recognise emotions from motionless, posed pictures of 
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faces. Instead, there is much more context, including dynamic facial expression, tone of 
voice, and body language. Although emotion recognition tasks with modalities other than 
posed facial expression do exist, they usually consist of just a single modality, such as 
audio recordings of vocal emotional expressions or pictures of posed bodily expressions 
(Ruffman et al., 2009; Schlegel et al., 2014). Within the last decade, researchers have 
begun to address this problem by creating tests that involve dynamic, multimodal emotion 
recognition, such as the Multimodal Emotion Recognition Test (MERT; Bänziger, 
Grandjean, & Scherer, 2009) and the Geneva Emotion Recognition Test (GERT; Schlegel 
et al., 2014).  
The GERT comprises 83 brief video clips in which actors portray different 
emotions, including the basic emotions (e.g., fear, anger, and sadness) in addition to some 
more complex emotions (e.g., pride, anxiety, and pleasure). After each video clip, 
participants are presented with 14 possible emotion labels and are required to click the 
emotion label that best matches the actor’s emotional portrayal. The creators of the GERT 
also created a briefer version, the Geneva Emotion Recognition Test (GERT-S), which 
includes only 42 items (Schlegel & Scherer, 2016). Since the video clips within these tests 
integrate multiple modalities (e.g., voice, body language, and facial expressions), the 
emotional expressions may be more ecologically valid than previous emotion recognition 
tests (Schlegel & Scherer, 2016). However, although Schlegel and colleagues (2014) found 
a negative correlation between age and emotion recognition ability on the GERT for adults 
aged 18-65, neither the GERT nor the GERT-S has been tested on older adults aged over 
65 years. 
Recently, Holland and colleagues (2018) also modified the static stimuli from their 
FACES database to create the Dynamic FACES database, with faces that morph from a 
neutral expression to an expression of one of six emotions: happiness, anger, fear, sadness, 
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disgust, or neutrality. They then conducted a study that compared young, middle-aged, and 
older adults’ accuracy at recognising emotions expressed by these newly developed 
Dynamic FACES stimuli. The authors found that older adults were less accurate than 
young and middle-aged adults at recognising anger, but that older and middle-aged adults 
were better than young adults at identifying sadness. Furthermore, older adults performed 
as well as middle-aged and young adults at recognising happiness, disgust, neutrality, or 
fear. These results indicate that using more dynamic and naturalistic stimuli may reduce 
the age differences previously seen on emotion recognition tasks.   
Age-related differences in emotion recognition using dynamic and/or multimodal 
paradigms remain largely understudied. It is possible, then, that the lack of context in 
previous studies – especially the integration of facial expressions, voice, and body 
language – may account for some of the differences observed in emotion recognition 
between younger and older adults.  
 
The Effects of Stereotype Threat on Stereotype-Relevant Tasks 
Researchers have attempted to explain age-related differences in emotion 
recognition ability using a number of different theories, such as the positivity bias, general 
cognitive decline with healthy aging, and changes in neural structures involved in 
recognising emotions (Ruffman et al., 2008). Furthermore, they have suggested that 
additional factors may contribute to these age differences, such as an own-age bias 
(Holland et al., 2018) or an absence of context in emotion recognition paradigms (Noh & 
Isaacowitz, 2013). However, there is another important factor that could partially explain 
age-related differences in emotion recognition ability. Namely, widely-held negative 
stereotypes about aging and about older adults’ cognitive abilities might have a powerful, 
negative effect on older adults’ ability to recognise emotions.  
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Stereotype threat refers to a phenomenon whereby people who belong to a minority 
or stigmatised group (such as African-Americans, females, or older adults) experience 
impairments on relevant tasks when negative stereotypes about their group are emphasised 
(Spencer et al., 2016). As part of Steele and Aronson’s (1995) seminal research on 
stereotype threat, they investigated the effects of highlighting negative stereotypes about 
African-Americans’ scholastic performance on their test performance, since African-
Americans are often expected to have lower academic ability compared to white students. 
African-American and white students were given a difficult verbal test, prior to which they 
were either required or not required to write their race on the cover of the paper. The 
authors found that, whereas African-American students performed as well as white 
students when their race was not requested (after controlling for differences in self-
reported aptitude scores), they performed significantly worse than white students when 
instructed to provide their race. The authors concluded that simply making race salient 
prompted African-American students to conform to racial stereotypes, thus decreasing 
their performance on the test.  
Steele and Aronson (1995) also demonstrated these effects simply through framing 
the same test in a way that would elicit relevant stereotypes about African-Americans’ test 
performance. In one condition, they informed white and African-American students that 
the test was diagnostic of intellectual ability, which is stereotypically believed to be lower 
in African-Americans. In another condition, they told participants that the test was non-
diagnostic of ability and framed it simply as a problem-solving task. The results revealed 
that simply framing the test as diagnostic of intellectual ability was enough to cause a 
decline in African-American students’ performance on the task. A meta-analysis 
corroborated these early findings that reminding minorities (such as African-Americans) of 
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stereotypes about their intellectual ability leads to a reduction in performance on relevant 
tasks (Nguyen & Ryan, 2008). 
Stereotype threat effects are not limited to race. Similar detrimental effects of 
stereotypes on women’s task performance have also been demonstrated, particularly for 
task domains in which men are believed to be more competent. In one study, women and 
men who were proficient at mathematics were presented with a difficult math test 
(Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999). In a stereotype-relevant condition, the researchers 
informed participants that men and woman had previously differed in performance on the 
test, whereas in a stereotype-irrelevant condition, they implied that men and women 
usually performed equally. Interestingly, women obtained lower scores than men on the 
test in the first condition but performed equally to men when stereotypes about women’s 
math performance were rendered irrelevant to the task. 
Similarly, Schamder (2002) found that, when students were told that men and 
women’s scores on a math test would be compared, women who identified strongly with 
their gender performed worse than men, whereas women who did not identify strongly 
with their gender performed equally to men. These deleterious effects of eliciting 
stereotypes on women’s math performance have been shown to be reliable and robust 
(Doyle & Voyer, 2016; Nguyen & Ryan, 2008). Further, effects on women’s performance 
in other stereotype-relevant task domains have also been established. For example, a meta-
analysis indicated that stereotype threat has a reliably negative effect on women’s sport 
performance, especially for sports in which males are typically believed to perform better 
(Gentile, Boca, & Giammusso, 2018).  
Stereotype threat leads to a feeling that one is at risk of confirming negative 
perceptions and beliefs about a group that they belong to (Steele & Aronson, 1995). 
According to Steele’s (2010) account, individuals do not even need to endorse or believe 
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the stereotypes to be true – they merely need to identify with the group to which the 
stereotype refers. This then leads to a feeling of added pressure to do well in the required 
domain in order to avoid confirming the negative stereotypes about their group (Spencer et 
al., 2016). As a consequence of this extra pressure, many people succumb to a self-
fulfilling prophecy, whereby their behaviour or cognitive performance confirms these 
stereotypes (Jussim, Eccles, & Madon, 1996). The effects of stereotype threat when tested 
in the laboratory have been found to be robust, and are usually moderate to small (Lamont 
et al., 2015; Spencer et al., 2016). 
Stereotype threat is distinct from simple priming in that, in the former but not the 
latter, reminding people about stereotypes regarding a specific group should only have 
negative effects on members of that group (Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002). Targets of 
a stereotype not only possess the knowledge that a stereotype exists (e.g., “women are 
worse than men at mathematics”), but also understand that they are a part of that 
stigmatised group (e.g., being a woman). As described by Jamieson and Harkins (2012), it 
is this “knowing and being” that leads to stereotype threat (p. 292). In other words, the 
stereotype must be self-relevant in order to provoke stereotype threat. Unlike priming, 
stereotype threat stems from the knowledge that one is a part of a particular group and that 
one might confirm negative stereotypes about that group (Jamieson & Harkins, 2012). 
Mediators and Moderators of Stereotype Threat 
Numerous researchers have explored potential mechanisms through which 
stereotype threat may reduce performance in different areas. As previously noted, 
stereotype threat likely leads to the extra pressure to disconfirm – or at the very least, 
avoid confirming – the negative stereotype (Spencer et al., 2016). Some researchers claim 
that this pressure may lead to the experience of anxiety, which subsequently disrupts 
performance (Steele, 2010; Wheeler & Petty, 2001). As Steele (2010) explained, those 
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being threatened “know at some level, that they are in a predicament: their performance 
could confirm a bad view of their group and of themselves, as members of that group” (p. 
59). Thus, those being threatened may experience anxiety, which undermines their 
performance, especially in cognitive tasks such as memory recall (Lamont et al., 2015). 
This is thought to occur through processes such as distraction derived from anxious 
thoughts, declines in attention, and reduced cognitive capability (Osborne, 2007).  
Multiple studies have corroborated this theory. Osborne (2007) conducted a study 
in which girls and boys completed two mathematics tests in either a high stereotype threat 
condition, in which they were told that “girls consistently do worse than boys” on the tests, 
or in a low stereotype threat condition, in which they were told that “these two tests have 
never shown gender differences” (p. 143). As the participants completed the task, 
physiological measures of anxiety (skin conductance, blood pressure, and skin 
temperature) were measured. It was found that girls performed much worse than boys on 
the task in the high-threat condition, but that girls and boys performed equally well in the 
low-threat condition. Moreover, it was found that the physiological reactance of girls in 
the high-threat condition was significantly more pronounced (e.g. increase in skin 
conductance, decrease in surface skin temperature, and increase in diastolic blood 
pressure) compared to males in the high-threat condition, and males and females in the 
low-threat condition.  
Another study provided further support for Steele’s (2010) claim that anxiety 
explains the link between stereotype threat and reduced task performance. Lu and 
colleagues (2015) found that stereotype threat indirectly led to poorer performance in 
females on a mathematics task, and that this link was mediated by self-reported anxiety. 
Furthermore, the link between stereotype threat and performance was also mediated by 
mind wandering, which refers to an individual engaging in thoughts unrelated to the task. 
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The mediation effects of anxiety and mind wandering were independent of each other, 
suggesting that stereotype threat produces both anxiety and mind wandering in stigmatised 
individuals which, in turn, impairs their task performance. Although the independence of 
these mediation effects fails to demonstrate causality between anxiety and mind 
wandering, Lu et al. (2015) suggested that anxiety may lead to the avoidance of processing 
of threatening stimuli.  
Tempel and Neumann (2014) investigated whether an interplay between enduring 
trait test anxiety and stereotype threat may affect women’s performance on a mathematics 
task. In this study, women were presented with a mathematics test in either a ‘stereotype 
denial’ condition (told that the stereotype about women being poorer than men at 
mathematics is incorrect) or a ‘stereotype threat’ condition (stereotype not mentioned in 
order to elicit the stereotype subtly). In both conditions, the women were asked to indicate 
their gender. A measure of test anxiety was used to assess the women’s trait (or chronic) 
anxiety about taking tests. Participants’ fear of the test was also measured immediately 
prior to the mathematics task, in order to measure their state (or situational) anxiety about 
taking the test. The results demonstrated that, whereas participants with high chronic test 
anxiety had low performance regardless of condition, participants with low chronic test 
anxiety performed less well in the stereotype threat condition than the stereotype denial 
condition. Equivalent results were found for state anxiety. Thus, stereotype threat only 
negatively influenced performance for those women who were low in test anxiety, 
effectively reducing their performance to the equivalence of women who were high in test 
anxiety. These results indirectly support the idea that stereotype threat may impair 
performance via similar mechanisms to test anxiety. 
However, research about anxiety as the main underlying mechanism of stereotype 
threat is mixed, with some other studies failing to demonstrate that anxiety mediates the 
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effects of stereotype threat on task performance (Hess, Hinson, & Hodges, 2009; Keller & 
Dauenheimer, 2003). Other research has shown that anxiety does underlie stereotype threat 
to an extent, but that it may be just one of many mediators of stereotype threat (Chung, 
Ehrhart, Holcombe-Ehrhart, Hattrup, & Solamon, 2010; Lu et al., 2015; Mrazek et al., 
2011).  
Another of the most prevalent theories attempting to explain the underlying 
mechanisms of stereotype threat is the cognitive load hypothesis (Schmader, Johns, & 
Forbes, 2008), which places more focus on the disruption of cognitive processing. The 
cognitive load hypothesis purports that, in accordance with the original suggestions of 
Steele and Aronson (1995), eliciting stereotypes about a target group leads its members to 
feel highly motivated to disconfirm the stereotype. Consequently, working memory and 
other cognitive resources are preferentially devoted to avoiding failure on the task and 
regulating feelings of frustration, which interrupts an individual’s ability to complete the 
test items successfully (Schamder et al., 2008).  
Findings from various experiments have supported this hypothesis. Schmader and 
Johns (2003) investigated whether stereotype threat did in fact lead to lowered working 
memory capacity in women on a stereotype-relevant task (a mathematics test). In this 
study, male and female participants were assigned either to a stereotype threat condition, 
in which the experimenter specifically related the task to mathematics and mentioned 
gender differences in mathematic ability, or to a control condition, in which the 
experimenter simply described the task as assessing working memory capacity. Male and 
female participants were then required to solve mathematical equations while 
simultaneously attempting to hold words in memory. The number of words recalled was 
used as a measure of working memory capacity. In line with the authors’ hypotheses, 
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stereotype threat had a detrimental effect on the female participants’ working memory 
capacities. 
Croizet et al. (2004) further investigated the idea that cognitive interference due to 
heightened mental workload would reduce performance on a task of intellectual ability. 
The authors recruited college students with either a psychology major or a science major to 
take part in the study and assigned them to one of two conditions, in which a cognitive test 
(Raven Advanced Progressive Matrices Test; Raven, 1962) was framed as either 
diagnostic or non-diagnostic of intellectual ability. It was hypothesised that, due to 
common stereotypes in France regarding psychology students being less intelligent than 
science students, framing a task as assessing intelligence would produce stereotype threat 
in psychology majors. While participants took the cognitive test, experimenters measured 
their Heart Rate Variability (HRV). HRV was used as a measure of mental load (with 
decreases reflecting increased mental load), as it has been shown to be a sensitive 
psychophysiological indicator of cognitive workload (Scerbo et al., 2001). Croizet and 
colleagues (2004) found that psychology majors experienced a disruptive mental load due 
to stereotype threat, and consequently exhibited poorer performance. Other research has 
since corroborated the idea that cognitive load is responsible for stereotype threat effects 
(e.g., Rydell, van Loo, & Boucher, 2014). 
Research has also been conducted to investigate whether particular coping 
mechanisms or dispositional factors of an individual might moderate the effects of 
stereotype threat on performance. In one study, the possible moderating effect of sense of 
humour on stereotype threat was investigated (Ford, Ferguson, Brooks, & Hagadone, 
2004). Women completed a mathematics test under one of two conditions. In the 
stereotype-threat condition, the experimenter described the test as a mathematics task that 
usually produces gender differences, whereas in the no-stereotype-threat condition, the test 
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was framed as a problem-solving task on which men and women usually perform equally. 
As expected, women performed worse in the stereotype-threat condition than in the no-
stereotype-threat condition. In the stereotype threat condition only, there was a positive 
relationship between participants’ coping sense of humour and their performance on the 
maths task. Thus, women who were higher in coping sense of humour did not show the 
typical response of reduced performance on a mathematics task in response to stereotype 
threat. Furthermore, in the stereotype threat condition, the relationship between coping 
sense of humour and math performance was mediated by state anxiety, suggesting that 
having a good sense of humour protected women from the anxiety that may result from 
stereotype threat. The authors suggested that perhaps such women viewed the task as a 
challenge, as opposed to a serious threat. 
 Von Hippel and colleagues (2005) proposed that certain people might utilise 
denial as a way of coping with stereotype threat. Specifically, they suggested that 
particular individuals might preserve their integrity by either denying that the negative 
stereotype is true, or denying that the stereotype is relevant to themselves. The authors 
hypothesized that people might be more likely to use denial as a coping strategy if they are 
high in chronic impression management – in other words, if they consistently emphasise 
their positive characteristics but deny their negative traits in order to portray a positive 
image to others. Over four different studies, von Hippel et al. (2005) investigated the 
relationship between stereotype threat, denial of the stereotype, and level of impression 
management in different groups (including African-Americans, older adults, and 
temporary employees). The analyses revealed that, when faced with stereotype threat, 
participants were more likely to deny incompetence in the stereotype-relevant domain 
(e.g., that older adults are cognitively inept) if they were more concerned about impression 
management. 
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Another study looked at the role of ‘defensive pessimism’ in stereotype threat 
effects (Perry & Skitka, 2009). Defensive pessimism was defined as when an individual 
ruminates about all the negative things that could go wrong in a particular situation or task, 
and sets lower standards for themselves than what they have achieved in the past. 
According to Perry and Skitka (2009), defensive pessimism is a strategy used to cope with 
academic stress, and is actually as effective as optimism or positive thinking. The authors 
found that women who were high in defensive pessimism performed better under high 
than low stereotype threat conditions on a difficult math test, whereas women who were 
low in defensive pessimism performed worse under high than low stereotype threat 
conditions. The authors suggested that ruminating may be a strategy to reduce anxiety for 
defensive pessimists, which may then reduce possible interfering effects of anxiety on 
performance. 
The difficulty of the stereotype-relevant task may also moderate stereotype threat 
effects. If the cognitive load hypothesis is correct, then performance on a task should be 
impaired by stereotype threat to a greater degree when the task requires a high level of 
cognitive resources, compared to tasks that require a lower level of cognitive resources 
(Nguyen & Ryan, 2008). Nguyen and Ryan’s (2008) meta-analysis indicated that test 
difficulty does appear to moderate stereotype threat effects on task performance, such that 
more difficult tasks are associated with larger effects. 
Another important factor that may moderate the effects of stereotype threat on task 
performance is the degree of identification with the relevant task domain. It is possible that 
only those who actually care about performing well on a task (and thus identify strongly 
with the task domain) are affected by stereotype threat (Steele, 1999). Indeed, Nguyen and 
Ryan’s (2008) meta-analysis found that, compared to women who identified strongly with 
the subject of mathematics, women who had low identification with mathematics were less 
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affected by stereotype threat relating to math performance (Nguyen & Ryan, 2008). 
However, the meta-analysis also revealed an interesting finding whereby highly-identified 
women were less affected by stereotype threat than moderately-identified women. Nguyen 
and Ryan (2008) suggested that this may be a result of highly-identified women displaying 
stereotype reactance, whereby explicit stereotype threat cues lead some individuals to 
defensively perform better on a task (Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001). 
Kray and colleagues (2001) first introduced the idea of stereotype reactance as an 
extension of ‘psychological reactance’, whereby people respond to perceived threats to 
their freedom with even greater assertion of their freedom (Brehm, 1966). For example, in 
the common case of a parent trying to tell a young child which clothes they should wear to 
school, the child may feel that the freedom to choose his or her own clothes is being 
threatened; thus, they may demonstrate reactance (Miron & Brehm, 2006). The 
phenomenon of psychological reactance is also apparent in the famous play by William 
Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, in which Romeo and Juliet’s families’ vehement 
disapproval of their partnership causes them to fall even deeper in love. 
With regards to stereotype threat, reactance against negative stereotypes may occur 
instead of confirmation under particular circumstances. Kray and colleagues (2001) 
posited that psychological reactance may be experienced when people are blatantly told 
that they will not perform well in a task as a consequence of their group membership, as 
opposed to when stereotypes about their group are invoked more subtly (such as framing a 
task in a particular way that favours one group over another, or reminding participants of 
stereotypes related to their abilities). Specifically, Kray et al. (2001) investigated whether 
blatant versus subtle stereotype threat manipulations would lead to different effects on 
women’s performance on a negotiations task, compared to men (who are widely believed 
to have superior negotiations skills). It was hypothesised that overtly telling women that 
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they were expected to perform worse than men on a negotiations task would actually 
enhance their performance through stereotype reactance. On the other hand, women’s 
performance was hypothesised to be poorer than that of men in response to a more subtle 
stereotype activation (i.e., simply framing the task as assessing negotiation skills), in line 
with the theory of stereotype threat. These hypotheses were indeed supported, showing 
that women reacted against the stereotype that was blatantly evoked and consequently 
performed better than men, but confirmed the stereotype when it was activated more 
subtly, performing worse than men.  
In line with Kray and colleagues’ (2001) findings, it has been suggested that subtle 
stereotype threat manipulations might be more effective than blatant, fact-based 
manipulations due to increased ambiguity about the accuracy of the stereotypes (e.g., are 
women truly worse than men at math?), which might subsequently divert an individual’s 
attention and focus to the stereotype (Lamont et al., 2015). As a result of an increase in 
distracting thoughts about the stereotype, one may experience a disruptive cognitive load 
(Schmader et al., 2008), resulting in deleterious stereotype threat effects (Lamont et al., 
2015). 
 
Effects of Negative Stereotypes on Older Adults’ Abilities 
Stereotype threat has not only been shown to affect people of a particular race or 
gender, but also affects older adults’ abilities. There are numerous negative stereotypes 
associated with aging. Meta-analyses have consistently found that people hold more 
negative attitudes towards older people than younger people (Kite & Johnson, 1988; Kite, 
Stockdale, Whitley Jr., & Johnson, 2005; North & Fiske, 2012). Negative attitudes and 
stereotypes commonly held include that attractiveness declines with age, that older adults 
are less competent than young adults, that older adults lack creativity, and that they are 
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less able than young people to learn new skills (Hummert, Garstka, Shaner, & Strahm, 
1994; Kite et al., 2005; Swift, Abrams, & Marques, 2013). Furthermore, it is often 
expected that older people will – at least to some extent – be lonelier (Pikhartova, 
Bowling, & Victor, 2016), that aging involves reductions in physical health (Robertson, 
Savva, King-Kallimanis, & Kenny, 2015), and that cognitive processes decline later in the 
lifespan (Lamont et al., 2015). Widespread ageism and negative stereotypes about age-
related declines have been found even in Eastern cultures, where people are traditionally 
expected to hold their elders in high regard (North & Fiske, 2015). 
Indeed, many expectations about aging are accurate to an extent; for example, 
aging is well known to be associated with physiological, cognitive, and some social 
declines. However, these deficits are often exacerbated by the extent to which one 
endorses age-related stereotypes (Wurm, Warner, Ziegelmann, Wolff, & Schüz, 2013) and 
the effects of stereotype threat (Lamont et al., 2015). Unlike an individual’s race or gender, 
which (in most cases) remain stable across their lifetime, the age group to which they 
belong is constantly changing. This makes ageism unique compared to racism or sexism, 
as nearly everybody from the ingroup (i.e., young adults) is highly likely to eventually join 
the outgroup (i.e., older adults; Cuddy & Fiske, 2002). Further, ageism appears to be less 
condemned or challenged by society compared to other “isms” (Cuddy & Fiske, 2002), 
and can function implicitly, or without one’s conscious awareness (Levy & Banaji, 2002; 
Levy, 2003). Thus, negative aging stereotypes that one might endorse as a young adult are 
likely to be strongly reinforced and internalised by the time one becomes an older adult 
(Levy, 2003). This suggests that older adults’ abilities might be affected by both their own 
self-stereotypes as well as stereotype threat. 
A number of studies have supported the hypothesis that older adults’ abilities and 
wellbeing are negatively affected by their own self-stereotypes. Pikhartova and colleagues 
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(2016) investigated whether people who believe old age to be a period of loneliness and 
think they will become lonelier with age actually experience more loneliness in later life 
than those who do not endorse these stereotypes. The authors’ findings demonstrated that 
agreeing with the statements, “As I get older I expect to get more lonely,” and, “Old age is 
a time of loneliness” was strongly associated with actual reported loneliness within the 
following 8 years, even when other variables such as depression, self-perceived age, and 
marital status were adjusted for. 
Another study investigated whether negative perceptions of aging were related to 
walking speed in middle aged and older adults (Robertson et al., 2015). Adults aged over 
50 were given the Aging Perceptions Questionnaire (B-APQ), on which they rated their 
agreement with positive items such as, “As I get older I continue to grow as a person”, and 
negative items such as, “Slowing down with age is not something I can control”. 
Participants also completed two Timed Up-and-Go (TUG) tasks – one as a baseline, and 
one at a follow-up two years later. The TUG task involved timing how long it took each 
participant to get up out of a chair, walk 3 metres at their usual pace, and walk back to sit 
down again. The results demonstrated that, even when controlling for baseline TUG and 
multiple other covariates, participants who had greater negative perceptions about aging 
had a greater decline in walking speed at follow-up than those with fewer negative 
perceptions. These studies indicate that older adults’ self-stereotypes about aging can have 
a negative effect on relevant tasks. 
However, older adults do not necessarily have to endorse negative stereotypes 
about aging in order to be affected by them. More central to the current research is the role 
of age-related stereotype threat, whereby older adults are simply reminded of commonly 
held negative aging stereotypes, on various processes and abilities. In one study, young 
and older adults were randomly assigned to either a positive or negative stereotyping 
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condition, in which they were presented with scientific evidence that either disconfirmed 
or supported negative stereotypes about aging, respectively, or to a control condition that 
did not involve the presentation of any evidence (Hess, Auman, Colcombe, & Rahhal, 
2003). The results showed that older participants in the negative stereotyping (i.e. 
stereotype threat) condition performed more poorly on a memory recall task, compared to 
younger participants, and also to older participants who were in the positive or control 
conditions. This indicated that simply making negative aging stereotypes salient was 
sufficient to produce performance decrements. 
Another study by Swift, Lamont, and Abrams (2012) investigated whether 
stereotype threat via comparisons with young adults would impact older adults’ hand grip 
strength. Before testing older adults’ hand grip, half of the participants were informed that 
the goal of the study was to compare older and young adults’ performance on various 
tasks, and that both older and young adults would be taking part in the study. In the control 
condition, participants were simply told that the purpose of the study was to see how 
people perform on different tasks. Indeed, the results showed that older adults’ 
performance on the hand grip strength task reduced by approximately 50% in the 
stereotype threat condition, compared to control. These results suggest that social 
comparisons with young adults can impair older adults’ performance even on a simple, 
objective task of physical strength.  
Stereotype threat has also been shown to impair older adults’ performance on 
cognitive tests commonly used to screen for predementia (Mazerolle et al., 2017). In one 
study, older adults were assigned to either a threat or a reduced-threat condition (Mazerolle 
et al., 2017). In the threat condition, participants were informed that memory was being 
assessed and that both young and older adults were participating. In the reduced-threat 
condition, participants received the same instructions but were told that young and older 
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adults usually perform equally well on the tests. The participants were then tested on both 
the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) and the 
Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA; Nasreddine et al., 2005). The authors found that 
older adults were more likely to meet criteria for a mild cognitive impairment in the threat 
condition (40% of participants) than in the reduced-threat condition (only 10% of 
participants). This finding has significant implications for the testing of older adults’ 
cognitive abilities in real-world environments and highlights the importance of minimising 
stereotype threat in settings where such testing takes place. 
One stereotype threat manipulation used by Desrichard and Köpetz (2005) 
involved framing a task in a way that was stereotype-relevant to older adults (i.e., would 
rely on an ability that is expected to decline with age) versus framing it in a way that 
would not elicit negative stereotypes about aging. Participants were asked to complete a 
“running an errand” task (Radziskewska & Rogoff, 1991), which involved memorising a 
list of shop items and then, without viewing the list, using a map to work out the quickest 
way of getting from shop to shop to purchase each item. Before completing this task, 
participants were either told that the task relies on memory skills (which was expected to 
produce stereotype threat in older adults), or that it relies on orientation skills. The authors 
found that older adults’ performance on the errand task was much poorer when it was 
framed as a memory task, compared to when it was framed as an orientation task. In 
contrast, young adults’ performance did not differ between the two conditions. These 
results suggested that making the task relevant to stereotypes about age-related memory 
decline led to feelings of stereotype threat in older adults, which subsequently further 
impaired their memory performance. 
Age-related stereotype threat has now been demonstrated by numerous studies to 
affect older adults’ performance within many different task domains. Stereotype threat has 
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been shown to reduce older adults’ self-reported hearing (Barber & Lee, 2016), their 
driving ability and confidence (Chapman, Sargent-Cox, Horswill, & Anstey, 2016; 
Lambert et al., 2016), and their learning of maps (Meneghetti et al., 2015). Lamont and 
colleagues (2015) conducted a review and meta-analysis of the effects of age-related 
stereotype threat on memory, cognitive, and physical processes in older adults. The 
analysis, which included 22 published and 10 unpublished articles, demonstrated a robust 
and significant small-to-medium effect of age-related stereotype threat (Lamont et al., 
2015). This research was further corroborated by a subsequent meta-analysis, which 
demonstrated that age-related stereotype threat reliably reduced older adults’ episodic and 
working memory (Armstrong et al., 2017). 
In addition, Lamont and colleagues (2015) found that older adults were more 
susceptible to age-related stereotype threat when studies used stereotype-based 
manipulations (e.g. using subtle cues such as comparing age groups, or informing 
participants that older adults are widely believed to be worse at the task) as opposed to 
fact-based manipulations (e.g. telling participants that there is evidence to show that 
memory performance declines with age). As previously described, more blatant, fact-based 
manipulations occasionally lead to the phenomenon of stereotype reactance, whereby 
people attempt to disprove the evidence that they have been given, and deliberately engage 
in behaviour contrary to the stereotype (Kray et al., 2001; Lamont et al., 2015). 
Another way that performance may be enhanced rather than impaired by 
stereotypes is a potential “stereotype boost” effect, produced by evoking positive 
stereotypes about aging. Swift and colleagues (2013) investigated whether invoking 
positive stereotypes causes older adults to perform better on cognitive tasks. Indeed, there 
are many positive characteristics associated with aging, with older adults often being 
perceived to be wiser, more knowledgeable, and to have more life experience than young 
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adults (Swift et al., 2013). Thus, Swift and colleagues (2013) emphasised these 
characteristics in a stereotype boost condition, telling older adults that, “It is widely 
assumed that experience and wisdom increases with age so that people become better at 
solving all kinds of everyday practical problems” (pp. 26). They also included a typical 
stereotype threat condition – in which they told participants that it is widely assumed that 
cognitive performance declines with age – as well as a control condition.  
Participants were then tested on a battery of cognitive tasks, including tasks that 
assessed working memory, as well as a crossword puzzle – a task on which older adults 
are often assumed to perform well. It was found that the stereotype threat condition led to 
decreased performance compared to the control condition, on both the cognitive tasks and 
the crossword puzzle – an effect that was mediated by anxiety. In contrast, the stereotype 
boost condition lead to augmented performance on the crossword puzzle. However, the 
boost condition did not increase performance on the cognitive tasks. It is possible that 
enhancing older adults’ performance by invoking positive stereotypes is only successful 
for task domains in which older adults are expected to be competent. 
Shapiro and Neuberg’s Multi-Threat Framework 
The way in which stereotype threat is experienced may differ depending on both 
the situation, and who is experiencing the threat. A female taking a mathematics test may 
differ from an older adult taking a test of cognitive ability with regard to the extent to 
which the stereotype threat interferes with their performance on these tasks, the underlying 
mechanisms of stereotype threat, and the factors that moderate the effect of stereotype 
threat on performance (Nguyen & Ryan, 2008; Barber, 2017). Indeed, Nguyen and Ryan’s 
(2008) meta-analysis demonstrated that, when tasks were difficult, reductions in test 
performance due to stereotype threat were smaller for women than for racial minorities. 
For women, task performance was most affected by subtle stereotype threat manipulations, 
CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 32 
followed by blatant and moderately explicit threat manipulations, whereas minorities’ 
performance was most affected by moderately explicit threat manipulations, followed by 
blatant and subtle manipulations. Therefore, while many researchers discuss stereotype 
threat as though it were a stable phenomenon that works via the same mechanisms for 
different stereotyped groups and across various tasks, it may not be so clear-cut (Nguyen 
& Ryan, 2008).  
In an attempt to conceptualise and explain the existence of multiple forms of 
stereotype threat, Shapiro and Neuberg (2007) proposed a multi-threat framework 
involving six qualitatively different types of stereotype threat: Self-concept threat, Group-
concept threat, Own-reputation threat (outgroup), Group-reputation threat (outgroup), 
Own-reputation threat (ingroup), and Group-reputation threat (ingroup). These six types of 
stereotype threat are the result of two factors: 1) whether an individual is worried about 
confirming stereotypes about themselves personally, or their group as a whole (i.e. threat 
target), and 2) whether an individual is worried about judgement from themselves, the 
outgroup, or the ingroup (i.e. threat source). Table 1 outlines the possible types of 
stereotype threat according to Shapiro and Neuberg (2007), and includes descriptive 
examples of each type using the illustrative case of a female taking a mathematics test 
under stereotype threat. 
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Table 1.  
Six Qualitatively Different Types of Stereotype Threat (Depending on the Perceived 
Target and Source of the Threat; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2007) 
Type of 




threat Self Self 
A female worries that, if she 
performs poorly on a maths test, it 
will confirm to herself that she 
personally has the stereotyped trait 
(poor math ability) 
Group-concept 
threat Group Self 
A female worries that poor math 
performance will confirm to herself 
that the stereotype trait is true of her 
group (females in general) 
Own-reputation 
threat (outgroup) Self 
Outgroup 
members 
A female worries that poor math 
performance will confirm to 
outgroup members (males) that she 
personally has the stereotype trait, 
and that this will lead to judgement 
from males 
Group-reputation 
threat (outgroup) Group 
Outgroup 
members 
A female worries that poor math 
performance will confirm to 
outgroup members (males) that the 
stereotyped trait is true of her group 
(females), and that this will lead to 
judgement from males 
Own-reputation 
threat (ingroup) Self 
Ingroup 
members 
A female worries that poor math 
performance will confirm to ingroup 
members (other females) that she 
personally has the stereotyped trait, 
and that this will lead to judgement 
from other females 
Group reputation 
threat (ingroup) Group 
Ingroup 
members 
A female worries that poor math 
performance will confirm to ingroup 
members (other females) that the 
stereotyped trait is true of her group 
(females), and that this will lead to 
judgement from females against 
their own group (i.e. conceding that 
they are indeed worse than males at 
math) 
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Although Shapiro and Neuberg (2007) proposed that there are six distinct types of 
stereotype threat, they do not necessarily occur independently of one another. In some 
cases, a group member might experience only one of the six types of stereotype threat. For 
example, if an individual wants to do well on a test for their own benefit and does not care 
how others perceive them, they might only experience “self-concept” threat. However, it is 
also possible for a group member to experience two or more (and perhaps even all six) of 
the stereotype threat types, particularly if they identify strongly with their group and the 
task domain (Shapiro & Neuberg, 2007).  
Building on this multi-threat framework, Barber (2017) argued that the type of 
stereotype threat experienced by older adults with regard to cognitive decline is likely to 
be a combination of “self-concept” and “own-reputation” stereotype threat. Most people 
begin developing and internalising negative stereotypes about aging in childhood but are 
not threatened by them since they are not relevant to the self (Barber, 2017). People do not 
become part of the stigmatised older age group until later in life, making this stereotyped 
trait unique compared to stable traits such as race and gender. This also means that the 
negative aging stereotypes people have developed from childhood have usually been 
deeply ingrained by the time they become self-relevant. Therefore, older adults may be 
particularly vulnerable to “self-concept” stereotype threat, as they should be worried that 
the negative aging stereotypes they have long endorsed are now true of them personally 
(Barber, 2017).  
In addition, many older adults have low identification with being “old”, and instead 
usually report feeling younger than they are (Neugarten & Hagestad, 1976; Rubin & 
Bernsten, 2006; Barber, 2017). Older adults can maintain these subjective feelings of 
being younger by making downward comparisons with other people their age (e.g., 
believing their own abilities are better than other ingroup members), and with negative 
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aging stereotypes (e.g., believing that their abilities are better than is expected according to 
ageist stereotypes), which can actually result in these stereotypes being reinforced even 
further (Barber, 2017). Because group identification with the “older” age group is usually 
low, older adults are less likely to experience “group-reputation threat”, and instead are 
more likely to experience “own-reputation threat”, where they worry that the negative 
stereotypes about cognitive decline with age are true of themselves, and may lead to 
judgment from ingroup or outgroup members. Thus, Barber (2017) concluded that older 
adults are most likely to experience self-concept, own-reputation stereotype threat when it 
comes to cognitive ability (although this is not necessarily true for all older adults).  
In response to the self-concept, own-reputation stereotype threat that older adults 
may be most likely to experience, they might preferentially adopt a prevention focus, 
whereby they attempt to avoid taking any risks that may lead to them performing poorly 
on cognitive tasks (Barber, 2017). Regulation focus theory is premised on people’s innate 
motivations to approach pleasure and avoid pain, which are implemented as two distinct 
behavioural foci: promotion and prevention (Higgins, 1997). A promotion focus 
emphasises advancement and achieving gains, whereas a prevention focus emphasises 
safety and avoiding losses (Higgins, 1997; Crowe & Higgins, 1997). Barber (2017) 
suggested that older adults are more likely to adopt such a prevention focus in response to 
stereotype threat because they become motivated to avoid doing badly and thus confirming 
negative stereotypes about their group (Barber, 2017). 
However, certain tasks are more compatible with either a promotion or prevention 
focus, and adopting the wrong type of focus can itself lead to poor performance (Barber & 
Mather, 2013; Higgins, 2000). While rewards-based tasks are more suited to a promotion 
focus, losses-based tasks are more compatible with a prevention focus (Barber, Mather & 
Gatz, 2015). Shah, Higgins, and Friedman (1998) demonstrated that people with a chronic 
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promotion focus performed better than those with a prevention focus on an anagram task 
framed in terms of gains (i.e. performing well led to a monetary reward), but the opposite 
was true when the task was framed in terms of losses (i.e. performing well avoided the loss 
of money; Shah et al., 1998). The compatibility – or lack thereof – between a task and the 
focus adopted by an individual (either chronically or temporary), is known as regulatory 
‘fit’ (Higgins, 2000). 
Most cognitive tasks require a promotion focus, due to gains being emphasised 
(e.g. correctly recalling as many items as possible in a memory test; Barber et al., 2015; 
Barber, 2017). Therefore, when older adults adopt a prevention focus in response to 
stereotype threat, in an attempt to avoid confirming negative aging stereotypes, there is 
often a lack of regulatory fit with the task they are completing (Barber, 2017). In other 
words, because older adults have switched to a prevention focus on a task that requires a 
promotion focus, they end up performing poorly, despite the motivation to avoid doing so 
(Barber, 2017). 
Accordingly, changing the task to fit a prevention focus may prevent older adults 
from performing poorly when aging stereotypes are elicited. Barber and Mather (2013) 
adapted a memory task so that, in one condition, correct recall led to gains (for each word 
participants recalled, they received 2 poker chips), and in the other, forgetting led to losses 
(for each word participants forgot, 3 poker chips were subtracted from an initial 100). In 
the first task, which fits best with a promotion focus, stereotype threat reduced older 
adults’ performance, presumably because they switched to a prevention focus, thus 
diminishing regulatory fit (Barber & Mather, 2013). In the second task, which fits better 
with a prevention focus, stereotype threat actually improved older adults’ performance 
because regulatory fit was achieved (Barber & Mather, 2013). Therefore, older adults may 
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only be affected by stereotype threat when the task has an implicit or explicit promotion 
focus.  
Barber (2017) suggested that this regulatory focus framework might be a better 
explanation for age-related stereotype threat effects on older adults’ cognitive ability, as 
opposed to mechanisms that have been theorised to underlie race-based or gender-based 
stereotype threat, such as an increased cognitive load. Barber and Mather (2014) reviewed 
the mixed research regarding how stereotype threat affects older adults’ cognitive abilities. 
They acknowledged that the research remains inconsistent, and that there were indeed 
some studies that supported the cognitive load hypothesis in relation to age-related 
stereotype threat. One study demonstrated that stereotype threat impaired older adults’ 
controlled use of memory, but not their automatic recall (Mazerolle, Régner, Morisset, 
Rigalleau, & Huguet, 2012). Mazerolle and colleagues (2012) suggested that, as a result of 
stereotype threat, older adults experienced an increased cognitive load that was detrimental 
only to memory processes that rely greatly on cognitive resources.  
However, Barber and Mather (2014) discussed opposing evidence that cognitive 
load may not explain age-related stereotype threat effects to the same extent that it 
explains stereotype threat effects in younger populations. Hess et al. (2009) found no 
evidence to suggest that stereotype threat affects older adults through increased working 
memory or load. As part of their study, young-old adults (aged 60-70 years) and old-old 
adults (aged 71-82 years) completed a computation span task under either stereotype threat 
conditions, in which participants were informed that the task assessed memory ability and 
that age differences were being investigated, or a nonthreat condition, in which 
participants were told that the test was age fair. The results showed that there were no 
interaction effects involving stereotype threat condition on young-old or old-old adults’ 
working memory performance.  
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Popham and Hess (2013) reported further evidence for the idea that, whereas 
stereotype threat might affect young adults via increased cognitive load, stereotype threat 
might affect older adults via prompting the adoption of a prevention focus when a 
promotion focus is optimal. In their study, young and older adults were subject to different 
stereotype threat manipulations prior to completing a letter cancellation task and an 
operation span task. For young adults, who were students majoring in subjects other than 
engineering, the threat manipulation involved implying that engineering students would 
perform better than them on the tasks. For older adults, the threat manipulation involved 
implying that young adults would have superior task performance to themselves.  
With regards to the operation span task, the results demonstrated that young adults’ 
working memory performance was impaired under threat conditions, whereas older adults’ 
working memory was not, supporting the idea that stereotype threat may increase 
cognitive load for young, but not older, adults. Furthermore, on the letter cancellation task, 
both young and older adults’ performance was affected by stereotype threat (although this 
effect was far greater for older adults). Older adults’ reductions in letter cancellation 
performance appeared to be consistent with the regulatory focus theory, as their speed on 
the task was significantly lower and thus reflected a more risk-averse (and possibly 
prevention-focussed) approach. Of note, however, the same (but weaker) pattern was seen 
for younger adults.  
Taking this previous research into account, Barber (2017) proposed that, rather 
than increased cognitive load or working memory resources, regulatory focus theory may 
be the mechanism that underlies age-related stereotype threat effects for most older adults. 
If her suggestion is correct, and stereotype threat impairs older adults’ cognitive abilities 
by causing them to adopt a prevention focus when a promotion focus is optimal, then 
stereotype threat might also affect older adults’ ability to recognise emotions. Emotion 
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recognition is a cognitive ability that is known to decline with age (Gonçalves et al., 2018; 
Ruffman et al., 2008), and that requires a promotion focus in most emotion recognition 
paradigms, with gains usually being emphasised (i.e. asking participants to correctly label 
as many emotion expressions as possible).  
Indeed, research has supported the idea that emotion recognition may benefit from 
a promotion focus (Sassenrath, Sassenberg, Ray, Scheiter, & Jarodzka, 2014). Sassenrath 
and colleagues (2014) were the first to investigate the relationship between regulatory 
focus and facial emotion recognition. They hypothesized that emotion recognition would 
be facilitated by a promotion focus, since well-learned skills and tasks (like emotion 
recognition) usually require less monitoring. In their study, Sassenrath et al. (2014) 
experimentally manipulated the regulatory focus of undergraduate students. In a promotion 
focus condition, participants were asked to recall promotion-type successes and failures, 
whereas in a prevention focus condition, they were asked to recall prevention-type 
successes and failures. Participants then completed a basic emotion recognition task that 
required them to label facial expressions of happiness, sadness, fear, and anger. In line 
with their hypothesis, the authors found that promotion-focused students were more 
accurate at recognising emotions than prevention-focused students. 
Thus, a prevention focus may not be optimal for emotion recognition (Sassenrath et 
al., 2014), and if raising negative stereotypes about age-related cognitive decline leads 
older adults to adopt a prevention focus (Barber, 2017), their emotion recognition 
performance may consequently be further impaired. If this is the case, then age-related 
stereotype threat might partially explain empirical findings that older adults are less 
accurate than older adults at recognising emotions. Given that no research has yet 
investigated this possibility, the primary objective of the current thesis was to discover 
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whether older adults’ emotion recognition, like other cognitive abilities, is affected by age-
related stereotype threat.  
 
Summary of the Literature 
The ability to recognise emotions from other people’s faces, bodies, and voices, is 
an important cognitive ability that is integral to human social interaction. However, this 
ability has consistently been shown to decline with age (Gonçalves et al., 2018; Ruffman 
et al., 2008). Researchers have yet to reach a conclusive answer or consensus about the 
aetiology of this age-related decline in emotion recognition. It may be caused by one or a 
combination of a positivity effect, the cognitive decline that occurs with normal aging, 
neural changes within the brain (Ruffman et al., 2008), an own-age bias (Holland et al., 
2018), or the absence of context inherent in many typical emotion recognition paradigms 
(Noh & Isaacowitz, 2013). However, another factor that may have exaggerated differences 
in emotion recognition between young and older adults is a well-known phenomenon 
known as stereotype threat. 
Stereotype threat refers to the feeling that one is at risk of confirming stereotypes 
about a group to which one belongs, which often leads one to suffer impairments on 
stereotype-relevant tasks (Steele, 2010). Stereotype threat effects have been widely 
demonstrated in such areas as women’s mathematics performance (Doyle & Voyer, 2016), 
African-Americans’ academic test performance (Nguyen & Ryan, 2008), and importantly 
for the current research, older adults’ cognitive abilities (Armstrong et al., 2017; Lamont et 
al., 2015). Whereas race-based and gender-based stereotype threat effects have been 
theorised to occur via affective and/or cognitive mechanisms (such as anxiety or cognitive 
load), age-related stereotype threat might involve different mechanisms (Barber & Mather, 
2014). Barber (2017) proposed that stereotype threat causes older adults to adopt a 
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prevention focus, where they aim to avoid failure, which in turn, leads to impairments on 
cognitive tasks that require a promotion focus (i.e., aiming to achieve successes). Emotion 
recognition is one such cognitive ability that, like memory, benefits from a promotion 
focus (Sassenrath et al., 2014) and declines with age (Ruffman et al., 2008). Thus, it is 
possible that age-related stereotype threat further impairs older adults’ recognition of 
emotion. 
 
Potential Age-Related Stereotype Threat Effects on Older Adults’ Emotion 
Recognition Ability: The Present Research and Possible Implications 
Eliciting stereotypes about aging has been shown to produce stereotype threat in 
older adults, which subsequently negatively impacts their performance on stereotype-
relevant tasks involving cognition, physical tasks, and memory (Lamont et al., 2015). This 
empirical finding has important implications both for older adults’ everyday life and for 
laboratory research. Firstly, older adults may frequently be exposed to stereotypes about 
aging in their daily life, including through the media and through the manner in which 
other people act towards them. These everyday cues may emulate a stereotype threat 
effect, consequently worsening age-related cognitive and memory deficits (Hess et al., 
2003). On the other hand, this also implies that minimising aging stereotypes and reducing 
the number of aging cues in an environment may help to preserve certain abilities in older 
adults (Hess et al., 2003). 
Moreover, findings about age-related stereotype threat effects on older adults’ 
memory and cognitive functioning indicate that previous laboratory-demonstrated memory 
deficits in older adults may have been exaggerated (Hess et al., 2003). Age-related 
stereotype cues that might reduce older adults’ performance are often evident in studies 
that assess age differences. Simply using task instructions that emphasise abilities that 
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decline with age (Rahhal, Hasher, & Colcombe, 2001) or informing older participants that 
they are being compared with younger adults (Abrams et al., 2006) can produce stereotype 
threat effects. Therefore, it is possible that age-related declines in memory are not as 
extreme as has been demonstrated in laboratory settings and may partially reflect 
stereotype threat effects rather than being exclusively due to true age differences. 
Another aspect of cognitive functioning that may be susceptible to age-related 
stereotype threat impairments is emotion recognition ability. The recognition of emotions 
in faces, body language, and tone of voice, has been empirically demonstrated to decline 
with age, with older adults reliably performing worse than young adults when recognising 
anger, fear, sadness, and happiness (Ruffman et al., 2008). However, as with memory and 
other cognitive abilities, it is possible that age-related differences in emotion recognition 
ability have been exaggerated by stereotype threat. According to Barber (2017), stereotype 
threat might lead older adults to adopt a prevention focus, which can impair their 
performance on cognitive tasks that require a promotion focus (such as emotion 
recognition; Sassenrath et al., 2014). Thus, raising stereotypes about aging may impair 
older adults’ emotion recognition ability. If this were the case, it would have important 
implications for past and future laboratory research into older adults’ emotion recognition 
ability. 
A potential limitation of many studies that compare young adults and older adults 
is the participants’ knowledge of such comparisons. The mere fact that age differences are 
being examined in a particular study may be sufficient to evoke stereotype threat. Indeed, 
numerous studies have used stereotype threat manipulations of which a large (or the only) 
component is informing participants that young and older adults are being compared (e.g. 
Abrams et al., 2006; Abrams et al., 2008; Swift et al., 2012). These manipulations were 
effective in that older adults’ performance on cognitive and physical tasks was reduced 
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when they were informed about the age comparison, compared to control (Abrams et al., 
2006; Abrams et al., 2008; Swift et al., 2012). 
It follows, then, that studies that have investigated age-related differences on 
emotion recognition tasks – and have informed their participants of this – may have 
unknowingly evoked stereotype threat. For instance, in one study that investigated age 
differences in accuracy and reaction times on an emotion recognition task, participants 
were first advised that “young and older adult’s perceptual judgements in response to 
visual stimuli” were being compared (Keightley, Winocur, Burianova, Hongwanishkul, & 
Grady, 2006). This may have elicited stereotype threat, as it is generally accepted that 
people’s cognitive faculties decline with age (Lamont et al., 2015). As a consequence, the 
study’s finding that older adults were poorer than young adults at correctly identifying fear 
and sadness could possibly have been exaggerated. 
If emotion recognition abilities are affected by aging stereotypes, this would also 
have important implications for older adults’ everyday life. Exposure to frequent cues 
about aging in their environment – in addition to potentially ageist behaviour from other 
people – may worsen older adults’ ability to recognise emotions expressed by others, 
which could have detrimental effects on their capacity to effectively communicate and 
interact with people in social situations. Such detrimental effects would be significant 
considering longitudinal research showing that deficits in social connection and 
engagement in older age are associated with greater cognitive decline (Evans, Martyr, 
Collins, Brayne, & Clare, 2018; Kelly et al., 2017; Seeman, Lusignolo, Albert, & 
Berkman, 2001; Zunzunegui, Alvarado, Del Ser, & Otero, 2003). 
The overarching objective of the present research was to investigate whether older 
adults’ emotion recognition ability, like other cognitive abilities, is impaired by age-related 
stereotype threat. This was explored across three studies. The first study involved 
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comparing the effects of a stereotype threat manipulation on young (aged 18-30 years) and 
older (aged over 65 years) adults’ emotion recognition ability. Participants were assigned 
to one of three conditions (two experimental, one control). In both experimental 
conditions, they were informed that young and older adults were being compared, whereas 
participants were not told this in the control condition. Furthermore, in an ‘older threat’ 
condition, participants were told that older adults are widely believed to be worse at 
recognising emotions, while in a ‘young threat’ condition, they were told that young adults 
are commonly believed to be worse. In the control condition, there was no mention of age-
related differences in emotion recognition ability.  
Participants completed two tasks; one involving the basic recognition of emotions 
in faces, and another involving the recognition of complex mental states expressed by 
photos of eyes. In keeping with prior research, it was expected that older adults would be 
less accurate than young adults at recognising basic emotions and mental states. More 
importantly, it was hypothesised that, as a result of commonly held stereotypes that 
cognitive abilities decline with age, eliciting stereotypes about age-related deficits in 
emotion recognition would cause older adults to feel threatened. As a result of these 
feelings of stereotype threat, older adults’ emotion recognition accuracy was expected to 
be reduced. On the other hand, because young adults are not the target of stereotypes about 
age-related cognitive decline, they were not expected to be threatened by the stereotype 
threat manipulation (and therefore, their emotion recognition accuracy was expected to 
remain unaffected). 
As will be discussed in depth in upcoming chapters, the stereotype threat 
manipulation in Study 1 did not have the expected effect on older adults’ feelings of threat, 
nor their emotion recognition ability. This raised questions about whether lay people 
perceive emotion recognition to be a cognitive task, or whether they view it more as a 
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social task. If people generally perceive emotion recognition to be a cognitive task, then 
implying that older adults should be worse at recognising emotions would be expected to 
produce stereotype threat effects due to stereotypes about age-related cognitive decline 
(Prohaska, Parham, & Teitelman, 1984; Singer, 1986; Swift et al., 2013). However, if lay 
people view emotion recognition more as a social task, age-related stereotype threat might 
not be successful in producing stereotype threat since older adults are often expected to be 
equally good as young adults in social domains (e.g., Swift et al., 2013). Furthermore, it is 
possible that there are not widely held beliefs that emotion recognition declines with age, 
despite the empirical research demonstrating such a decline.  
To address these questions, the second study aimed to clarify the current status of 
age-based stereotypes in a western society (United States of America). The primary aim of 
this exploration was to discover whether people view emotion recognition more as a 
cognitive or social task, and whether there is indeed a widely held belief among lay people 
that emotion recognition deteriorates with age. To my knowledge, there has not yet been 
any research investigating stereotypes about young and older adults’ abilities to recognise 
emotions. Therefore, young (aged 18-30 years), middle-older (aged 50-64 years), and 
older (aged over 65 years) adults were asked to complete a questionnaire regarding the 
competencies of a typical 25-year-old compared to a typical 75-year-old, in a number of 
skill areas (including emotion recognition, cognitive tasks, and social interaction).  
Another objective of the second study was to investigate the effect of participants’ 
own perceptions of aging on their emotion recognition ability. Stereotypes that people hold 
about aging inevitably become self-stereotypes with age, and therefore might negatively 
affect certain abilities in a similar way to experimentally inducing stereotype threat. 
Indeed, more negative perceptions about aging have been shown to predict declines in 
memory and verbal fluency in older adults (Levy, 2003; Robertson, King-Kallimanis, & 
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Kenny, 2016). Therefore, to investigate whether more negative perceptions about aging 
were associated with reduced emotion recognition in older adults, participants’ perceptions 
of aging were measured (using the Brief Aging Perceptions Questionnaire; Sexton, King-
Kallimanis, Morgan, & McGee, 2014). All participants completed a dynamic, multimodal 
emotion recognition task (the GERT-S, described previously).  
Finally, a third study is reported, which implemented a subtle stereotype threat 
manipulation based on the prevalent aging stereotypes ascertained in Study 2. Because 
cognitive abilities are believed to decline with age, it was considered that framing an 
emotion recognition task as assessing cognitive ability might produce stereotype threat in 
older adults, consequently disrupting their emotion recognition performance. Previous 
research has demonstrated that framing tasks as measuring an ability known to decline 
with age (e.g., memory) can, in fact, negatively affect older adults’ performance on 
relevant tasks (Desrichard & Köpetz, 2005).  
In this study, young (aged 18-30) and older (aged over 65) adults were assigned to 
one of three conditions. In the ‘cognitive’ condition, participants were informed that the 
study aimed to assess young and older adults’ cognitive abilities. In the ‘social’ condition, 
the study was framed as assessing young and older adults’ social ability. Finally, in the 
control condition, participants were given a generalised explanation that the study was 
assessing different types of people’s abilities in various domains. All participants then 
completed the GERT-S. They also completed a measure of identification with their age 
group, to see whether the degree of age group identification moderated stereotype threat 
effects, in line with previous research showing this to be the case (e.g., Deaux et al., 2007; 
Kang & Chasteen, 2009; Schmader, 2002). 
It was expected that framing emotion recognition as a cognitive task would 
produce feelings of stereotype threat in older adults, which would in turn impair their 
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emotion recognition ability. In contrast, it was hypothesised that older adults would not 
feel threatened in the control condition, nor in the social condition since many social 
abilities are believed to be preserved over the lifespan (Blanchard-Fields, 2007; Swift et 
al., 2013). As a result, it was expected that emotion recognition ability would remain 
unaffected in these conditions. It was also considered possible that age group identification 
might moderate the hypothesised effects in this study. 
As in the first study, it was expected that, because young adults are not the target of 
negative aging stereotypes about cognitive or social decline, their self-reported threat 
concerns and emotion recognition performance would not differ between conditions. In the 
same vein, it was also expected that age group identification would not have any effect 
(moderating or otherwise) on young adults’ emotion recognition performance. The 
following three chapters provide further detail on each study conducted as part of this 
thesis and summarise the results of each. The final chapter includes a full discussion of the 
integrated results and their implications.








Study One: The Effect of Stereotype Threat on Older Adults’ Emotion 
Recognition Ability 
 
Humans inevitably experience declines in physical functioning, memory, and 
cognitive ability with age. However, these age-related declines can be exacerbated by 
stereotype threat, whereby eliciting stereotypes about a certain group often leads to its 
members experiencing performance deficits on relevant tasks (Steele, 2010). Generally, 
people believe that older adults have worse cognitive ability than young adults (Prohaska 
et al., 1984; Singer, 1986; Swift et al., 2013), and this belief can further impair older 
adults’ performance across a range of cognitive tasks. Indeed, Lamont and colleagues’ 
(2015) meta-analysis demonstrated a significant and robust effect of age-related stereotype 
threat on older adults’ performance on various memory and cognitive tasks, including 
mathematics, letter cancellation, and mental rotation. 
To date, no research has considered the effects of stereotype threat on another 
cognitive ability that is subject to decline with age – emotion recognition. The ability to 
recognise emotions, particularly from facial expressions (but also from body language and 
tone of voice), has been shown to decline in adults aged over 60 (Ruffman et al., 2008). 
Older adults are significantly worse than young adults at recognising anger, fear, and 
sadness, in particular (Gonçalves et al., 2018; Ruffman et al., 2008). Emotion recognition 
is a complex cognitive task that involves attention, perception, evaluation, and labelling of 
emotional expressions (Adolphs, 2002). As older adults are generally believed to be worse 
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than young adults on cognitive tasks, it is highly plausible that eliciting stereotypes about 
age-related declines in emotion recognition may lead to older adults performing worse at 
recognising facially-expressed emotions.  
The present study aimed to explore the potential effects of stereotype threat on 
older adults’ emotion recognition ability using a stereotype threat manipulation based on 
the method implemented by Swift et al. (2013). Young adults (aged 18-30 years) and older 
adults (aged over 65 years) were assigned to one of three stereotype threat conditions: 
‘older threat’, ‘young threat’, or control. Participants in the ‘older threat’ condition were 
told that “it is widely believed that the ability to recognise emotions declines with age” and 
that “the purpose of this study is to see whether older people do perform more poorly on 
emotion recognition tasks than young people.” Participants in the ‘young threat’ condition 
were told that “it is widely believed that the ability to recognise emotions increases with 
age,” and that the aim of the study was to “see whether older people do perform better on 
emotion recognition tasks than young people.”  In the control condition, there were no 
references to comparing young and older adults or investigating age differences in emotion 
recognition. 
Before completing the emotion recognition tasks, participants’ state anxiety was 
measured with the brief state scale of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; 
Marteau & Bekker, 1992), as situational anxiety caused by stereotype threat is one 
possible mechanism underlying performance deficits on stereotype-relevant tasks (e.g., 
Abrams et al., 2006). All participants then completed a basic emotion recognition task, 
which involved selecting an emotion label (from five options: disgust, anger, sadness, fear, 
happiness) that best described the emotion expressed by a number of young and older 
faces. Given that previous research has shown that older adults may have compromised 
theory of mind, participants also completed the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test 
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(RMET; described in the General Introduction). Following these tasks, participants were 
asked two questions to measure how threatened they had felt (“Were you worried that your 
ability to perform well on these tasks was affected by your age?” and “Were you worried 
that if you performed poorly on the test, the researcher would attribute your poor 
performance to your age?”; see Gaillard, Desmette, & Keller, 2011).  
Because older adults are generally expected to be worse than young adults at 
completing cognitive tasks, and have been shown to be poorer at recognising emotions, it 
was hypothesised that mentioning stereotypes about age-related declines in emotion 
recognition would cause older adults to report heightened levels of stereotype threat, and 
possibly increased state anxiety. As a consequence, it was expected that they would 
experience performance deficits on the emotion recognition task and RMET. Specifically, 
it was hypothesised that older adults would exhibit higher levels of stereotype threat and 
state anxiety, but lowered accuracy on the emotion recognition task and RMET, in the 
‘older threat’ condition compared to the ‘young threat’ and control conditions.  
In contrast, it was hypothesised that young adults’ performance on the basic 
emotion recognition task would not be affected by stereotype threat condition. In order to 
elicit feelings of stereotype threat, the target must be a part of the stigmatized group and 
must be aware of the relevant stereotypes about them (Steele, 2010). Because young adults 
are expected to be superior to older adults when completing cognitive tasks, and are better 
than older adults at recognising emotions, they should theoretically be immune to the 
stereotype threat manipulation. Specifically, it was hypothesised that young adults’ overt 
reports of stereotype threat, self-reported state anxiety, and their performance on the 
emotion recognition task and RMET, would remain consistent across the three conditions. 
 
 





After exclusion criteria were applied (see Results section), the participants included 
72 young adults (38 male) aged 18-29 (M = 20.61 years, SD = 2.26 years) and 83 older 
adults (42 male) aged 65-90 (M = 72.43 years, SD = 4.98 years). Young participants were 
recruited through the University of Otago’s Psychology Research Participation website 
and were reimbursed $15 for their out-of-pocket and travel expenses, or participated to 
satisfy a small part of their first- or second-year Psychology course assessment at 
University of Otago. Older participants were recruited through a database of volunteers 
who have offered to participate in research within the University of Otago’s Department of 
Psychology and were reimbursed $20 for their out-of-pocket and travel expenses. All 
participants spoke English, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and reported no 
neurological problems. Ethical approval was obtained from the Human Ethics Committee 
(Reference number = D15/403), and all participants gave informed consent prior to taking 
part in the study.  
Stimuli and Measures 
Basic emotion recognition task. The present study used 80 photographs of faces 
from the FACES database (Ebner et al., 2010), including equal numbers of young faces 
(age range = 19-31 years) and older faces (age range = 69-80 years). The photos consisted 
of 16 different models with age and gender balanced (i.e. four each of young male faces, 
young female faces, older male faces, and older female faces), each displaying five basic 
emotions (disgust, fear, anger, happiness, and sadness). All faces were forward-gazing, 
and photographs were displayed in full colour. Each image was 14.5cm (height) x 11cm 
(width), and when viewed from 60cm away, subtended a visual angle of 10.3° horizontally 
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Figure 1. Examples of trials presented in the basic emotion recognition task: a) disgusted 
expression portrayed by a young face, b) angry expression portrayed by an older face. 
 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test. Thirty-seven black-and-white photographs of 
eyes (from 18 male and 19 female faces) were used in the Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Each image was 7.4cm (height) by 17.3cm (width), and 
exhibited a complex state of mind, such as ‘worried’, ‘pensive’, and ‘despondent’. When 
viewed at a distance of 60cm, the stimuli subtended a visual angle of 16.1° horizontally 





















Figure 2. An example trial from the RMET, depicting eyes with an upset expression. 
 
Six-item short form of the state scale of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI-6). Both young and older participants’ level of state anxiety was 
measured prior to the emotion recognition tasks using the STAI-6, a brief questionnaire 
used to measure an individual’s current degree of anxiety (Marteau & Bekker, 1992). The 
STAI-6 includes anxiety-present items such as, “I am worried”, and anxiety-absent items 
such as, “I feel calm”, which participants rated on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (not at 
all) to 4 (very much). The anxiety-absent items were reverse-scored, and then all responses 
were summed to give a score between 6 and 24, with higher scores suggesting a greater 
level of state anxiety. The STAI-6 has been shown to have good reliability (a = .79 - .81) 
and validity, with correlations between the STAI-6 and the 20-item state scale of the STAI 
ranging from .94 to .95 (Tluczek, Henriques, & Brown, 2009). 
The Depression Anxiety Stress Scales-21 (DASS-21). Because mood can 
influence performance on emotion recognition tasks (e.g., Surguladze et al., 2004), 
depression, anxiety, and stress were screened for using the DASS-21, the short-form of 
Lovibond and Lovibond’s (1995) 42-item self-report questionnaire designed to assess 
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depression, anxiety, and stress in adults. Scores on the DASS-21 are doubled to achieve 
equivalent scores to the DASS-42. The DASS-21 has been demonstrated to have high 
reliabilities and acceptable validity (Henry & Crawford, 2005).  
The Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE). To screen for dementia or mild 
cognitive impairment, older adults’ cognitive ability was assessed using the MMSE 
(Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975). The MMSE has been shown to have good 
reliability and validity (Folstein et al., 1975), particularly for screening out dementia in 
non-clinical settings (Mitchell, 2009).  
Procedure 
At the outset, participants were screened with a Snellen eye test to ensure normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision. Subsequently, they were provided with information about 
the study, which differed according to the condition to which they were randomly assigned 
(‘older threat’, ‘young threat’, or control). The experimenter read information sheets to 
participants that included statements based on the stereotype threat manipulations from 
Abrams et al. (2006) and Swift et al. (2013). The stereotype threat statements provided to 
participants in each condition are detailed in Table 2 (and information sheets are presented 













Study Information Provided to Participants, Depending on Stereotype Threat Condition. 
Condition Stereotype Threat Statement 
Older Threat 
It is widely believed that the ability to recognise emotions 
declines with age. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to see 
whether older people do perform more poorly on emotion 
recognition tasks than young people. Both older and younger 
people will be taking part in this research. 
Young Threat 
It is widely believed that the ability to recognise emotions 
increases with age. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to see 
whether older people do perform better on emotion recognition 
tasks than young people. Both older and younger people will be 
taking part in this research. 
Control 
The purpose of this study is to examine how we respond to 
emotional information in faces. Different types of people will be 
taking part in this research. 
 
 
Following the acquisition of written consent (see consent form in Appendix B), all 
participants completed the STAI-6 on paper. They then began the basic emotion 
recognition task, which was presented on a 22-inch monitor using E-Prime 2.0 software 
(Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). As depicted in Figure 1, each trial involved the 
presentation of a face stimulus in the centre of the screen, with five emotion labels 
displayed below the face in two rows (disgust, anger, sadness, fear, happiness), always in 
the same arrangement. Participants were required to indicate aloud which emotion label 
they believed matched the emotion exhibited by the face. The experimenter entered the 
response using assigned keys on the computer keyboard for each of the five emotions. 
Response times were not recorded. The next trial began after the experimenter entered the 
response. The order in which the 80 faces appeared was randomised.  
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Subsequent to completion of the emotion recognition task, participants completed 
the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task, also presented using E-Prime 2.0 (Schneider et al., 
2002). Participants were first given a practice trial, followed by 36 experimental trials, an 
example of which can be seen in Figure 2. Each trial involved the participant choosing one 
of the four mental state labels (e.g. ‘terrified’, ‘upset’, ‘arrogant’, and ‘annoyed’) that they 
believed best matched the mental state of the person whose eyes were displayed in the 
photograph. Participants stated their choice aloud and the experimenter recorded their 
response using the assigned key for each of the mental states on the keyboard. As in the 
emotion recognition task, response times were not recorded. 
To ensure that participants were paying attention when the manipulation was 
employed at the beginning of the study (i.e. when stereotypes were elicited or not elicited), 
a manipulation check was used. Participants were asked to circle one of three options that 
they believed to be the objective of the study: “To investigate whether older adults are 
worse than young adults at recognising emotions”, “to investigate whether older adults are 
better than young adults at recognising emotions”, or “to further our understanding of 
different people’s emotion recognition abilities (no mention of age-related differences)”. 
Subsequently, to explore the extent to which young and older adults were worried 
about confirming negative stereotypes, participants were asked two questions adapted 
from Gaillard et al. (2011): “Were you worried that your ability to perform well on these 
tasks was affected by your age?” and “Were you worried that if you performed poorly on 
the test, the researcher would attribute your poor performance to your age?” Participants 
responded to these questions using a 7-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). 
Next, all participants answered three demographic questions about their age, gender, and 
highest level of education, before completing the DASS-21. Older adults were then 
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administered the MMSE. The full procedure typically took up to 30 minutes for the young 
adults, and up to 45 minutes for the older adults. 
Results 
Exclusion Criteria 
Young and older adults were screened according to their age so that participants’ 
age ranges fell between 18 – 30 years for young adults and 65 – 90 years for older adults. 
Further, all older adults scored above the cut-off on the MMSE (< 24), indicating no 
cognitive decline. However, six participants’ data (two young adults, four older adults) 
were excluded for exceeding the cut-off score for severe depression, anxiety, and/or stress 
on the DASS-21. Data from 36 participants (12 young adults, 24 older adults) were also 
excluded for responding incorrectly to the manipulation check1, and data from three older 
adults were excluded for problems with vision, as measured by the Snellen eye chart. A 
further older adult’s data were excluded due to his adoption of an inappropriate strategy 
for selecting mental state labels on the RMET2. Finally, another older adults’ data were 
excluded due to his disclosure that, prior to participating in the experiment, he had 
researched emotion recognition in aging populations (thus invalidating the manipulation 
procedure). After exclusion criteria were applied, the remaining participants were 72 
young adults (38 male) aged 18-29 (M = 20.61 years, SD = 2.26 years) and 83 older adults 
(42 male) aged 65-90 (M = 72.43 years, SD =  4.98 years).   
 
                                               
1 Although the number of older adults excluded from the study (n = 24) was double that 
of the number of young adults (n = 12), analyses conducted with the inclusion of these 
participants did not notably alter the primary research findings. 
 
2 This was based on the experimenter’s judgement that the older male simply chose the 
first mental state label he attended to on the RMET (i.e. he responded immediately as the 
next set of words appeared, leaving no time to have actually read and considered all four 
words). 




Participants’ mean scores on the screening questionnaires (i.e. the DASS-21 scales 
and the MMSE) are depicted in Table 3, along with older adults’ level of education. 
Independent samples t-tests indicated that older females and males did not differ with 
regard to their average education level, t(81) = .54, p = .59, nor average MMSE scores, 
t(81) = .59, p = .56. A multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to 
investigate whether young and older males and females differed on the DASS-21 scales. 
On the depression scale, there were no significant differences between age or gender 
groups (all ps > .05). On the anxiety scale, there was a significant main effect of age, with 
young adults (M = 5.00, SD = 4.18) scoring higher than older adults (M = 2.77, SD = 
2.77), F(1, 151) = 15.32, p < .001, ηp2  = .09, but there were no effects of gender (ps > .05). 
Likewise, young adults’ scores on the stress scale (M = 10.25, SD = 6.67) were higher than 
older adults’ scores (M = 8.12, SD = 5.16), F(1, 151) = 4.73, p = .03, ηp2  = .03, but gender 
did not have any significant effect (ps > .05). These results are somewhat consistent with 
research that susceptibility to anxiety, depression, and distress declines across the lifespan 
(Jorm, 2000). On all three scales (i.e., depression, anxiety, and stress), average scores for 
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Table 3.  
Education Level and Screening Questionnaire Means (SDs) for Young and Older Adults in 
Study 1 
 Young Adults Older Adults 
 Female Male Female Male 



































MMSE – – 28.38  (1.40) 
28.24  
(1.34) 
Notes. Education level was categorised as 1 = primary school, 2 = some high school, 3 = 
high school, 4 = trade certificate, 5 = technical certificate, 6 = an undergraduate university 
degree, and 7 = postgraduate. This was only scored for older adults as all young 
participants were studying at University level. 
 
The objective of recruiting equivalent numbers of male and female participants for 
the present study (counterbalanced across each age group) was to avoid any potential 
confounding effects of gender on the results. Because it was not of interest in relation to 
the primary hypotheses, gender has not been included as a variable in any of the reported 
data analyses. However, to check that gender did not change the significant effects 
revealed by primary analyses, the exact same analyses were conducted with the addition of 
gender as a between-subjects variable. These analyses confirmed that none of the 
significant effects found were affected by gender.  
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Furthermore, although initial analyses found that young adults scored slightly 
higher than older adults on the DASS-21 for anxiety and stress (as described above), 
including DASS-21 scores as covariates did not have an effect in any of the subsequent 
analyses. Given also that the DASS-21 was intended solely as a screening measure to 
exclude data from participants experiencing severe mental health problems, DASS-21 
scores were not considered in further analyses. 
The following data were analysed using analysis of variance (ANOVA), and all 
interactions were investigated further using t-tests. For all ANOVAs, Mauchly’s Test of 
Sphericity was utilised to assess whether the assumption of sphericity was met. Where this 
assumption was violated, Huynh-Feldt corrected F, p, mean square error (MSE), and ηp2 
values are reported. Likewise, for all t-tests, Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances was 
employed, and corrections subsequently made for any unequal variances. In the case of 
multiple comparisons, Bonferroni correction was applied to ensure the family-wise error 
rate was p < .05. 
Threat-Based Concerns Across Conditions 
Participants’ responses on the 7-point scale for each of the two questions regarding 
explicit threat-based concerns were found to be significantly positively correlated, r = .52, 
n = 155, p < .001. Therefore, they were averaged to create a single score for each 
participant. These threat scores were then examined in a 2 (participant age group: young, 
older) x 3 (condition: control, older threat, young threat) between-subject analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). This analysis revealed a significant main effect of participant age 
group, F(1, 149) =19.17, p < .001, ηp2  = .11, with young adults reporting experiencing a 
greater degree of stereotype threat (M = 2.18, SD = 1.08) than older adults (M = 1.52, SD = 
.86). Further, there was a significant main effect of condition, F(2, 149) = 5.62, p = .004, 
ηp2  = .07. A follow-up independent samples t-test showed that, compared to the control 
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condition (M = 1.51, SD = .62), participants were significantly more threatened in the 
young threat condition (M = 2.07, SD = 1.18), t(77.3) = 3.03, p = .003, and more 
threatened in the older threat condition (M = 1.92, SD = 1.10), t(76.5) = 2.31, p = .02 (non-
significant according to a Bonferroni p value of .017). There was no significant difference 
between the latter two conditions, t(100) = .65, p = .52. 
As shown in Figure 3, these main effects were qualified by a significant interaction 
of participant age group and condition, F(2, 149) = 4.99, p = .008, ηp2  = .06. To explore 
this interaction further, one-way ANOVAs (comparing threat scores among the three 
conditions) were performed separately for young adults and older adults. Interestingly, 
there was no significant effect of stereotype threat condition on older adults’ self-reported 
threat concerns, F(2, 80) = 1.98, p = .15, ηp2  = .05. However, for young adults, there was a 
significant effect of condition, F(2, 69) = 7.12, p = .002, ηp2  = .17.  
Follow-up independent samples t-tests demonstrated that young adults reported 
feeling significantly more threatened in the young threat condition (M = 2.77, SD = 1.07) 
than in the control condition (M = 1.71, SD = .66), t(46) = 4.14, p < .001. Their self-
reported threat concerns were also higher in the young threat condition compared to the 
older threat condition (M = 2.06, SD = 1.17), although this effect just failed to reach 
significance according to a Bonferroni-adjusted p value of .017, t(46) = 2.18, p = .03. 
There was no significant difference between control and older threat conditions, t(46) = 



















Figure 3. Mean self-reported threat scores as a function of participant age group and 
stereotype threat condition. Error bars denote one standard error around the mean and an 
asterisk denotes a significant difference between two mean scores. 
 
From these results, it appears that the stereotype threat manipulation had the 
opposite effect to what was hypothesised in that it influenced overtly reported levels of 
stereotype threat for young adults, rather than older adults. Young adults reported feeling 
most threatened in the stereotype threat condition where it was implied that young adults 
are expected to perform worse than older adults at recognising emotions. Contrary to 
expectations, older adults’ self-reported threat concerns did not differ between conditions. 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-6 (STAI-6) Scores 
Participants’ scores on the six-item short form of the state scale of the Spielberger 
STAI were calculated. Scores ranged from 6 to 24, with higher scores indicating a greater 
degree of state anxiety. STAI-6 scores were analysed in a 2 (participant age group: young, 
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were no significant main effects; however, there was a significant interaction between 
participant age and condition, F(2, 149) = 3.48, p = .03, ηp2 = .05, shown in Figure 4.  
This interaction was explored further with one-way ANOVAs separately for young 
and older adults. For young adults, there was a significant main effect of condition, F(2, 
69) = 4.44, p = .02, ηp2 = .11. Follow-up t-tests demonstrated that young adults were 
significantly more anxious in the young threat condition (M = 9.50, SD = 2.89) than in the 
control condition (M = 7.58, SD = 1.64), t(36.4) = 2.83, p = .008. Young adults’ state 
anxiety was also higher in the young threat condition compared to the older threat 
condition (M = 8.75, SD = 2.03), t(46) = 2.19, p = .03, although this difference was not 
significant according to a Bonferroni p value of .017.  
For older adults, a one-way ANOVA indicated that there was no difference 
between their state anxiety scores between conditions, F(2, 80) = .38, p = .69, ηp2 = .01. 
Thus, the stereotype threat manipulation did not lead older adults to report increased state 
anxiety. However, interestingly, young adults were more anxious in the condition in which 
it was implied that they were expected to perform worse than older adults. 
 
 




Figure 4. Young and older adults’ mean STAI-6 scores in each experimental condition. 
Error bars denote one standard error around the mean and an asterisk denotes a significant 
difference between two means. 
 
Accuracy on the Basic Emotion Recognition Task 
Initially, the mean proportion of accurately identified emotions was calculated for 
each participant, separately for each of the five emotions (disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, 
anger) and each face age (young, older). These mean proportion correct scores were then 
adjusted to ensure that there was no influence of emotion-specific response biases (see 
Isaacowitz et al., 2007). As an extreme example of an emotion-specific response bias, 
consider a hypothetical participant who selects ‘happiness’ as the label for every single 
emotion presented. They would obtain a perfect mean proportion correct score for the 
emotion ‘happiness’. However, this result would be misleading as this participant was 
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Therefore, kappa scores were calculated using a formula3 that adjusted the mean 
proportion correct scores to account for any emotion-specific response biases. The 
resulting kappa scores ranged from 0 (performance at chance level) to 1 (all responses to 
the emotion were correct identifications and correct rejections). Young and older adults’ 
kappa scores are depicted in Table 4 (for each combination of face age, participant age 
group, and emotion). 
Emotion kappa scores were analysed in a 2 (participant age group: young, older) x 
2 (face age: young, older) x 3 (condition: control, older threat, young threat) x 5 (emotion: 
disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, anger) mixed ANOVA. Older adults were shown to 
perform significantly worse overall (M = .76, SD = .09) than young adults (M = .79, SD = 
.08) on the basic emotion recognition task, F(1, 149) = 6.06, p = .02, ηp2 = .04. A main 
effect of emotion was also found, F(3.9, 583.3) = 162.86, p < .001, ηp2 = .52, such that 
happiness was most accurately recognised (M = .95, SD = .06), followed by fear (M = .79, 
SD = .14), disgust (M = .72, SD = .14), sadness (M = .72, SD = .14), and lastly, anger (M = 
.68, SD = .14). 
These main effects were qualified by a significant interaction of emotion and 
participant age group, F(3.9, 583.3) = 5.59, p < .001, ηp2 = .04, such that older adults 
performed worse than young adults on the basic emotion task for certain emotions, but 
performed equally well on others. Using independent samples t-tests, it was demonstrated 
that older adults were less accurate than young adults when recognising fear (M = .76, SD 
= .13 vs M = .83, SD = .13, respectively), t(153) = 3.47, p = .001, anger (M = .65, SD = .15 
vs M = .72, SD = .11), t(153) = 2.97, p = .003, and happiness (M = .93, SD = .07 vs M = 
                                               
3 K = (total number of correct responses and correct rejections – total number of 
responses expected by chance)/(total number of stimuli – number of responses expected 
by chance). 
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.97, SD = .04), t(132.4) = 3.80, p < .001. Older and young adults performed equally well 
when recognising disgust and sadness (all ps > .05). 
The ANOVA also revealed a main effect of face age, F(1, 149) = 261.25, p < .001, 
ηp2  = .64, with participants exhibiting better accuracy when emotions were expressed by 
young faces (M = .83, SD = .09) compared to when emotions were expressed by older 
faces (M = .71, SD = .10). This effect was qualified by a significant interaction of face age 
and emotion, F(3.7, 549.7) = 20.48, p < .001, ηp2  = .12. Paired-samples t-tests revealed 
that, for all five emotions, accuracy was higher when the emotion was expressed by young 
faces compared to older faces. The difference in emotion recognition accuracy between 
young and older faces was largest for anger (M = .79, SD = .16 vs M = .58, SD = .17), 
t(154) = 14.03, p < .001, followed by sadness (M = .78, SD = .16 vs M = .65, SD = .18), 
t(154) = 9.76, p < .001, fear (M = .85, SD = .14 vs M = .73, SD = .18), t(154) = 9.62, 
disgust (M = .76, SD = .15 vs M = .67, SD = .19), t(154) = 5.71, p < .001, and lastly, 
happiness (M = .98, SD = .04 vs M = .92, SD = .08), t(154) = 10.78, p < .001.  
As depicted in Table 4, the main effects and two-way interactions were further 
qualified by a significant three-way interaction of emotion, age of face, and participant age 
group, F(3.7, 549.7) = 4.41, p = .002, ηp2  = .03. To investigate this interaction further, a 2 
(participant age group: young, older) x 5 (emotion: disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, 
anger) mixed ANOVA was conducted once for young faces, and again for older faces.  
When recognising emotions in young faces, there was a significant main effect of 
participant age group, whereby older adults were less accurate than young adults, F(1, 
149) = 6.23, p = .01, ηp2  = .04, qualified by a two-way interaction between emotion and 
participant age group, F(4, 596) = 4.42, p = .002, ηp2  = .03. Follow-up independent t-tests 
were conducted to compare young and older adults’ accuracy when recognising each 
individual emotion expressed by young faces. The t-tests revealed that older adults were 
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less accurate than young adults when labelling young faces displaying fear (M = .82, SD = 
.13 vs M = .88, SD = .15, respectively), t(153) = 2.60, p = .01, and anger (M = .74, SD = 
.18 vs M = .84, SD = .12), t(144.1) = 3.97, p < .001. Both age groups performed equally 
well when labelling disgust, happiness, and sadness expressed by young faces (all ps > 
.05). 
Likewise, there was an interaction between emotion and participant age group for 
the recognition of emotions expressed by older faces, F(3.7, 543.9) = 5.65, p < .001, ηp2  = 
.04. Independent t-tests demonstrated that older adults’ emotion recognition accuracy 
scores were significantly lower than young adults’ scores for older faces displaying fear 
(M = .69, SD = .18 vs M = .78, SD = .16, respectively), t(153) = 3.36, p = .001, and 
happiness (M = .89, SD = .09 vs M = .94, SD = .06), t(142.1) = 3.96, p < .001. There was 
no difference in accuracy between young and older adults when recognising disgust, anger, 
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Notes. Significant differences between young and older adults are identified in bold 
(accuracy scores with matching letters are significantly different from each other). 
 
Critically for the present research question, stereotype threat condition did not 
affect participants’ emotion recognition scores (p > .05), and there was no interaction 
effect between participant age group and condition (p > .05). In fact, there were no 
interaction effects involving stereotype threat condition (all ps > .05; see Table 5 for all 
ANOVA effects involving condition). This indicates that, although young adults reported 
feeling more threatened and more anxious when it was implied that their age group are 
worse at emotion recognition, such threat and anxiety was not detrimental to their actual 
performance on the task. 
 
Table 4. 
Mean Emotion Recognition Accuracy Scores (Kappa) and Associated Standard Deviations 
for Each Combination of Face Age, Participant Age Group, and Emotion. 




  Disgust Fear Anger Happy Sad 
Young faces 









































ANOVA Results for All Main and Interaction Effects on Emotion Recognition 
Accuracy Scores (Kappa) Involving Stereotype Threat Condition 
Source df MS F p ηp2 
Condition 2 .05 .61 .54 .01 
ParticipantAge*Condition 2 <.001 .00 1.00 .00 
Emotion*Condition 7.8 .01 .49 .86 .01 
Emotion*ParticipantAge*Condition 7.8 .03 1.46 .17 .02 
FaceAge*Condition 2 .02 1.00 .37 .01 
FaceAge*ParticipantAge*Condition 2 .01 .22 .81 .00 
Emotion*FaceAge*Condition 7.4 .01 .61 .76 .01 
Emotion*FaceAge*ParticipantAge*Condition 7.4 .00 .36 .93 .01 
 
Accuracy on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task (RMET) 
For each participant, the mean proportion of eyes assigned with the correct mental 
state in the RMET was calculated. These accuracy scores were examined in a 2 
(participant age group: young, older) x 3 (condition: control, older threat, young threat) 
between-subject ANOVA. The analysis revealed that young adults’ accuracy (M = .73, SD 
= .10) did not significantly differ in comparison to older adults (M = .72, SD = .10) when 
recognising mental states on the RMET, F(1, 149) = 1.00, p = .32, ηp2  = .01. There was 
also no significant main effect of condition, F(2, 149) = .17, p = .85, ηp2  = .00, and no 
significant interaction of participant age group and condition, F(2, 149) = .23, p = .79, ηp2  
= .00. 
Discussion 
The results of the first study indicated that the stereotype threat manipulation had 
an effect, but not in the way that was expected. The main findings were that: 1) older 
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adults performed worse than young adults at recognising certain facially-expressed 
emotions (but performed equally on the RMET); 2) the stereotype threat condition was 
effective in increasing self-reported stereotype threat and state anxiety for young adults, 
but not older adults; and 3) young and older adults’ performance on the basic emotion 
recognition task was unaffected by stereotype threat condition. Each of these findings are 
discussed in further detail below. 
Firstly, the results demonstrated that, on the basic emotion recognition task, older 
adults were less accurate than young adults at recognising fear in young and older faces, 
anger in young faces, and happiness in older faces. This is consistent with previous 
research showing that older adults are poorer than young adults at recognising certain 
emotions (e.g., Ruffman et al., 2008). It also supports the idea that, even when the 
possibility of an own-age bias is controlled for by including young and older face stimuli, 
older adults still experience reduced emotion recognition ability compared to their younger 
counterparts (Campbell et al., 2017; Riediger, Voelkle, Ebner, & Lindenberger, 2011). 
On the RMET, however, older adults were as accurate as young adults at assigning 
labels to complex mental states portrayed by sets of eyes. Although Henry and colleagues’ 
(2013) meta-analysis demonstrated an overall age-related decline in theory of mind, the 
present study’s finding is not completely surprising given that some previous studies have 
demonstrated that young and older adults perform equally on theory of mind tasks (e.g., 
Bottiroli, Cavallini, Ceccato, Vecchi, & Lecce, 2016; Castelli et al., 2010; Slessor, 
Phillips, & Bull, 2007), especially when older adults are motivated to do well (Zhang, 
Fung, Stanley, Isaacowitz, & Ho, 2013). In any case, the present study’s results are 
consistent with a large body of research that negates an early suggestion that theory of 
mind might actually increase with age (Happé et al., 1998). 
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With regards the primary research question, it was hypothesised that eliciting 
stereotypes about age-related declines in emotion recognition would lead older adults to 
experience stereotype threat (and possibly increased state anxiety), and subsequently lead 
them to perform worse when recognising facially expressed emotions.  This was not 
supported by the present study’s results, which demonstrated that the threat manipulation 
did not lead to an increase in older adults’ self-report of stereotype threat nor state anxiety, 
and did not alter their performance on the basic emotion recognition task. This is 
inconsistent with previous empirical research showing that eliciting age-related stereotypes 
about declines in cognition or memory negatively impacted older adults’ performance on 
cognitive tasks (Lamont et al., 2015).  
The second hypothesis was that, because young adults do not belong to the 
stigmatized group targeted by stereotypes about age-related cognitive decline, and are 
superior at recognising emotions, they would not feel threatened by being told that they are 
expected to be worse at recognising emotions. Consequently, it was expected that their 
emotion recognition ability would be unaffected. However, the results from the present 
study indicated that young adults did report heightened levels of stereotype threat when it 
was implied that their age group should perform worse. In fact, young adults also reported 
higher levels of state anxiety in this condition. Nevertheless, young adults’ reports of 
higher stereotype threat and increased anxiety did not result in reduced performance on the 
basic emotion recognition task. This finding is consistent with a previous finding that 
younger adults reported experiencing greater stereotype threat than older adults in the 
workplace, but that this threat did not lead to detrimental consequences (such as low job 
satisfaction and poor employment-related mental health), perhaps due to young adults 
appraising it as somewhat of a challenge (von Hippel, Kalokerinos, & Henry, 2013). 
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The current study’s findings raise the question of why young adults were 
threatened by the implication that they should be worse than older adults on a task domain 
(i.e., emotion recognition) that is scientifically known to decline with age. Furthermore, 
why were older adults not threatened? There are a few possible answers to these questions. 
Firstly, it was assumed that lay people view emotion recognition as a cognitive task and, 
therefore, that older adults would feel threatened due to societal stereotypes about older 
people being less cognitively adept. It is possible, however, that lay people do not 
automatically associate the recognition of emotions with cognitive ability (as they might 
with mathematics, memory, or mental rotation, for example). To scientists and researchers, 
the recognition of emotion is a complex task that involves multiple cognitive processes, 
including attention, perception, recognition (e.g., from memory, life experiences, and/or 
innate ability), and categorisation (Adolphs, 2002). However, to lay individuals, it is 
possible that the recognition of emotions is simply perceived as a basic social task. 
Whereas research has shown that people generally expect older individuals to perform 
poorly on cognitive tasks (Prohaska et al., 1984; Singer, 1986; Swift et al., 2013), people 
expect older adults to do well in certain social domains, such as being able to settle 
arguments, being polite, and understanding other people’s points of view (Swift et al., 
2013). Therefore, if it were indeed the case that people do not consider emotion 
recognition to be a cognitive task, it is entirely possible that people also do not believe that 
emotion recognition declines with age.  
Thus, a second possible explanation for the lack of stereotype threat in older adults 
in the current study is that lay people might actually believe that emotion recognition 
ability increases which age. If this is true, then implying that young adults are worse than 
older adults at recognising emotions could actually lead young adults to feel threatened, as 
they would theoretically be the target of such a stereotype. Given that young adults in the 
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present study reported feeling threatened and anxious as a result of the stereotype threat 
manipulation, whereas older adults did not, this explanation is quite feasible. The 
possibilities that a) emotion recognition might be perceived more as a social task than a 
cognitive task and/or b) might be expected to increase with age were the subject of further 
exploration in the second study.








Study Two: Prevalent Aging Stereotypes Held by Young, Middle-Older and 
Older Adults 
 
The main findings of Study 1 were that, contrary to expectations, raising 
stereotypes about age-related declines in emotion recognition did not lead older adults to 
experience increased threat concerns nor state anxiety, and did not affect their performance 
on an emotion recognition task. Conversely, young adults’ self-reported threat concerns 
and state anxiety were significantly increased in the condition in which it was implied that 
they were expected to perform worse than older adults (although their emotion recognition 
performance was still unaffected). The latter finding is surprising given that young adults 
have actually been shown to be superior at recognising emotions (Ruffman et al., 2008) 
and are not the target of stereotypes about age-related cognitive decline. The current study 
aimed to interpret these findings through further exploration of current stereotypes about 
aging (particularly in relation to emotion recognition). 
The hypotheses of Study 1 were largely based on the assumption that lay people 
perceive the recognition of emotion in faces to be a cognitive ability. Although emotion 
recognition is a cognitive task that relies heavily on visual perception, recognition, and 
decision-making (Adolphs, 2002), it also falls within the social domain. It is possible that 
lay people view emotion recognition less as a cognitive task and more as a social task, on 
which older adults may be expected to do well (Swift et al., 2013). If this is the case, then 
it follows that older adults might be expected to perform as accurately (or even more 
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accurately) than young adults when recognising emotions. To my knowledge, although 
one study has investigated beliefs about the expression of emotions across the lifespan 
(Montepare & Dobish, 2013), there has not yet been any research investigating lay 
people’s perceptions of age differences in emotion recognition ability specifically.  
Another assumption of the first study that requires confirmation was that there is 
indeed a societal stereotype that cognitive functioning declines across the lifespan. 
Previous research has indicated that people do believe older adults to be inferior on 
cognitive tasks (Prohaska et al., 1984; Singer, 1986; Swift et al., 2013), therefore, it is 
likely that the decline of cognition with age remains a currently pervasive stereotype. To 
confirm this, the present study also aimed to corroborate the generally accepted view that 
stereotypes regarding age-related declines in cognitive functioning are prevalent. 
The primary objective of the second study was to clarify whether emotion 
recognition is viewed as a cognitive or a social task, and what stereotypes about aging are 
actually currently prevalent in a western society (United States of America; USA). 
Although there are undoubtedly cultural differences between people living in the USA and 
people in New Zealand (who comprised the participant sample in Study 1), research has 
shown that stereotypes about aging are relatively consistent across cultures (especially 
among western cultures; Löckenhoff et al., 2009). To address the first objective of Study 2, 
answers to the following questions were sought: 1) Do people primarily view emotion 
recognition as a cognitive or a social task? 2) Are there any stereotypes about changes in 
social ability across the lifespan? 3) Do lay people believe that emotion recognition 
declines with age? 4) Is there indeed a stereotype that cognitive ability declines with age? 
Researchers have emphasised the importance of collecting data about stereotypes 
from participants of varying age groups, as aging stereotypes have been found to differ 
across ages (Davis & Friedrich, 2010; Hummert, Gartska, Shaner, & Strahm, 1994). 
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Therefore, individuals from three different age groups were recruited to participate in the 
current study. Young adults (aged 18-30) and older adults (aged 65 and over) were 
included in order to compare the perceptions about aging between those who belong to the 
stigmatised age group and those who do not. A third participant age group (aged 50-64 
years – classified in the current study as “middle-older” adults) was included in the current 
study to obtain an idea of the current aging stereotypes held by individuals who may not 
yet feel as though they belong to the stigmatised age group but are soon approaching it.  
To explore the stereotypes related to aging, participants were asked to consider 
whether they believed a typical 25-year-old adult or a typical 75-year-old adult would be 
more competent in a number of different task domains (such as, memory, emotion 
recognition, cognitive tasks, and social ability) or whether they believed there to be no 
difference in competency between these ages. Participants were also asked a forced-choice 
question about whether they perceive the recognition of emotion to be predominantly a 
cognitive or a social task. 
A second objective of the present study was to investigate whether older adults’ 
perceptions of aging are related to their ability to recognise emotions. Compared to other 
common stereotypes (e.g., relating to race or gender), age-related stereotypes are unique in 
that most people will eventually belong to the stigmatized group (Cuddy & Fiske, 2002). 
Therefore, stereotypes that a young person might hold about older adults ultimately 
become self-stereotypes, or beliefs about the positive and negative effects of one’s own 
ageing (Levy, 2003; Robertson et al., 2016). In a similar manner to experimentally-
induced stereotype threat, the self-stereotypes that an older person holds may negatively 
affect their abilities in a number of relevant areas, such as memory, physical activity, and 
cognition.  
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Indeed, a longitudinal study by Robertson and colleagues (2016) demonstrated that, 
for older adults aged 50-93 years, more negative self-perceptions of aging – as measured 
by the Brief-Aging Perceptions Questionnaire (BAPQ; Sexton, King-Kallimanis, Morgan, 
& McGee, 2014) – were associated with greater declines in verbal fluency and self-rated 
memory over two years. Another study showed that older adults (aged over 60 years) with 
positive perceptions of aging were less likely to develop dementia, even if they were 
carriers of the high-risk APOE ε4 gene (which greatly increases one’s likelihood of 
developing dementia; Levy, Slade, Pietrzak, & Ferrucci, 2018). 
Taking into account this previous research, the present study aimed to explore 
young, middle-older, and older adults’ self-perceptions of aging and how these perceptions 
might be related to emotion recognition ability. Participants’ perceptions of aging were 
measured using the B-APQ (Sexton et al., 2014), which is designed to assess agreement 
with various positive and negative views of aging (such as, “As I get older I get wiser” and 
“Getting older makes me less independent”).  
Participants’ emotion recognition ability was tested using the Geneva Emotion 
Recognition Test (Short Version; GERT-S), a dynamic, multi-model task comprising 
video clips of actors expressing 14 different emotions (Schlegel & Scherer, 2016). It has 
been suggested that using multimodal (i.e., a combination of visual and auditory), dynamic 
portrayals of emotion may be more ecologically valid than requiring participants to 
recognise emotions from photographs of posed faces (Schlegel, Fontaine, & Scherer, 
2017). Furthermore, Ruffman (2011) suggested that emotion recognition tasks that use 
dynamic videos may improve older adults’ performance, and in some cases, have been 
shown to eradicate differences found between young and older adults’ emotion recognition 
accuracy (Wieck & Kunzmann, 2017). However, the research evidence remains mixed, 
with other studies demonstrating age-related deficits in emotion recognition despite 
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utilising dynamic expressions of emotion (Ruffman, Sullivan, & Dittrich, 2009; Sullivan 
& Ruffman, 2004).  
The GERT-S also includes a wider range of emotions than many other emotion 
recognition tasks. While many paradigms include the identification of a few negative 
emotions (e.g., anger, fear, sadness, and disgust), they often include only one positive 
emotion (happiness; Schlegel & Scherer, 2016). Thus, participants completing such 
emotion recognition tasks might select the label of happiness for any face that appears to 
have a positive valence, rather than actually recognising happiness (Frank & Stennett, 
2001; Schlegel & Scherer, 2016). The GERT-S, on the other hand, includes 14 emotions, 
of which seven are negative (e.g., sadness, irritation, and anxiety) and seven are positive or 
neutral (e.g., amusement, pride, and joy).  
To date, no studies have directly compared young and older adults’ performance on 
the GERT-S, although Schlegel and Scherer (2016) found no correlation between age and 
GERT-S scores for participants aged 18 – 65 years. Interestingly, a negative correlation 
between age and emotion recognition scores was demonstrated when the original, longer 
version of the GERT was used (Schlegel et al., 2017). Nevertheless, neither of these 
studies included participants older than age 65, limiting the conclusions that can be drawn 
from them. Therefore, although outside of the main research focus, the current study may 
help to clarify whether there are differences between young, middle-older, and older adults 
in emotion recognition accuracy on the GERT-S. 
With regard to the relationship between perceptions of aging and emotion 
recognition ability, it was hypothesised that, for older (and possibly middle-older) adults, 
more negative perceptions of aging on the B-APQ would be associated with lower 
performance on the GERT-S. This finding would be consistent with previous research 
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indicating that more negative perceptions are correlated with greater declines in cognitive 
functioning (Robertson et al., 2016).  
To my knowledge, no studies have investigated young adults’ B-APQ scores. 
Whereas older adults’ perceptions of aging reflect their self-perceptions of their own aging 
process and outcomes (Robertson et al., 2016), young adults’ perceptions of aging may not 
be as self-relevant. For instance, a young adult’s endorsement of a B-APQ item (such as, 
“slowing down with age is not something I can control”) demonstrates their belief about an 
aspect of aging; however, they would be unlikely to worry about experiencing such effects 
of aging until they join older adulthood. As such, it was considered unlikely that young 
adults’ B-APQ scores would be related to their emotion recognition ability.  
To summarise, the two primary objectives of the current study were to:  
1. Determine what stereotypes about aging currently exist among young, middle-older, 
and older adults. Specifically, do lay people view emotion recognition as a cognitive or 
a social task? Further, what are their beliefs about young and older adults’ 
competencies (particularly with regard to social tasks, emotion recognition, and 
cognitive tasks)? 
2. Investigate the relationship between self-perceptions of aging and accuracy on a 
dynamic, multimodal emotion recognition task. Specifically, are more negative aging 




After exclusions were applied to the data (described in the results section), the 
participants included 123 young adults (55 male) aged 18-30 (M = 25.2 years, SD = 3.17 
years), 154 middle-older adults (68 male) aged 50-64 (M = 55.7 years, SD = 3.83), and 143 
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older adults (61 male) aged 65-99 (M = 69.0 years, SD = 4.45 years) from the United 
States of America. Participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk, a 
crowdsourcing Internet marketplace that recruits ‘workers’ to complete tasks for 
compensation. For this 20-30 minute study, MTurk workers were remunerated $0.90 to 
$1.004. All participants spoke English and reported no neurological difficulties. Ethical 
approval was obtained from the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee (Reference 
number = D17/006). 
Stimuli and Measures 
The Geneva Emotion Recognition Test – Short Version (GERT-S). The GERT-
S (Schlegel & Scherer, 2016) is a 42-item emotion recognition task designed to assess 
people’s ability to recognise emotions in another person’s facial expression, tone of voice, 
and body language. On average, the GERT-S takes approximately ten minutes to 
complete. Each trial consists of a short video clip of an actor portraying an emotion, with 
nonsensical syllables used to express emotional tone of voice. The video clips used were 
from the Geneva Multimodal Emotion Portrayals database (GEMEP, Bänziger et al., 
2011). Ten actors (five male, five female) conveyed 14 different emotions: pride, joy, 
amusement, pleasure, relief, interest, surprise, anxiety, fear, despair, sadness, disgust, 
irritation, and anger. Over the course of the test, each emotion was presented three times 
(resulting in a total of 42 trials). After each video clip, 14 emotion words were presented in 
a circular arrangement (shown in Figure 5) and participants were required to select the 
emotion label that they believed best described the emotion portrayed by the actor in the 
clip.  
 
                                               
4 Remuneration was increased slightly partway through the study to better incentivise 
participation.  






















Figure 5. The circular response format of the GERT-S (Schlegel & Scherer, 2016). After 
each video clip, participants were required to select the emotion label that best matched the 
emotion expressed by the actor in the clip. 
 
The Brief Ageing Perceptions Questionnaire (B-APQ). The B-APQ (Sexton et 
al., 2014) is a 17-item short version of the Ageing Perceptions Questionnaire (APQ; 
Barker, O’Hanlon, McGee, Hickey, & Conroy, 2007). The questionnaire assesses self-
perceptions and beliefs about one’s own aging, and was used in the present study to assess 
the extent to which participants endorse negative stereotypes and perceptions of aging. 
Items in the B-APQ include, “I get depressed when I think about how aging might affect 
the things that I can do” and, “As I get older I can take part in fewer activities”. Responses 
to items are made on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The B-APQ 
is comprised of five subscales. The ‘Timeline-Chronic’ subscale is used to measure the 
extent to which people view the aging process as chronic (higher scores indicate more 
negative perceptions). The ‘Consequences-Positive’ subscale measures beliefs about 
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positive consequences of aging (e.g., getting wiser), with higher scores representing more 
positive perceptions. The ‘Emotional Representations’ subscale assesses negative 
emotional responses to aging, such as anxiety, depression, and worry (higher scores 
indicate more negative perceptions). The ‘Consequences and Control Negative’ subscale 
measures beliefs about negative consequences of aging and feeling a lack of control over 
the aging process (higher scores indicate more negative perceptions). Finally, the ‘Control-
Positive’ subscale measures beliefs about having control over some elements of aging, 
with higher scores reflecting more positive perceptions. The B-APQ has been found to be 
psychometrically valid and reliable (Sexton et al., 2014).  
The Depression Anxiety Stress Scales-21 (DASS-21). To screen for depression, 
anxiety, and stress, the DASS-21 was employed. The DASS-21 is the short version of the 
42-item self-report questionnaire (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995), and has been 
demonstrated to have good reliability and acceptable validity in assessing depression, 
anxiety, and stress in adults (Henry & Crawford, 2005). If participants’ scores on any of 
these three constructs exceeded the cut-off scores for extremely severe depression, anxiety, 
or stress, their data were omitted from the study. 
Procedure 
After clicking on a link provided through MTurk, participants were presented with 
a survey using Qualtrics software (https://www.qualtrics.com). Participants initially 
answered demographic questions (see Appendix C) regarding their age in years, date of 
birth, gender, ethnicity, and level of education, in addition to screening questions about 
English proficiency, whether they were currently taking any medication, and whether they 
had suffered any neurological problems (such as dementia or brain damage). If a 
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participant did not meet the age requirements, the survey then ceased5. If a participant’s 
age was within one of the target age brackets, they were permitted to continue on to the 
main survey. These participants were then provided with information about the study (see 
Appendix D) and were required to give written informed consent before proceeding (see 
consent form in Appendix E).  
First, participants were asked a number of questions about their perceptions of 
young and older adults’ competencies in various task domains (see Appendix F).  The 
questions were based on Swift et al.’s (2013) study, in which they asked participants to 
choose who they believed would perform better in particular skill areas: adults aged 25, 
adults aged 75, or whether they perceive there to be no difference in ability between these 
age groups. These questions were adopted in the current study to obtain an overall 
understanding of the current prevalent age-related stereotypes in society, including 
whether people generally believe that older adults are worse or better than young adults on 
cognitive tasks, social tasks, and more specifically, recognising other people’s emotions. 
The original items used in Swift et al.’s (2013) study were retained (e.g., solving a 
crossword, looking after children, and settling arguments), and additional items were 
added that relate directly to the current research question (e.g., completing cognitive tasks, 
social interaction, and recognising emotions in other people’s faces).  
 After the participants completed these items, they were presented with the 
following forced choice question: “Do you think the recognition of emotions in other 
people’s faces is predominantly a cognitive task? OR a social task?” Participants were 
required to select only one of these responses. The aim of this question was to investigate 
                                               
5 If the survey ended here (due to not meeting age requirements), participants were not 
compensated. However, they were forewarned prior to clicking the MTurk link that there 
would first be an eligibility screen and that they would not be compensated if deemed 
ineligible. 
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whether people primarily perceive emotion recognition as a cognitive task (at which older 
adults might be expected to perform worse than young adults) or a social task (at which 
older adults might generally be expected to perform equally). Next, participants completed 
the B-APQ and the DASS-21, followed by the GERT-S. Finally, participants confirmed 
whether all of the videos and audio in the GERT-S worked properly (if not, their data were 
excluded from the study).  
Results 
Exclusion Criteria 
10,880 MTurk workers clicked through to the present study’s initial eligibility 
screen. 8.2% of these workers (n = 896) met the requirement for being aged within one of 
the three required age brackets and thus were permitted to continue on to the main survey. 
Participants’ data were excluded from the current study if they: reported currently taking 
medication for depression or anxiety; had scores on the DASS-21 exceeding the cut-off for 
extremely severe depression, anxiety, and/or stress; reported current neurological 
problems; indicated that any of the GERT video clips did not work properly; or did not 
complete the survey. After the application of exclusion criteria, the remaining participants 
included 123 young adults (55 male) aged 18-30 (M = 25.2 years, SD = 3.17 years), 154 
middle-older adults (68 male) aged 50-64 (M = 55.7 years, SD = 3.83), and 143 older 
adults (61 male) aged 65 and over (M = 69.0 years, SD = 4.45 years). 
Preliminary Analyses 
Participants’ average scores on each of the DASS-21 scales are displayed in Table 
6 for each age group and gender, along with their average level of highest education. To 
determine whether self-reported levels of depression, anxiety, and stress differed across 
age groups or genders, the three DASS-21 scales scores were analysed in a 3 (participant 
age group: young, middle-older, older) x 2 (gender: female, male) multivariate analysis of 
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variance (MANOVA). For each of the DASS-21 scales, there were main effects of both 
gender and participant age group (all ps < .05), but no interactions between the two 
variables. With regard to the main effect of gender, it was found that males scored higher 
than females on the depression scale (M = 9.91, SD = 7.88 vs M = 6.47, SD = 7.07), F(1, 
414) = 20.72, p < .001, ηp2  = .05, the anxiety scale (M = 8.51, SD = 6.49 vs M = 4.75, SD 
= 5.57), F(1, 414) = 39.98, p < .001, ηp2  = .09, and the stress scale (M = 11.51, SD = 8.47 
vs M = 8.95, SD = 7.40), F(1, 414) = 9.79, p = .002, ηp2  = .02.  
The main effects of participant age group on the depression scale, F(2, 414) = 6.61, 
p = .001, ηp2  = .03, anxiety scale, F(2, 414) = 10.51, p < .001, ηp2  = .05, and stress scale, 
F(2, 414) -= 14.72, p < .001, ηp2  = .07, were explored further using independent samples t-
tests.  These showed that young adults and middle-older adults’ scores did not significantly 
differ on any of the DASS-21 scales (all ps > .05). However, on each scale, older adults 
had lower scores than both young and middle-older adults (all ps < .05). Nevertheless, 
including the three scales as covariates in subsequent analyses did not influence the 
significant main and interaction effects involving gender or participant age group. 
Consequently, DASS-21 scores were not included in further analyses. 
Participants’ highest level of education scores were analysed in a 3 (participant age 
group: young, middle-older, older) x 2 (gender: female, male) analysis of variance 
(ANOVA), which revealed only a main effect of age group, F(2, 414) = 3.15,  p = .04, ηp2  
= .02. Follow-up t-tests demonstrated that older adults (M = 5.34, SD = 1.60) had a slightly 
(but significantly) higher level of education compared to young adults (M = 4.92), SD = 
1.54), t(264) = 2.19, p = .03, but that there were no significant differences in education 
level between middle-older adults (M = 5.04, SD = 1.59) and the other two age groups 
(both ps > .05). This difference in education level between young and older adults likely 
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reflects the fact that many young participants reported being partway through completing a 
college degree. 
 
Table 6.  
Education Level and DASS-21 Scale Means (SDs) for Young, Middle-Older, and Older 
Males and Females in Study 2 
 Young Adults Middle-Older Adults Older Adults 
 Female Male Female Male Female Male 























































Notes. Education level was categorised as 1 = primary school, 2 = some high school, 3 = 
high school, 4 = trade certificate, 5 = technical certificate, 6 = an undergraduate university 
degree, and 7 = postgraduate. 
 
As in the first study, gender was not included as a variable in the subsequent 
analyses (but there were approximately equivalent numbers of males and females within 
each participant age group), nor were DASS-21 scores. The following data were analysed 
using chi square tests of independence, chi square tests of goodness of fit, and ANOVAs. 
For analyses using the latter, Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity was employed, and Huynh-
Feldt corrected F, p, and ηp2 values were reported where the assumption of sphericity was 
violated. All interaction effects found using ANOVAs were further investigated using 
post-hoc comparisons or t-tests, with corrections made for any unequal variances 
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according to Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances. The Bonferroni correction was 
applied to multiple comparisons to ensure the family wise error rate was p < .05. 
Age-Related Stereotypes Endorsed by Young, Middle-Older, and Older Participants 
During the survey, participants were asked to choose whether they believed adults 
aged 25 or adults aged 75 were more competent on a number of varying tasks, or whether 
they believed there to be no difference in competency between these age groups. The 
percentage of participants who selected each response (“adults aged 25”, “no difference”, 
or “adults aged 75”) was calculated for each competency domain (e.g. “solving crossword 
puzzles”), separately for each age group. These percentages, for each competency domain 
and each age group, are given in full in Table G-1 (in Appendix G). In all competency 
domains, and for each age group separately, chi-square tests for goodness of fit revealed 
significant differences between the percentage of participants who selected “Adults aged 
25”, “No difference”, and “Adults aged 75” (all ps < .05). The results of these chi-square 
tests are also reported in Table G-1. The percentage data for the competency domains that 
are integral to the present study’s research question are presented below, in Table 7. 
 
  




Percentage of Participants Who Selected Either “Adults Aged 25”, “No Difference”, or 
“Adults Aged 75” as Most Competent in Relevant Domains, for Each Participant Age 
Group 
Competency domain Participant age group 
Percentage of participants who selected “adults aged 
25”, “no difference” or “adults aged 75” 
  Adults aged 25 No difference Adults aged 75 
Social Interaction 
18-30 41.5 51.2 7.3 
50-64  30.5 54.5 14.9 
65+ 18.2 67.1 14.7 
Mean (all ages) 29.5 57.9 12.6 
Recognising emotions 
in others’ faces 
18-30 10.6 56.1 33.3 
50-64 5.2 45.5 49.4 
65+ 4.2 51.7 44.1 
Mean (all ages) 6.4 50.7 42.9 
Understanding how 
someone is 
feeling/what they are 
thinking 
18-30 17.1 59.3 23.6 
50-64 3.2 42.2 54.5 
65+ 4.2 49.7 46.2 
Mean (all ages) 7.6 49.8 42.6 
Completing cognitive 




18-30 69.1 28.5 2.4 
50-64 56.5 37.7 5.8 
65+ 53.1 40.6 6.3 




18-30 11.4 68.3 20.3 
50-64 11.7 48.7 39.6 
65+ 4.2 47.6 48.3 
Mean (all ages) 9.0 54.0 36.9 





18-30 84.6 13.0 2.4 
50-64 83.8 13.6 2.6 
65+ 77.6 19.6 2.8 
Mean (all ages) 81.9 15.5 2.6 
Recognising the 
emotion in others’ tone 
of voice 
18-30 9.8 69.1 21.1 
50-64 2.6 55.2 42.2 
65+ 0 55.2 44.8 
Mean (all ages) 3.8 59.3 36.9 
Notes. Percentages presented in bold are the highest within each participant age group 
(significance level of p < .05). Where the second-highest percentage is statistically 
equivalent to the highest, that percentage is also bolded. 
 
As shown in Table G-1, participants endorsed many age-related stereotypes that are 
consistent with stereotypes established in previous studies (e.g., Swift et al., 2013). For 
example, participants from all three age groups judged 25-year-olds to be more competent 
than 75-year-olds at driving, learning new skills, using the internet, completing memory 
tasks, completing computer tasks, and completing a running race. Importantly for the 
present research’s focus on age-related differences in cognition, a significantly higher 
percentage of participants from all three age groups judged 25-year-olds to be the most 
competent at completing cognitive tasks, compared to those who judged 75-year-olds to be 









Figure 6. Mean percentage of participants who perceive the greatest competency on 
cognitive tasks to be among adults aged 25, adults aged 75, or that there is no difference. 
 
In addition to the negative aging stereotypes, there were also some positive aging 
stereotypes endorsed. Participants from all three age groups judged 75-year old individuals 
to be more competent than 25-year old individuals at making financial decisions and 
imparting knowledge and wisdom, and better or equal to 25-year old people at reading for 
pleasure, being polite, settling arguments, understanding others’ viewpoints, and managing 
staff. Interestingly, participants judged adults aged 75 to be either equal to or worse than 
adults aged 25 at solving crosswords, despite previous research demonstrating that older 
adults were expected to be more competent at this task (Swift et al., 2013). Regarding the 
domain of social interaction, a majority of young, middle-older, and older adults judged 
there to be no difference in competency between adults aged 25 and adults aged 75.  
With regard to the specific research question relating to emotion recognition (and 
to a lesser extent, theory of mind), participants consistently judged a typical 75-year-old 
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young participants were most likely to believe that, when recognising emotions in others’ 
faces, there is no difference in competency between people aged 25 and people aged 75. 
Only 10.6% of young participants believed that people aged 25 would be more competent 
at recognising facially expressed emotions. For this task domain, both middle-older and 
older participants were equally likely to say that there is no difference between people 
aged 75 and people aged 25, or that people aged 75 years are actually more competent. 
These data are illustrated further in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7. Mean percentage of participants who perceive the greatest ability to recognise 
facially expressed emotions to be among adults aged 25, adults aged 75, or that there is no 
difference. 
 
Similar results were found for every other task domain related to emotion 
recognition or theory of mind. When considering an individual’s ability to understand how 
someone is feeling or what they are thinking, young participants were most likely to say 
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middle-older and older participants judged that adults aged 75 are as good as, or better 
than, adults aged 25. Likewise, the majority of young participants believed that adults aged 
25 and adults aged 75 are equally competent at understanding others’ emotional body 
language, while middle-older and older adults judged that adults aged 75 perform equally 
or better than adults aged 25 within this task domain. The same pattern of results was 
found for the task domain of recognising the emotion in others’ tone of voice. Thus, it 
appears clear that, despite an abundance of research demonstrating that emotion 
recognition declines with age (Gonçalves et al., 2018; Ruffman et al., 2008), lay people 
believe older adults are equal to or better than young adults at recognising emotions. 
Perceptions of emotion recognition as a cognitive or social task. The percentage 
of participants who consider the recognition of emotions to be either a cognitive task or a 
social task was calculated for each age group separately. A chi-square test of independence 
was then conducted to see whether participant age group was related to whether 
participants view the recognition of emotions as a social or a cognitive task. The 
relationship between these two variables was significant, X2 (2, N = 420) = 8.01, p = .02. 
To explore this effect further, individual chi-square tests of goodness of fit were conducted 
for each participant age group separately, to investigate whether more participants consider 
emotion recognition to be a cognitive task or a social task. 
For young participants, the chi-square test for goodness of fit was significant, X2 (1, 
N = 123) = 15.03, p < .001, suggesting that participants in this age group consider the 
recognition of emotions to be more of a social task (67.5% of young adults) than a 
cognitive task (32.5%). For the middle-older participants, the chi-square test did not reach 
significance, X2 (1, N = 154) = 3.14, p = .08, indicating that the percentages of middle-
older adults who consider the recognition of emotions to be a social task (57.1%) or a 
cognitive task (42.9%) did not significantly differ. Similarly, the chi-square test for 
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participants aged over 65 was insignificant, X2 (1, N = 143) = .01, p = .93, with equal 
percentages of participants considering emotion recognition to be a social task (50.3%) or 
a cognitive task (49.7%).  
Young, Middle-Older, and Older Adults’ Perceptions of Aging and Their 
Relationship with Emotion Recognition Ability 
Subscale scores on the Brief Aging Perceptions Questionnaire were calculated for 
each participant by averaging their responses to items separately for each particular 
subscale. The resulting scores ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). For 
the subscales ‘Timeline-Chronic’, ‘Emotional Representations’, and ‘Consequences and 
Control Negative’, higher scores represent more negative perceptions of aging, whereas 
for the subscales ‘Consequences-Positive’ and ‘Control-Positive’, higher scores represent 
more positive perceptions of aging. 
A one-way MANOVA was utilised to compare BAPQ scores between participant 
age groups on each of the three negative subscales (see Figure 8) and both of the positive 
subscales (see Figure 9). The analysis revealed significant main effects of participant age 
group for the ‘Timeline-Chronic’ subscale, F(2, 417) = 11.80, p < .001, ηp2  = .05, 
‘Emotional Representations’ subscale, F(2, 417) = 4.94, p = .008, ηp2  = .02, and the 
‘Consequences-Positive’ subscale, F(2, 417) = 4.05, p = .02, ηp2  = .02. Participant age 
groups did not significantly differ in their scores on the ‘Consequences and Control 
Negative’ subscale, F(2, 417) = 2.17, p = .12 ηp2  = .01, nor on the ‘Control-Positive’ 
subscale, F(2, 417) = .67, p = .51, ηp2  = .00. 
To explore the significant main effects of participant age group on these mean 
subscale scores, post-hoc comparisons were conducted to compare the scores of the three 
age groups. On the ‘Timeline-Chronic’ subscale, young participants had significantly 
lower scores (M = 2.64, SD = .69) than middle-older participants (M = 2.99, SD = .71), p < 
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.001, and older participants (M = 3.06, SD = .81), p < .001, indicating that young 
participants have less negative perceptions about the chronicity of aging. There was no 
significant difference between scores of middle-older and older participants, p = 1.00.  
On the ‘Emotional Representations’ subscale, young participants’ scores (M = 
2.69, SD = .92) were significantly higher than middle-older participants (M = 2.44, SD = 
.85), p = .04, and older participants (M = 2.38, SD = .81), p = .009, which is suggestive of 
more negative emotional responses to aging (such as depression, anxiety, and worry). 
Middle-older and older participants did not differ on this subscale, p = 1.00. Finally, on the 
‘Consequences- Positive’ subscale, older participants had significantly lower scores (M = 
4.00, SD = .71) than middle-older adults (M = 4.21, SD = .61), p = .02, suggesting less 
positive perceptions about the consequences of aging. However, the scores of older 
participants did not significantly differ from those of young participants (M = 4.09, SD = 
.61), p = .79, nor did middle-older participants’ scores differ from young participants’ 
















Figure 8. Mean scores (out of 5) on the three negative subscales of the Brief Aging 
Perceptions Questionnaire, as a function of participant age group. Higher scores represent 
more negative perceptions about aging. An asterisk denotes a significant difference 
























































Figure 9. Mean scores (out of 5) on the two positive subscales of the Brief Aging 
Perceptions Questionnaire, as a function of participant age group. Higher scores represent 
more positive perceptions about aging. Error bars denote one standard error around the 
mean and an asterisk denotes a significant difference between two mean scores. 
 
To investigate whether perceptions about aging were related to participants’ 
emotion recognition performance on the GERT-S, mean GERT-S scores and mean total 
BAPQ scores were computed. To calculate GERT-S scores, the number of emotions that 
each participant correctly labelled were summed and converted into proportion accurate, 
separately for negative emotions and positive/neutral emotions. To calculate the total 
BAPQ scores, the two positive subscales (‘Consequences Positive’ and ‘Control Positive’) 
were reverse scored so that higher scores now represented more negative (or less positive) 
perceptions of aging. These scores were then summed with the other three negative 
subscales to form a total BAPQ score for each participant, with higher scores indicating 
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having more positive perceptions (all those with BAPQ scores below a median score of 
2.354) or more negative perceptions (all those with BAPQ scores above 2.354).  
GERT-S scores were then analysed in a 2 (emotion valence: negative, 
positive/neutral) x 3 (participant age group: young, middle-older, older) x 2 (perceptions of 
aging: more positive perceptions, more negative perceptions) mixed ANOVA. The 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of emotion valence, F(1, 412) = 204.99, p < 
.001, ηp2  = .33, whereby participants were significantly worse overall at recognising 
negative emotions (M = .49, SD = .15) than positive/neutral emotions (M = .61, SD = .16). 
This main effect was qualified by a significant interaction effect of emotion 
valence and participant age group, F(2, 412) = 5.72, p = .004, ηp2  = .03, shown in Figure 
10. To explore this interaction further, one-way ANOVAs were conducted for negative 
emotions and positive/neutral emotions separately, comparing the performance of 
participants across the three different age groups. For positive emotions, the ANOVA 
demonstrated that GERT-S scores did not significantly differ across participant age 
groups, F(2, 415) = .68, p = .51, ηp2  = .00. However, for negative emotions, there was a 
significant effect of participant age group on the GERT-S scores, F(2, 416) = 5.19, p = 
.006, ηp2  = .02. Post-hoc analyses using Bonferroni correction demonstrated that older 
adults (M = .47, SD = .15) were poorer than young adults (M = .53, SD = .16) at correctly 
recognising negative emotions, p = .004. Middle-older adults (M = .49, SD = .14) did not 
differ in accuracy from young adults or older adults when labelling negative emotions 
(both ps > .05).  
 




Figure 10. Mean proportion correct on the GERT-S for negative and positive/neutral 
emotions, as a function of participant age group. Error bars denote one standard error 
around the mean and an asterisk denotes a significant difference between two means. 
 
Furthermore, there was a significant main effect of perceptions of aging, F(1, 412) 
= 7.30, p = .007, ηp2  = .02, whereby people with more positive perceptions about aging 
were more accurate on the GERT-S (M = .57, SD = .12) than people with more negative 
perceptions about aging (M = .53, SD = .15)6. However, perceptions of aging did not 
significantly interact with emotion valence or participant age group (all ps > .05). These 
results suggest that the ability to accurately recognise emotions may be related to an 




                                               







































An exploratory analysis was conducted to investigate whether participants who 
perceive emotion recognition ability to be a cognitive task, versus a social task, differed in 
their performance on the GERT-S. Participants were classified into a group of ‘social 
categorisers’ (who reported perceiving emotion recognition as predominantly a social task; 
n = 243) and ‘cognitive categorisers’ (those who reported perceiving it as a cognitive task; 
n = 177). Subsequently, GERT-S scores (proportion correct) were analysed in a 3 (age 
group: young, middle-older, older) x 2 (task categorisation: social, cognitive) x 2 (emotion 
valence: negative, positive/neutral) mixed ANOVA. Consistent with previous analyses, 
there was a main effect of emotion valence, F(1, 412) = 185.32, p < .001, ηp2  = .31, 
qualified by an interaction between emotion valence and participant age group, F(2, 412) = 
6.89, p = .001, ηp2  = .03. There was also a trend such that cognitive categorisers (M = .53, 
SD = .13) performed worse on the GERT-S than social categorisers (M = .56, SD = .14), 
F(1, 412) = 3.74, p = .05, ηp2  = .01. The three-way interaction between emotion valence, 
participant age group, and task categorisation did not reach significance, F(2, 412) = 1.48, 
p = .23, ηp2  = .01.  
However, although the three-way interaction was nonsignificant, examination of 
the interaction plots exhibited a trend in which young adults outperformed older adults at 
recognising negative emotions only for ‘cognitive’ but not ‘social’ categorisers. It is 
possible that a significant interaction effect may have been obscured by the use of an 
initial omnibus F test and reduced power (Hancock & Klockars, 1996). Therefore, for 
exploratory purposes, GERT scores were analysed in a 3 (participant age group: young, 
middle-older, older) x 2 (emotion valence: negative, positive/neutral) ANOVA, separately 
for ‘social categorisers’ and ‘cognitive categorisers’.  
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For participants who were cognitive categorisers, there was a significant main 
effect of emotion valence, F(1, 173) = 81.28, p < .001, ηp2  = .32, such that participants 
were worse at recognising negative emotions (M = .48, SD = .15) than positive/neutral 
emotions (M = .59, SD = .15). This main effect was qualified by a significant interaction of 
emotion valence and participant age group, F(2, 173) = 6.31, p = .002, ηp2  = .07. A follow-
up one-way ANOVA comparing participant age groups’ accuracy when recognising 
positive/neutral emotions indicated no difference in scores between young, middle-older, 
and older adults, F(2, 173) = .49, p = .62, ηp2  = .01. However, for the recognition of 
negative emotions, there was a significant effect of participant age group, F(2, 173) = 4.22, 
p = .02, ηp2  = .046, whereby older adults (M = .45, SD = .16) were less accurate than 
young adults (M = .53, SD = .14), p = .02. Middle-older adults’ GERT-S scores (M = .465, 
SD = .157) were not significantly different from young or older adults (ps > .05). 
For participants who were social categorisers, there was a significant main effect of 
emotion valence, F(1, 239) = 112.91, p < .001, ηp2  = .32, such that participants had lower 
accuracy scores for negative emotions (M = .51, SD = .15) than positive/neutral emotions 
(M = .62, SD = .17) on the GERT-S. However, there was no significant interaction effect 
of emotion valence and age group, F(2, 239) = 1.31, p = .27, ηp2  = .01. 
Therefore, the finding that older adults were worse than young adults at 
recognising negative emotions on the GERT-S held for ‘cognitive categorisers’ but not for 
‘social categorisers.’ These results may provide some preliminary evidence that older 
adults perform worse than young adults only when they view emotion recognition as a 
cognitive task (which they are stereotypically assumed to be worse at), but not if they view 
it as a social task (at which they are expected to perform equally to young adults). 
However, given that these analyses were conducted using self-reported belief and the 
initial omnibus F test did not reach significance, they should be interpreted with caution.  




The first objective of the current study was to explore the current stereotypes about 
aging in the USA. In line with previous research and reviews (e.g., Kite et al., 2005; 
Posthuma & Campion, 2009; Swift et al., 2013), the present results indicated that people 
hold several negative stereotypes about declines in competency with age. For example, 
older adults (aged 75 years) were believed to be less competent than young adults (aged 
25) at driving, learning new skills, using the internet, completing memory tasks, 
completing computer tasks, and participating in a running race. However, they also held 
various positive stereotypes about aging, such as that older adults are better at making 
financial decisions and imparting knowledge and wisdom. With regards to present study’s 
main areas of interest, a stereotype shared by most participants was that older adults are 
worse than young adults at completing cognitive tasks. On the other hand, older adults 
were believed to be as good as young adults at social interaction.  
On task domains relating to emotion recognition, there was a perception that older 
adults were equally – or even more – competent than young adults. For example, the 
majority of participants (across all age groups) believed that older adults were equal to or 
better than young adults at recognising emotions in faces, understanding how someone is 
feeling or what they are thinking, understanding others’ emotional body language, and 
recognising the emotion in somebody’s tone of voice. Very few participants believed that 
young adults were more competent than older adults on these tasks. This main finding is 
remarkable considering the literature showing that older adults are in fact poorer than 
young adults at recognising many emotions (Ruffman et al., 2008). Unlike age-related 
stereotypes about memory difficulties, cognitive decline, and deterioration in physical 
ability, it appears that stereotypes about emotion recognition ability across the lifespan are 
in the opposite direction to what has been established by empirical research. It is possible, 
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then, that older adults’ lack of knowledge about age-related declines in emotion 
recognition ability might protect them from being threatened by the implication that they 
will perform worse on emotion recognition tasks. Further, the finding that very few people 
actually believe young adults to be more competent at recognising emotions may explain 
why the stereotype threat manipulation in Study 1 led to young adults feeling highly 
threatened and anxious. 
A related finding was that middle-older and older adults were equally likely to 
consider emotion recognition to be a cognitive or a social task, and that young adults were 
actually more likely to view it as a social task. The fact that a) participants in the current 
study believed that older adults are just as competent as young adults in the domain of 
social interaction, and b) many of the participants view emotion recognition as a social 
task, may partially explain why lay people do not expect older adults to be worse at 
recognising emotions. 
The second objective of the current study was to investigate whether young, 
middle-older, and older adults’ perceptions of aging were related to their performance on 
an emotion recognition task. Initial comparisons of aging perceptions between the three 
participant age groups resulted in three main findings. Firstly, middle-older and older 
adults were shown to have more negative perceptions about the chronicity of aging than 
young adults. This is unsurprising given that one would expect both older participant age 
groups to be more likely than young adults to categorise themselves as “old”, to be 
cognizant of aging, and to “feel their age” in daily activities. Indeed, research has shown 
that many older adults report feeling old and tired (Harris, 1975), and that they report 
feeling older with increasing age (Kotter-Grühn, Kleinsphen-Ammerlahn, Gerstorf, & 
Smith, 2009). 
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Secondly, older adults were found to have less positive perceptions about the 
consequences of aging than middle-older adults. This is consistent with previous research 
showing that satisfaction with aging declines with age in older adults (Kleinsphen-
Ammerlahn, Kotter-Grühn, & Smith, 2008; Kotter-Grühn et al., 2009). One potential 
explanation for this is that middle-older adults may have more optimistic (perhaps wishful) 
expectations that reaching older age will result in positive outcomes, such as becoming 
wiser, developing further as a person, and becoming more appreciative of things in life. It 
is possible that, once adults actually reach older age and begin to experience more age-
related difficulties, they have a less positive outlook of the good outcomes of aging.  
Finally, compared to middle-older and older adults, young adults were shown to 
experience more negative emotional responses (such as depression, anxiety, and anger) 
when thinking about aging and how it might affect them. This finding possibly reflects 
ageism and negative stereotypes from young adults towards their older counterparts. 
Because young adults perceive older adults to be less competent in a number of task 
domains (as was corroborated in the present study), it is conceivable that they would 
experience a negative emotional response when considering becoming part of the 
stigmatized age group. Middle-older and older adults, on the other hand, may have become 
better at regulating negative emotional responses by choosing to switch their focus towards 
the positive, meaningful aspects of life due to anticipated limits on their lifespan (in line 
with the socioemotional selectivity theory; Carstensen, Fung, & Charles, 2003). 
With regard to young, middle-older, and older adults’ performance on the GERT-S, 
the results were in line with previous findings of age-related differences in emotion 
recognition ability. Despite employing a dynamic, multimodal emotion recognition task 
(the GERT-S), older adults were still poorer at recognising negative emotions than young 
adults (with middle-older adults scoring somewhere in the middle). However, older adults 
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were equally good as young adults at recognising positive/neutral emotions. These 
findings are consistent with previous research showing that older adults’ ability to 
recognise negative emotions such as fear, anger, and sadness is impaired (Ruffman et al., 
2008) while the ability to successfully recognise positive emotions may be somewhat 
spared (Murphy, Lehrfeld, & Isaacowitz, 2010). Although Ruffman and colleagues’ (2008) 
meta-analysis indicated that young adults were better than older adults at recognising 
happiness, the effect size found was very small. In addition, the 95% confidence interval 
included zero, suggesting that older adults’ accuracy when recognising positive emotions 
(such as happiness) may not actually differ significantly from young adults (Murphy et al., 
2010). The current study’s results support this idea. 
Across all three participant groups, those with more positive perceptions of aging 
were more accurate on the GERT-S than those with more negative perceptions. It is 
unclear why this effect occurred irrespective of participant age. One possible explanation 
is that thinking pessimistically about aging led all participants (regardless of age) to 
experience temporarily lowered mood, which may have reduced their emotion recognition 
performance. This would be consistent with previous research showing that psychological 
distress or depression may be associated with lowered emotion recognition accuracy 
(Csukly et al., 2011; Persad & Polivy, 1993; Surguladze et al., 2004).  
Alternatively, it is possible that participants who are more optimistic and positive 
about aging also have higher levels of empathy, which could improve their emotion 
recognition performance. Indeed, studies have respectively demonstrated that optimism 
and empathy may be closely interrelated (Hojat, Vergare, Isenberg, Cohen, & Spandorfer, 
2015), and that empathy may be positively related to emotion recognition ability (Gery, 
Miljkovitch, Berthoz, & Soussignan, 2009). However, because the present study did not 
include measures of current mood or empathy, a conclusive explanation for this finding is 
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unable to be made. With regard to future directions, a longitudinal study investigating 
whether older adults’ perceptions of aging are positively or negatively associated with 
emotion recognition over time might be more informative. 
In addition to the above primary analyses, a further rudimentary analysis was 
conducted to explore age differences on the GERT-S separately for those who perceive 
emotion recognition to be predominantly a cognitive task (i.e., cognitive categorisers) and 
those who perceive it to be a social task (i.e., social categorisers). It was found that age-
related differences on the GERT-S remained only for cognitive categorisers, but not for 
social categorisers. Although caution should be used when interpreting this finding (as 
categorisation was not experimentally manipulated), it provides a tentative suggestion that 
the way emotion recognition is perceived or framed may affect older adults’ emotion 
recognition ability. For example, perceiving emotion recognition as a cognitive task may 
lead to stereotype threat in older adults due to the societal stereotypes about age-related 
cognitive decline. On the other hand, perceiving emotion recognition to be a social task 
may not affect older adults’ ability to recognise emotions. This idea was explored further 
in Study 3. 








Study Three: Potential Effects of Framing an Emotion Recognition Task as a 
Cognitive Task on Older Adults’ Emotion Recognition Ability 
 
The results of Study 1 showed that eliciting stereotypes about age-related declines 
in emotion recognition was not successful in inducing stereotype threat in older adults, and 
in fact, appeared to induce stereotype threat in young adults. One possible explanation for 
this finding is that lay people do not actually believe that emotion recognition ability 
declines with age (as demonstrated in Study 2), despite the literature demonstrating so 
(Gonçalves et al., 2018; Ruffman et al., 2008). Therefore, the main objective of Study 3 
was to employ a more effective stereotype threat manipulation based on aging stereotypes 
that are prevalent in current western society. Given that older adults are believed to have 
worse cognitive functioning than young adults (as supported by findings from Study 2), 
framing emotion recognition as a cognitive task may produce stereotype threat effects in 
older adults. Because older adults are believed to be equally good as young adults in the 
domain of social interaction (also shown in Study 2), framing emotion recognition as a 
social task should not produce stereotype threat.  
Therefore, in the current study, young (aged 18-30 years) and older (aged over 65 
years) adults were assigned to one of three conditions: cognitive, social, or control. In both 
the cognitive and social conditions, participants were informed that young and older adults 
were going to be compared, whereas participants in the control condition were simply told 
that different types of people were taking part. Additionally, the emotion recognition task 
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was framed as assessing cognitive ability in the cognitive condition, and as assessing 
social ability in the social condition. In the control condition, participants were told that 
the aim of the study was to assess people’s abilities on various tasks. Participants then 
completed the same emotion recognition task used in Study 2 (the GERT-S). 
Subsequently, participants answered two explicit questions about how stereotype-
threatened they had felt while completing the task. 
Participants also completed the Age Group Identification Scale – Shortened 
Version (AGIS; Gartska, Branscombe, & Hummerts, 1997), which was used to measure 
the degree to which participants identify with their own age group. Previous research has 
shown that stereotype threat manipulations can have differing effects on one’s task 
performance depending on the degree to which one identifies with a group that they belong 
to. For example, Schmader (2002) demonstrated that, compared to women who identified 
weakly with their gender, women who identified strongly with their gender experienced 
greater impairments on a math test as a result of stereotype threat about women’s math 
ability. In addition, Deaux and colleagues (2007) found that stereotype threat had greater 
effects on the academic success of Afro-Caribbean immigrants in America who identified 
more with being African-American, compared to those who identified more with being 
West Indian (and thus might be less targeted by racial stereotypes about African-American 
people’s academic ability). These effects have been explained in terms of social identity 
theory (Tajfel, 2010), whereby people who identify strongly with a particular group have 
an increased tendency to experience stereotype threat when their social identity is 
threatened (Marquet et al., 2019). 
More relevant to the current thesis, the degree of identification with one’s age 
group has also been shown to affect older adults’ performance on stereotype-relevant tasks 
(Kang & Chasteen, 2009; Marquet, Missotten, Dardenne, & Adam, 2019). For example, 
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Kang and Chasteen (2009) found that older adults who strongly identified with the older 
age group had worse memory for prose compared to older adults who identified less 
strongly with their age group. Interestingly, this effect was independent of experimentally 
manipulated stereotype threat, suggesting that older adults who have worse memories may 
increase their identification with the stigmatised age group in order to receive support from 
other members (Kang & Chasteen, 2009). Alternatively, cues relating to older adults’ 
competency on cognitive tasks (such as memory) may be more salient to those who 
identify strongly with their age group, even in low-threat conditions (Kang & Chasteen, 
2009). Taking this research into account, another objective of the present study was to 
explore whether the degree to which young and older adults identify with their own age 
group has any direct or moderating effects on their emotion recognition accuracy. 
The first main hypothesis of the current experiment was that, due to prevalent 
stereotypes about cognitive decline with age, older adults would report being more 
threatened in the condition in which emotion recognition was framed as a cognitive task, 
compared to the social and control conditions. As a result of this stereotype threat, it was 
expected that older adults would experience a performance deficit on the emotion 
recognition task in the cognitive condition, relative to the other two conditions. 
Conversely, it was hypothesised that young adults’ reported level of stereotype threat and 
performance on the GERT-S would remain constant across the three conditions.  
With regard to age group identification, it was considered possible that either: 1) 
older adults who identify strongly with their age group would experience greater 
deleterious effects of stereotype threat on emotion recognition accuracy, compared to those 
who identify weakly (in line with studies such as Deaux et al., 2007; Schmader, 2002), or 
2) older adults who identify strongly with their age group would be less accurate at 
recognising emotions than those who identify weakly, regardless of stereotype threat 
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condition (in line with Kang & Chasteen, 2009). As young adults were not the target of the 
stereotype threat, it was expected that age group identification would not have any direct 
or moderating effect on their emotion recognition performance. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and twenty-two young adults (68 male) aged 18 – 30 (M = 25.82 
years, SD = 3.05 years) and 117 older adults (52 male) aged 65 – 88 (M = 69.47 years, SD 
= 4.44 years) from the United States of America participated in the present study (after the 
application of exclusion criteria, which are described in the results). As in Study 2, 
Amazon Mechanical Turk was used to recruit participants (i.e. MTurk ‘workers’), who 
received $0.90 to $1.00 for taking the present 20-30-minute survey. All participants 
reported being proficient in English and reported no dementia or other neurological 
difficulties. Ethical approval was obtained from the Human Ethics Committee (Reference 
number = D17/006) and all participants provided informed consent before participating in 
the study. 
Stimuli and Measures 
The Geneva Emotion Recognition Test – Short Version (GERT-S). As 
described in the previous chapter, the GERT-S is a 42-item emotion recognition task that 
requires participants to assign an emotion label (from 14 options: pride, joy, amusement, 
pleasure, relief, interest, surprise, anxiety, fear, despair, sadness, disgust, irritation, and 
anger) to male and female actors’ emotional portrayals in short video clips. 
Age Group Identification Scale – Shortened Version. The short version of the 
AGIS (Garstka, Branscombe, & Hummerts, 1997) was used in the present study to assess 
the extent to which participants identify with their own age group. The scale consists of 5 
items such as “I like being a member of my age group”, and “My age group membership is 
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central to who I am”. Participants responded to these items using a scale from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), with higher scores indicating a greater level of 
identification with their age group. The full 13-item version of the AGIS has previously 
been shown to have excellent internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .97; Kang & Chasteen, 
2009). 
The Depression Anxiety Stress Scales-21 (DASS-21). As in the previous studies, 
the DASS-21 was employed as a screen for depression, anxiety, and stress. Participant data 
was not included in any data analyses if their scores on the DASS-21 exceeded the cut-off 
for severe depression, anxiety, or stress.  
Procedure 
Once participants clicked the link provided to them on the MTurk website, they 
were presented with the present survey via Qualtrics. After being provided with a broad 
overview of the study, participants answered two questions about their age and their 
gender (see Appendix H). If participants were within the target age groups for the study, 
they were informed that they were eligible and could continue on to read the full 
information sheet. At this point, participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
conditions (cognitive, social, or control), and were subsequently presented with a study 
description that contained slightly different information depending on their assigned 
condition (see Appendix I and Appendix J).  
In the cognitive condition, the recognition of emotions was framed as a task that 
assesses cognitive ability, with participants being told that “the purpose of this study is to 
examine people’s cognitive ability at different ages” and that young and older adults were 
being compared. In the social condition, participants were told that “the purpose of this 
study is to examine people’s social ability at different ages” and that young and older 
adults were being compared. Finally, in the control condition, they were told that “the 
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purpose of this study is to examine people’s ability on various tasks”, and that different 
types of people would be taking part in the research (i.e. no mention of age group 
comparisons).  
Once participants had been informed about the study and had provided consent (see 
consent form in Appendix K), the manipulation was reinforced by stating to participants in 
the cognitive condition that “the following tasks will assess your cognitive ability”, while 
participants in the social condition were told that “the following tasks will assess your 
social ability.” Those in the control condition were merely told that “the following tasks 
will assess your abilities in various domains.” Participants then continued on to complete 
the GERT-S. After finishing the GERT-S, participants were asked whether the video clips 
and audio worked correctly throughout the test (and if they did not, their data were 
excluded from analyses). 
Next, participants’ explicit stereotype threat concerns were assessed using the two 
questions utilised in Study 1 (i.e., “Were you worried that your ability to perform well on 
these tasks was affected by your age?” and “Were you worried that if you performed 
poorly on the test, the researcher would attribute your poor performance to your age?”). 
They were required to respond using a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). 
Subsequently, participants answered a series of demographic questions about age, 
ethnicity, level of education, proficiency in the English language, current medication, and 
neurological difficulties (see Appendix L). Participants then completed the AGIS, 
followed by the DASS-21.  
Finally, as a manipulation check, participants were asked whether they 
remembered what the study was originally described as assessing. To discourage guessing, 
they were told that “if you don’t remember how we described it to you, it is ok to say you 
don’t remember.” Participants were required to select one of the following responses: 1) “I 
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was told that the study was assessing people’s cognitive ability at different ages”, 2) “I was 
told that the study was assessing people’s social ability at different ages”, 3) “I was told 
that the study was assessing people’s abilities on various tasks (no mention of age-related 
differences), or 4) “I don’t remember.” 
Results 
Exclusion Criteria 
A total of 8,823 MTurk workers clicked the link to the eligibility screen, but only 
6.3% of workers (n = 558) met the age requirements. Participants’ data were excluded the 
study if they: reported taking medication for a mental health problem; were above the 
DASS-21 cut-off for extremely severe depression, anxiety, or stress; reported suffering 
from neurological problems; indicated that any of the GERT videos did not work 
correctly; responded incorrectly to the manipulation check; or did not complete the survey. 
After the exclusion criteria were applied, the remaining participants included 122 young 
adults (68 male) aged 18-30 years old (M = 25.82, SD = 3.05) and 117 older adults (52 
male) aged 65-88 years old (M = 69.47, SD = 4.44). 
Preliminary Analyses 
DASS-21 scale scores (along with average highest level of education) are 
displayed in Table 8, separately for each age group and gender. To explore possible 
differences in DASS-21 scores, participants’ scores on the depression, anxiety and stress 
scales were examined in a 2 (participant age group: young, older) x 2 (gender: female, 
male) MANOVA. The analysis revealed a main effect of participant age group for the 
depression scale, F(1, 234) = 10.89, p = .001, ηp2  = .04, the anxiety scale, F(1, 234) = 
12.97, p < .001, ηp2  = .05, and the stress scale, F(1, 234) = 15.67, p < .001, ηp2  = .06, with 
young adults scoring higher than older adults on each. However, there were no main 
effects of gender (all ps > .05).  
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For each DASS-21 scale, the main effect of participant age group was qualified by 
a significant interaction between participant age group and gender (depression: F(1, 234) = 
4.65, p = .03, ηp2  = .02; anxiety: F(1, 234) = 7.95, p = .005, ηp2  = .03; stress: F(1, 234) = 
5.24, p = .02, ηp2  = .02). To explore the interaction effects further, independent samples t-
tests were used to compare male and female participants’ scores on each DASS-21 scales, 
separately for young and older participants. These tests were conducted using Bonferroni 
adjusted alpha levels of .017 per test (.05/3). For each of the three DASS-21 scales, the 
analyses demonstrated that although young males had lower scores than young females 
and older males had higher scores than older females, none of these differences reached 
statistical significance (all ps > .017).  
To determine whether education level differed between participant age groups and 
genders, average level of education was analysed in a 2 (participant age group: young, 
older) x 2 (gender: female, male) ANOVA. There were no main effects of participant age 
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Study 3 
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Notes. Education level was categorised as 1 = primary school, 2 = some high school, 3 = 
high school, 4 = trade certificate, 5 = technical certificate, 6 = an undergraduate university 
degree, and 7 = postgraduate. 
 
Consistent with Study 1 and Study 2, neither gender nor DASS-21 scores were 
included in the following analyses. Data from the current study were primarily analysed 
using ANOVAs, with Huynh-Feldt corrected values reported if Mauchly’s Test showed 
the assumption of sphericity to be violated. Where necessary, interactions revealed by 
ANOVAs were further analysed using t-tests, with the Bonferroni correction applied for 
multiple comparisons. Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances was also employed, and 
corrections subsequently made for any unequal variances. 
Threat-Based Concerns Across Conditions  
A Pearson correlation coefficient was computed to assess the correlation between 
the two questions about threat-based concerns (“Were you worried that your ability to 
perform well on these tasks was affected by your age?” and, “Were you worried that if you 
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performed poorly on the test, the researcher would attribute your poor performance to your 
age?”). The analysis demonstrated that participants’ responses on the 7-point scale for the 
two questions were significantly positively correlated, r = .66, n = 239, p < .001; therefore, 
responses for the two questions were averaged to create a single threat score for each 
participant. 
Participants’ threat scores were then examined in a 2 (participant age group: young, 
older) x 3 (condition: control, cognitive, social) analysis of variance (ANOVA), revealing 
a significant main effect of condition, F(2, 233) = 3.88, p = .02, ηp2  = .03. According to 
post-hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni correction, self-reported threat scores were 
significantly higher in the cognitive condition (M = 2.20, SD = 1.60) compared to the 
control condition (M = 1.64, SD = 1.19), p = .02. Threat scores did not significantly differ 
between the cognitive condition and the social condition (M = 1.88, SD = 1.15), p = .40, 
nor between the social condition and the control condition, p = .76. 
As shown in Figure 11, the main effect of condition on threat scores was qualified 
by an interaction between condition and participant age group, F(2, 233) = 4.85, p = .009, 
ηp2  = .04. To explore the interaction further, one-way ANOVAs were conducted that 
compared threat scores between conditions, separately for young and older participants. 
For young adults, there was no main effect of condition on threat scores, F(2, 119) = .11, p 
= .90, ηp2  = .00. However, for older adults, the effect of condition on threat scores was 
significant, F(2, 114) = 8.95, p < .001, ηp2  = .14. Post-hoc comparisons demonstrated that 
older adults were significantly more threatened in the cognitive condition (M = 2.57, SD = 
1.74) than both the social (M = 1.81, SD = 1.05), p = .03, and control conditions (M = 1.38, 
SD = .74), p < .001. There was no significant difference in self-reported threat between the 
social and control conditions, p = .45. Evidently, the stereotype threat manipulation was 
effective in producing higher levels of stereotype threat in older adults when the task was 
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framed as measuring an aspect of cognitive functioning (which is widely believed to 
decline with age). 
 
 
Figure 11. Mean self-reported threat scores as a function of participant age group and 
stereotype threat condition. Error bars denote one standard error around the mean and 
asterisks signify a significant difference in mean scores between conditions. 
 
Effect of Stereotype Threat Condition on Young and Older Adults’ Emotion 
Recognition Accuracy 
Separate negative and positive/neutral GERT-S scores were generated for each 
participant by calculating the respective proportion of negative and positive/neutral 
emotions that they correctly labelled. Then, GERT-S scores were analysed in a 2 (emotion 
valence: negative, positive/neutral) x 2 (participant age group: young, older) x 3 
(condition: control, cognitive, social) mixed ANOVA. A significant main effect of 
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labelling negative emotions (M = .50, SD = .15) than positive/neutral emotions (M = .61, 
SD = .16), F(1, 233) = 126.41, p < .001, ηp2  = .35.  
This effect was qualified by an interaction of emotion valence and participant age 
group, F(1, 233) = 6.54, p = .01, ηp2  = .03, displayed in Figure 12. Independent t-tests 
were conducted to investigate how negative and positive/neutral GERT-S scores differed 
between participant age groups.  For negative emotions, GERT-S scores did not 
significantly differ between young adults (M = .50, SD = .16) and older adults (M = .49, 
SD = .14), t(237) = .12, p = .90. Interestingly, however, older adults were more accurate at 
recognising positive/neutral emotions (M = .64, SD = .13) compared to young adults (M = 
.58, SD = .17), t(223.39) = 2.71, p = .007. 
 
 
Figure 12. Mean proportion correct on the GERT-S for negative and positive/neutral 
emotions, as a function of participant age group. Error bars denote one standard error 
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Importantly for the current research hypotheses, there were no significant effects of 
stereotype threat condition on GERT-S scores (all ps > .05; see Table 9 for all ANOVA 
results including stereotype threat condition as a variable). It appears that young and older 
adults’ ability to recognise emotions did not vary as a function of whether they were told 
that the task was assessing general ability, social ability, or cognitive ability. Therefore, 
despite the stereotype threat manipulation effectively increasing older adults’ self-reported 
threat, their performance on the emotion recognition task was not affected. 
 
Table 9. 
ANOVA Results for Main and Interaction Effects on GERT-S Accuracy Scores (Proportion 
Correct) Involving Stereotype Threat Condition 
Source df MS F p ηp2 
Condition 2 .03 .78 .46 .01 
ParticipantAge*Condition 2 .02 .59 .56 .01 
EmotionValence*Condition 2 .03 2.70 .07 .02 
EmotionValence*ParticipantAge*Condition 2 .01 .62 .54 .01 
 
Young and Older Adults’ Age Group Identification Scale (AGIS) Scores 
Responses for each of the five AGIS items, ranging from 1 to 7, were calculated 
for each participant and then averaged across young and older adults separately. An 
analysis of the reliability of the AGIS demonstrated a Cronbach’s alpha of .91, indicating a 
high level of internal consistency between the five items. As shown in Table 10, 
participants’ responses on the five items were all significant positively correlated. 
Consequently, responses on the five items were averaged to create a single age group 
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identification score for each participant, with higher scores indicating a greater level of 
identification with their own age group. A one-way ANOVA revealed that AGIS scores 
did not differ between young adults (M = 5.00, SD = 1.47) and older adults (M = 5.02, SD 
= 1.32), F(1, 237) = .00, p = .96, ηp2  = .00.  
 
Table 10. 
Correlations Between Five Items of the Age Group Identification Scale 
Item 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. I like being a member of my age 
group 
–     
2. I am proud to be a member of my 
age group 
.804** –    
3. My age group membership is 
central to who I am 
.536** .582** –   
4. I believe that being a member of my 
age group is a positive experience 
.754** .791** .608** –  
5. I have a clear sense of my age group 
identity and what it means to me 
.567** .677** .620** .667** – 
** p < .01. 
 
To determine whether age group identification differentially affected young and 
older adults’ performance on the GERT-S, participants were split into low and high age 
group identifiers. This was performed as a median split, where all participants whose 
AGIS scores fell below the median (< 5.2) were categorised as “low identifiers” and those 
whose scores fell above the median (> 5.2) were categorised as “high identifiers.” An 
initial ANOVA included stereotype threat condition as a variable; however, there were no 
significant effects of condition (all ps > .05). Consequently, stereotype threat condition 
was not included in the following analysis.  
CHAPTER 4: STUDY THREE 
 
120 
GERT-S scores were analysed in a 2 (emotion valence: negative, positive/neutral) 
x 2 (participant age group: young, older) x 3 (age group identification: low, high) 
ANOVA. Consistent with the results previously described (and in the same direction), the 
ANOVA revealed a main effect of emotion valence, F(1, 217) = 119.60, p < .001, ηp2  = 
.36, qualified by an interaction of emotion valence and participant age group, F(1, 217) = 
6.71, p = .01, ηp2  = .03.  
As shown in Figure 13, a significant two-way interaction was observed between 
participant age group and age group identification, F(1, 217) = 6.49, p = .01, ηp2  = .03, 
whereby older adults who identified more strongly with their age group were less accurate 
on the GERT-S than those who identified weakly, whereas the opposite was true for young 
adults. To investigate the effect further, independent samples t-tests were conducted that 
compared low and high age group identifiers’ emotion recognition accuracy on the GERT-
S for young and older adults separately. This analysis confirmed that, for older adults, high 
identifiers (M = .55, SD = .11) were less accurate at recognising emotions than low 
identifiers (M = .59, SD = .10), although the effect just failed to reach significance, t(110) 
= 1.96, p = .05. For young adults, the opposite was found, with high identifiers being more 
accurate (M = .57, SD = .12) than low identifiers (M = .51, SD = .18), albeit non-





                                               
7 Analysis of these data with linear regression showed similar effects that, as with the t-
tests described above, approached significance.  




Figure 13. Young and older adults’ GERT accuracy scores (mean proportion correct) for 
high age group identifiers and low age group identifiers. Error bars denote one standard 
error around the mean. 
 
Additional Analysis 
Combined analysis of GERT-S data from Study 2 and Study 3. The current 
study’s primary research focus was on the potential effects of stereotype threat on emotion 
recognition ability, and not age-related differences in emotion recognition ability 
specifically. Despite this, it was considered beneficial to further investigate the current 
finding that older adults were equally good as young adults at recognising negative 
emotions and actually better at recognising positive emotions (contrary to empirical 
research; e.g., Ruffman et al., 2008). Given that Study 2 and Study 3 employed the exact 
same GERT-S emotion recognition programme, data from both studies were combined 
(for young and older adults only; middle-older adults from Study 2 were excluded) to 
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GERT-S scores were analysed in a 2 (emotion valence: negative, positive/neutral) 
x 2 (study: Study 2, Study 3) x 2 (participant age group: young, older) ANOVA, which 
revealed a significant main effect of emotion valence, F(1, 500) = 245.03, p < .001, ηp2  = 
.33, with participants being less accurate at recognising negative emotions (M = .50, SD = 
.16) than positive emotions (M = .61, SD = .16). The ANOVA also revealed an interaction 
between study and age group, F(1, 500) = 5.12, p = .02, ηp2  = .01. Further exploration 
using t-tests indicated that, for young participants, there was no significant difference 
between GERT-S scores in Study 2 (M = .56, SD = .15) and Study 3 (M = .54, SD = .15), 
t(243) = 1.02, p = .31. However, older participants from Study 3 were more accurate at 
recognising emotions (M = .57, SD = .11) compared to older participants in Study 2 (M = 
.54, SD = .13), although this effect just failed to reach significance (according to the 
applied Bonferroni p value of .025), t(257.95) = 2.10, p = .04. 
Importantly, an interaction between emotion valence and participant age group was 
found, F(1, 500) = 17.03, p < .001, ηp2  = .03, which did not depend on the study in which 
participants completed the GERT-S (i.e., there was no three-way interaction between 
study, emotion valence, and participant age group, F(1, 500) = .02, p = .89, ηp2  = .00). The 
interaction between emotion valence and participant age group (depicted in Figure 14) was 
further explored by comparing young and older participants’ GERT-S scores separately for 
negative and positive/neutral emotions. When recognising positive/neutral emotions, older 
adults (M = .62, SD = .15) were equally as accurate as young adults (M = .59, SD = .17), 
t(476.9) = 1.77, p = .08. However, older adults performed more poorly (M = .48, SD = .15) 
than young adults (M = .51, SD = .16) when recognising negative emotions, t(502) = 2.34, 
p = .02.  
 




Figure 14. Mean proportion correct on the GERT-S for negative and positive/neutral 
emotions across Study 1 and Study 2, as a function of participant age group. Error bars 
denote one standard error around the mean and an asterisk signifies a significant difference 
between two means. 
Discussion 
The primary objective of the present study – and, moreover, of this entire thesis – 
was to investigate the effects of manipulating stereotype threat on older adults’ emotion 
recognition ability. The present study aimed to employ a more effective stereotype threat 
manipulation than was used in Study 1, based on the aging stereotypes that were endorsed 
by participants in Study 2. Young and older adults completed an emotion recognition task 
that was either framed as assessing cognitive ability, social ability, or general abilities. As 
hypothesised, the manipulation used in the current study produced a clear effect on older 
adults’ (but not younger adults’) feelings of stereotype threat. When emotion recognition 
was framed as a task that assesses cognitive ability – which is believed to decline with age 
– older participants reported heightened levels of stereotype threat. In comparison, their 
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which emotion recognition was framed as assessing social ability, which is believed to be 
equivalent in young and older adults. Young participants’ self-reported threat did not differ 
between experimental conditions. However, despite older adults’ overt threat concerns 
being significantly heightened by the stereotype threat manipulation, their performance on 
the emotion recognition task was unaffected. The latter finding is inconsistent with 
multiple studies demonstrating that stereotype threat negatively affects older adults’ 
performance on cognitive tasks, such as memory (Lamont et al., 2015). Rather, this finding 
indicates that emotion recognition may be one cognitive ability that is resilient against 
stereotype threat. 
Another aim of the present study was to examine whether age group identification 
had any moderating or direct effect on young and older adults’ emotion recognition ability. 
Unlike previous research showing that the degree of identification with stigmatised groups 
(such as race or gender groups) might moderate the effects of stereotype threat on 
stereotype-relevant tasks (Deaux et al., 2007; Marquet et al., 2019; Schmader, 2002), the 
present study’s findings were more in line with those demonstrated by Kang and Chasteen 
(2009). Those authors found that older adults who identified strongly with their age group 
performed worse on a memory task than older adults who identified weakly, and that this 
effect was independent of stereotype threat condition. Similarly, although the stereotype 
threat manipulation used in the current study did not have any effect on young or older 
adults’ emotion recognition, there was an effect of age group identification. Older adults 
who identified strongly with their age group performed worse on the GERT-S than those 
who identified weakly, regardless of stereotype threat condition. Conversely, young adults 
who identified strongly with their age group performed better than the weakly identified. 
Although Kang and Chasteen (2009) did not include young participants in their study, the 
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present study’s findings in relation to older adults’ emotion recognition closely parallel 
their findings about older adults’ memory. 
Kang and Chasteen (2009) provided two possible explanations for the results found 
in their study. Firstly, they suggested that older adults who are experiencing greater 
declines in memory may turn to other people their age for support, thus increasing their 
identification with their age group. With regard to the present study, it is highly feasible 
that those older adults experiencing greater cognitive decline (including the deterioration 
of emotion recognition ability) may also increase their identification with their age group. 
Indeed, increasing identification with a stigmatised group may lead to a sense of belonging 
that can buffer the negative effects of being part of a devalued group (Branscombe, 
Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999). 
The second possible explanation for Kang and Chasteen’s (2009) results was that 
older adults who identify strongly with their age group may be more likely to notice signs 
that they are expected to be perform poorly on a task, thus creating some kind of 
stereotype threat effect even in low threat conditions (Kang & Chasteen, 2009). The 
current study’s results are more consistent with the authors’ first suggestion, however, for 
one main reason. The stereotype threat manipulation in Study 3 had no effect on emotion 
recognition ability, despite clearly leading to increased stereotype threat levels in the older 
participants. Hence, if a manipulation that is successful in producing feelings of stereotype 
threat does not affect emotion recognition, it seems unlikely that ambiguous cues would 
have any significant effect.  
The finding that young adults who identified strongly with their age group were 
better at recognising emotions than those who identified weakly could be explained with 
reference to Tajfel’s (2010) social identity theory. People are highly motivated to maintain 
a positive social identity through belonging to groups, and if belonging to a group does not 
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enhance their self-esteem, they are likely to leave that group (Brown, 2000; Martiny & 
Rubin, 2016). Perhaps young adults who do not feel that their cognitive functioning is up 
to the standard of their same-age peers distance themselves from the young adult age 
group to avoid experiencing a blow to their group-based self-esteem. Thus, those with 
worse cognitive functioning (and therefore, possibly worse emotion recognition ability) 
may be less strongly identified with being a young adult than those with better cognitive 
abilities. 
Alternatively, young adults in the present study who are strongly identified with 
their age group might have been more sensitive to subtle cues that young and older age 
groups were being compared, even when age differences were not overtly mentioned (e.g., 
in the control condition). If this were the case, young adults who identified strongly with 
their age group may have been motivated to perform well on the GERT-S in order to 
maintain the ingroup advantage. This extra motivation may have helped young adults to 
perform slightly better than those young adults who were less strongly identified with their 
age group (and thus, potentially less motivated). This explanation would be in line with 
research suggesting that age comparisons can lead to improved performance within task 
domains in which an age group is competent (e.g., Swift et al., 2013). 
Another finding (secondary to the current research focus) was that, contrary to 
Study 2, older adults were equally competent as young adults at recognising negative 
emotions and better at recognising positive emotions.  At first glance, this finding appears 
to contradict the literature demonstrating age-related declines in emotion recognition. 
However, a comparison of GERT-S performance between participants from Study 2 and 
participants from Study 3 indicated that, while young adults’ emotion recognition accuracy 
did not differ between studies, older adults were more accurate overall in Study 3 
compared to Study 2. This enhanced accuracy of older participants in Study 3 could 
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potentially be driven by underlying differences in characteristics compared to the older 
participant sample in Study 2. Alternatively, some undetermined aspect of Study 3’s 
methods could have improved older adults’ overall performance on the GERT-S. 
Consequently, to control for potential confounding factors and inconsistencies across the 
two studies, to enhance power, and to gain a clearer picture of the age differences in 
emotion recognition, data from both studies were pooled. 
The synthesis of GERT-S data from Study 2 and Study 3 revealed an overall effect 
whereby older adults were poorer than young adults when recognising negative emotions, 
but equally good at recognising positive emotions. This finding is consistent with previous 
research demonstrating age-related declines in recognising negative emotions such as fear, 
anger, and sadness (e.g., Ruffman et al., 2008). Furthermore, it is consistent with studies 
showing that older adults’ recognition of dynamic expressions of positive emotions may, 
in fact, remain intact (Murphy, Lehrfeld, & Isaacowitz, 2010). For example, Murphy and 
colleagues (2010) found that, in one study, older adults did just as well as young adults at 
distinguishing between posed and spontaneous dynamic smiles, and in a second study, 
actually performed better than young adults. Their findings, along with the present study’s 
findings, indicate that employing dynamic emotion stimuli may improve older adults’ 
recognition of emotions – in particular, positive emotions (Ruffman, 2011). This idea is in 
line with the socioemotional selectivity theory and positivity effect (e.g., Carstensen, 
2006), whereby older adults are more motivated to pay attention to positive information as 
opposed to negative information, and consequently may exhibit enhanced recognition of 
positive emotion. Thus, in future research investigating age differences in emotion 
recognition, it may be beneficial to use dynamic, multimodal tests of emotion recognition 
(such as the GERT-S), which, compared to tests comprised of still photographs of faces, 
may improve older adults’ recognition of positive emotions. 
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To conclude, the results of Study 3 demonstrated a clear effect of stereotype threat 
on older adults’ (but not young adults’) self-reported threat concerns. Specifically, older 
adults felt more threatened when an emotion recognition task was framed as assessing 
cognitive ability (which is believed to decline with age), compared to when it was framed 
as assessing social or general abilities. However, this increased stereotype threat did not 
result in impairments in older adults’ emotion recognition accuracy, suggesting that 
emotion recognition may be unaffected by feelings of stereotype threat. Potential reasons 
for why age-related stereotype may not affect older adults’ emotion recognition ability are 
fully discussed in the following chapter (the General Discussion). 










The ability to accurately recognise emotions – particularly sadness, fear, and anger 
– from faces, bodies, and voices has consistently been shown to decline with age (Ruffman 
et al., 2008). However, it is possible that these age-related differences have been 
exaggerated or explained by a phenomenon known as stereotype threat. Being reminded of 
stereotypes about aging has a negative impact on older adults’ performance on a wide 
range of cognitive tasks (Lamont et al., 2015). Barber (2017) suggested that, as opposed to 
anxiety or cognitive load, a lack of regulatory fit might explain the negative effect of age-
related stereotype threat on older adults’ cognitive performance. Specifically, stereotype 
threat might lead older adults to adopt a prevention focus (i.e., being more risk averse) 
when a promotion focus (i.e., approaching gains/successes) is more effective (Barber, 
2017).  
Analogous to memory, the recognition of emotions is arguably a cognitive task that 
declines with age and that likely benefits from a promotion focus (Sassenrath et al., 2014). 
Thus, stereotype threat might be expected to impair older adults’ emotion recognition 
through a lack of regulatory fit. However, until this point in time, no research had been 
conducted into the possible effects of age-related stereotype threat emotion recognition. In 
response to this gap in the wide-ranging research on stereotype threat, three studies were 
conducted. The overarching hypothesis was that age-related stereotype threat would lead 
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older adults to experience feelings of threat, which, in turn, would further impair their 
ability to accurately recognise emotions expressed by others.  
Effect of Stereotype Threat on Older Adults’ Emotion Recognition 
In the first study, a stereotype threat manipulation involved suggesting that either 
young or older adults are believed to be worse at recognising emotions. Contrary to 
expectations, stereotype threat did not affect young or older adults’ recognition of 
emotions, or their identification of mental states. Furthermore, raising the stereotype that 
older adults are less accurate when recognising emotions did not lead participants aged 
over 65 years to experience increased self-reported stereotype threat, or increased state 
anxiety. On the other hand, adults aged 18-30 years were significantly threatened by the 
stereotype threat manipulation, and also experienced increased levels of anxiety. These 
findings raised the possibility that lay people do not actually believe that older adults are 
worse at recognising emotions, and may even believe that young adults are worse (hence 
the stereotype threat response in young adults).  
The second study corroborated this hypothesis by demonstrating the existence of 
stereotypes that older adults are as good as, or better than, young adults at recognising 
emotions. Older adults were also expected to perform as well as young adults on social 
tasks, but less well on tasks within the cognitive domain. Further, there was some 
indication that age differences on the GERT-S were only evident among participants who 
reported viewing emotion recognition to be predominantly a cognitive ability, rather than a 
social ability. These data provided the foundation for the stereotype threat manipulation 
employed in the third study.  
In Study 3, older adults’ self-reported experience of stereotype threat differed 
according to the way that the emotion recognition task was framed. When the task was 
framed as assessing cognitive ability, which is widely believed to decline with age, older 
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adults were significantly more threatened compared to when the task was framed as 
assessing social or general abilities. The results demonstrated that, as hypothesised, the 
stereotype threat manipulation did not affect young adults’ self-reported threat at all, 
whereas the manipulation was effective at producing feelings of stereotype threat in older 
adults. However, older adults’ performance on the emotion recognition task was still not 
affected. 
The finding that stereotype threat was effective in inducing feelings of threat in 
older adults is consistent with previous studies in which there were main or interaction 
effects of age-related stereotype threat (pertaining to cognitive or other stereotype-relevant 
tasks) on older adults’ self-reported perceived threat (e.g., Barber et al., 2015; Gaillard et 
al., 2011; Kang & Chasteen, 2009). However, the finding that stereotype threat was 
ineffective at reducing older adults’ emotion recognition ability is inconsistent with past 
studies. Previous research has consistently shown that age-related stereotype threat has 
robust, moderate-to-small negative effects on cognitive tasks in older adults (Armstrong et 
al., 2017; Lamont et al., 2015). Cognitive abilities that have been shown to be impaired by 
age-related stereotype threat include episodic and working memory (Armstrong et al., 
2017), map learning (Meneghetti et al., 2015), and performance on predementia screening 
tests (Mazerolle et al., 2017).  
Recently, Barber, Seliger, Yeh, and Tan (2018) – whose study was not yet 
published when the present research hypotheses were devised – investigated whether age-
related stereotype threat affects older adults’ memory for emotional information. As 
described in the introduction, socioemotional selectivity theory refers to how, in response 
to perceived limits on their lifespan, older adults tend to gravitate towards more positive 
aspects of life to effectively regulate their emotions (Carstensen, 1995, 2006). This leads to 
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a positivity effect, where older adults appear to attend more and have preferential memory 
for positive stimuli over negative stimuli (Barber et al., 2018; Mather & Carstensen, 2005). 
Barber and colleagues (2018) wanted to discover whether older adults’ positivity 
effect in memory is impaired by age-related stereotype threat concerning cognitive decline. 
In one of their experiments, young (aged 18-31 years) and older adults (aged 57-88 years) 
were assigned to one of two experimental conditions. In the stereotype threat condition, 
participants were reminded that older adults are usually not as competent as young adults 
on memory tests. In contrast, the stereotype alleviation condition involved informing 
participants that, although older adults are generally worse on memory tests, they always 
perform just as well as young adults on the specific picture test used in the present study. 
Participants then completed a memory test, which involved the presentation of positively- 
and negatively- valanced pictures and the subsequent free recall of these pictures. 
Barber and colleagues (2018) found that young adults’ memory for positive and 
negative pictures was not affected at all by stereotype threat condition, which is in line 
with the idea that stereotype threat should only affect individuals who are part of the 
targeted stigmatised group. On the other hand, it was demonstrated that age-related 
stereotype threat negatively affected older adults’ memory for positive pictures, but not for 
negative pictures. These results from both of Barber and colleagues’ (2018) experiments 
indicated that age-related stereotype threat has a negative effect on older adults’ memory 
for emotional information.  
Therefore, although the results of the present study suggest that age-related 
stereotype threat does not affect older adults’ recognition of emotion, it may well affect 
their memory for emotions. Future research could involve further exploration and 
delineation of these findings by experimentally manipulating stereotype threat about age-
related cognitive decline and measuring older adults’ performance on a task that not only 
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measures the recognition of emotions, but also measures their ability to later recall the 
emotional faces. If age-related stereotype threat is shown to exclusively reduce older 
adults’ memory for the facially-expressed emotions, but not their initial labelling of the 
emotions, this would provide further evidence that emotion recognition is unaffected by 
stereotype threat. 
The current findings do not appear to support Barber’s (2017) suggestion that a 
lack of regulatory fit underlies age-related stereotype threat. According to the regulatory fit 
hypothesis, stereotype threat might lead older adults to preferentially adopt a prevention 
focus (i.e., avoiding failures), which subsequently undermines their performance on 
cognitive tasks that require a promotion focus (i.e., approaching gains; Barber, 2017). If 
this were true, one might expect that emotion recognition, a cognitive task that benefits 
from a promotion focus (Sassenrath et al., 2014), would be disrupted by older adults’ 
adoption of a prevention focus, caused by stereotype threat. Instead, the current studies’ 
results demonstrated that emotion recognition was unaffected by feelings of stereotype 
threat. Thus, the findings fail to provide evidence in support of the regulatory fit 
hypothesis. However, given that regulatory focus was neither tested nor experimentally 
manipulated in the current research, it should not be ruled out as an underlying mechanism 
of age-related stereotype threat. 
Interestingly, the current studies’ results do appear to be consistent with the 
cognitive load hypothesis, which arguably underlies stereotype threat effects in younger 
adults (Barber, 2017; Schmader et al., 2008). According to this hypothesis, stereotype 
threat leads an individual to turn their focus towards the stereotype, thus increasing 
distracting thoughts and cognitive load (Schmader et al., 2008). In turn, an increased 
cognitive load reduces the amount of cognitive resources that can be applied to the 
stereotype-relevant task, subsequently impairing task performance (Schmader et al., 2008). 
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In line with this theory, it is possible that the recognition of emotions is more of an 
automatic process compared to other cognitive tasks (such as memory recall) and, 
therefore, requires fewer mental resources. This might make the recognition of emotions 
less susceptible to interference from cognitive load. In other words, the stereotype threat 
that older adults in Study 3 reported experiencing may have indeed increased their 
cognitive load but, due to the automaticity of emotion recognition, their accuracy on the 
emotion recognition task was unaffected. 
Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) posited that controlled processing, which involves 
effortful, intentional, conscious processing of information, is easily affected by external or 
internal factors and is highly dependent on cognitive load. Conversely, automatic 
processing, which does not require deliberate effort, is less changeable and largely 
unaffected by load (Satpute & Lieberman, 2006). While memory does involve some 
automatic processing, such as encoding of sensory information, long-term memory often 
relies heavily on controlled processing, including the rehearsal of items or sequences and 
the search process employed during retrieval (i.e., searching through memory items; 
Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Therefore, because controlled 
processing is contingent on cognitive load, performance on tasks requiring effortful recall 
from long-term memory may be highly likely to be affected by stereotype threat, whereas 
more automatic processes may be somewhat resistant against stereotype threat (Mazerolle 
et al., 2012; Schmader et al., 2008). 
Indeed, one study utilised a process-dissociation procedure (a method used to 
separate the contribution of automatic and controlled processes to performance on a task) 
to investigate the effects of stereotype threat on the automatic and controlled aspects of a 
memory recall task (Mazerolle et al., 2012). The authors found that age-related stereotype 
threat only impaired older adults’ controlled use of memory, and actually intensified their 
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automatic recall. Another study led to a similar finding that stereotype threat negatively 
affected controlled retrieval but did not affect item encoding (Eich, Murayama, Castel, & 
Knowlton, 2014). Therefore, if stereotype threat only affects controlled processing, and if 
emotion recognition involves largely automatic processes, then it is entirely possible that 
emotion recognition is impervious to the potentially negative effects of stereotype threat. 
However, the subject of whether emotion recognition is predominantly an 
automatic process continues to be debated by researchers (for a review, see Vuilleumier & 
Righart, 2011). Emotion recognition is typically assumed to involve rapid, automatic 
processing that often occurs outside of conscious awareness (Frith & Frith, 2007). Indeed, 
many studies have supported the idea that emotion recognition may be more automatic, 
fast, and involuntary, as opposed to controlled, deliberate, and intentional. Tracy and 
Robins (2008) found that adult participants were able to rapidly and accurately recognise 
basic emotions in faces even when cognitive load was increased (by instructing them to 
memorise a number prior to each block of photographs of faces). Furthermore, they 
compared participants’ emotion recognition ability in a fast condition (where participants 
were encouraged to respond quickly based on their intuition) and a deliberated condition 
(where participants were told to “think carefully” about their responses and to take their 
time). Although participants’ accuracy when recognising certain emotions was slightly 
higher when encouraged to deliberate, these differences were relatively small, and 
participants still had high accuracy scores in the fast condition. Therefore, although 
controlled processes such as deliberation might marginally improve emotion recognition 
accuracy, they do not appear to be necessary.  
Another study investigated the automaticity of integrating facially-expressed 
emotions and contextual information (Aviezer, Bentin, Dudarev, & Hassin, 2011). To 
determine whether this face-context integration is an automatic, involuntary process or 
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more of a controlled, effortful process, Aviezer et al. (2011) attempted to ascertain the 
level of intentionality involved (i.e. whether the integration occurs reflexively) and the 
degree of effort involved (i.e. whether or not it requires a high level of cognitive 
resources). Over two experiments, the authors found evidence for the automatic nature of 
integrating emotional faces and context. Instructing participants to ignore the context in 
facial expressions of emotion was unsuccessful, suggesting that face-context integration 
occurs involuntarily and uncontrollably. Further, increasing cognitive load by making 
participants simultaneously memorise strings of letters and numbers had no effect on the 
integration of emotional faces and context.  
To further examine the automaticity of integrating emotion and social information, 
Mumenthaler and Sander (2015) asked participants to identify dynamic facial expressions 
of fear, anger, or neutrality, expressed by target faces with forward-facing gaze. 
Concurrently, a contextual face (expressing either fear, anger, or neutrality) was presented 
in the periphery, which either gazed towards or away from the target face. Importantly, the 
contextual faces were rapidly masked before participants could become consciously aware 
of them. The results showed that participants were more accurate at recognising fear when 
an angry face in the periphery gazed at the target face, compared to when an angry face 
gazed away from the target face. This effect occurred despite the fact that the faces in the 
periphery did not reach participants’ awareness. Thus, the integration of contextual social 
information and facial expressions of emotion may be relatively automatic and may occur 
early on in cognitive processing. Taken together, all of these results support the idea that 
the recognition of emotions – and the integration of emotions with the environment – 
largely involves automatic, reflexive, and effortless processes that require few mental 
resources and are less susceptible to negative effects from cognitive load. 
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However, other researchers have found that cognitive load can reduce performance 
on emotion recognition tasks. For example, one study showed that differences in emotion 
recognition ability between young and older adults were amplified when participants had 
to divide their attention between recognising emotions and a secondary task, which was 
taken as evidence that emotion recognition may involve controlled processes (Casares-
Guillén, García-Rodríguez, Delgado, & Ellgring, 2016). Other researchers found evidence 
that the recognition of emotions in unfamiliar faces may involve a combination of 
automatic, bottom-up processes and controlled, top-down processes (Yan, Young, & 
Andrews, 2017).  
In sum, researchers have not yet come to a consensus about the automaticity of 
emotion processing. However, the results of the present study are consistent with the idea 
that emotion recognition may be a largely automatic process. Young adults in Study 1 and 
older adults in Study 3 reported higher levels of stereotype threat when their age group 
was targeted by stereotypes. Many researchers have theorised that stereotype threat 
increases cognitive load, which often reduces individuals’ performance on relevant tasks 
(Schmader et al., 2008). However, the current study’s participants’ ability to recognise 
emotions was unaffected by threat, suggesting that emotion recognition may be an 
automatic process that is impervious to the cognitive load caused by stereotype threat. 
Future research should continue to investigate the automaticity of emotion recognition.  
Although the current findings are consistent with the hypothesis that cognitive load 
increases – rather than regulatory fit – may underlie stereotype threat effects on older 
adults’ cognitive abilities, they do not provide direct evidence for this idea. Therefore, 
follow-up research could entail experimentally manipulating stereotype threat and 
regulatory focus (e.g., Barber et al., 2015) and measuring not only older adults’ cognitive 
abilities, but also their experienced cognitive load. Psychophysiological indicators, such as 
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Heart Rate Variability, could possibly be used as a proxy for cognitive load (e.g., Croizet 
et al., 2004). Such a method might be beneficial for investigating whether regulatory focus 
and/or cognitive load moderate, mediate, or otherwise interact with age-related stereotype 
threat effects on cognitive tasks. Within this suggested study, the potential effect (or lack 
thereof) of stereotype threat on older adults’ emotion recognition ability could be further 
tested, which would be valuable in determining the replicability of the current research 
findings.  
A secondary aim of Study 1 involved examining whether age-related stereotype 
threat about emotion recognition had any effect on young or older adults’ ability to 
identify more complex mental states (such as suspicious, playful, and nervous) from 
photos of eyes (on the RMET; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The results showed that, not 
only did RMET scores not differ between young and older participants (as discussed in 
Chapter 2), but stereotype threat condition did not affect either age groups’ ability to 
identify mental states from eyes, despite young adults reporting heightened stereotype 
threat and state anxiety. One possible explanation for this finding is that young adults have 
usually been shown to perform well (and often better than older adults) on theory of mind 
tasks, including on the RMET (Henry et al., 2013). As Nguyen and Ryan’s (2008) meta-
analysis demonstrated, stereotype threat effects may be much smaller or non-existent when 
tasks are not challenging, which may explain why young adults’ accuracy on the RMET 
was not impaired by their self-reported feelings of threat. Furthermore, like emotion 
recognition, theory of mind may be somewhat automatic (for a review, see Schneider, 
Slaughter, & Dux, 2017), and thus may be unaffected by cognitive load increases caused 
by stereotype threat. However, like the recognition of emotion, the automaticity of theory 
of mind continues to be debated among researchers (see Phillips et al., 2015).  
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Given that stereotype threat does not appear to explain differences in emotion 
recognition between young and older adults, it is likely that age-related declines in the 
recognition of emotion occur as a result of other processes, such as a decline in volume of 
certain cortical regions and/or neurotransmitters (Ruffman et al., 2008). This 
neuropsychological hypothesis is supported by studies showing that the age-related decline 
in the recognition of fear may be associated with a deterioration in grey matter (Williams 
et al., 2006) and that certain areas of the brain involved in emotion recognition (such as 
frontal and temporal regions) decline rapidly during older adulthood (Bartzokis et al., 
2001; Fjell et al., 2009; Raz et al., 2005). Other hypotheses are more motivation-based, 
such as the idea that older adults might preferentially attend to positive stimuli over 
negative stimuli (i.e., the positivity effect; for a review, see Reed, Chan, & Mikels, 2014), 
possibly leading to preserved accuracy when recognising positive emotions but reduced 
accuracy when recognising negative emotions (Charles & Campos, 2011). As Charles and 
Campos (2011) highlighted, neuropsychological and motivational mechanisms (and, 
indeed, other contributing factors) might operate simultaneously or interact to produce 
age-related declines in emotion recognition. Therefore, possible interactions between 
underlying mechanisms should continue to be explored in future research. 
Emotion Recognition as a Cognitive or a Social Task 
The results from Study 2 showed that older adults are generally believed to be 
worse than young adults on cognitive tasks, but equally good at social interaction. 
Building on these findings, Study 3 demonstrated that framing emotion recognition as 
either assessing cognitive ability (believed to decline with age) or social ability (believed 
to remain preserved with age) influenced older adults’ threat concerns. Although their 
emotion recognition ability was unaffected, older adults reported increased feelings of 
stereotype threat during the emotion recognition task when it was framed as assessing 
CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
140 
cognitive ability. Comparatively, older adults’ threat concerns were low when the task was 
framed as assessing social ability.  
This apparent distinction between cognitive and social ability is interesting given 
that cognitive processing and everyday social interaction are inextricably linked. As Frith 
(2008) emphasised, cognition, which encompasses “the many different processes by which 
creatures understand and make sense of the world” (pp. 2033) is integral – and indeed, 
required – for social interactions. Further, Pessoa (2008) argued that there is no separation 
between affect and cognition in the brain; rather, they are highly integrated and should be 
conceptualised as such. This likely explains why deficits in cognition often have a 
detrimental effect on social functioning. For example, cognitive impairments (such as 
those resulting from a traumatic brain injury, dementia, or schizophrenia) often lead to 
significant deficits within the social domain (such as interpersonal relationships, social 
withdrawal, and community outcomes; Beard & Fox, 2008; Benedictus, Spikman, & van 
der Naalt, 2010; Liddle, 2000). Due to the close interplay between cognitive and social 
abilities, researchers commonly refer to social cognition when discussing processes that 
fall both within the cognitive and the social domain (such as emotion recognition; Frith, 
2008).  
However, in comparison to psychological researchers, lay people may have more 
distinct conceptualisations of cognitive and social abilities. Despite the interrelationship 
between cognitive processes and social behaviour, Study 2 indicated that people generally 
believe that cognitive functioning, but not social functioning, declines with age. This 
suggests that lay individuals may view cognitive and social abilities as relatively discrete 
constructs, perhaps partly due to the human desire to classify information into distinct 
categories (Brosch et al., 2010). Interestingly, however, Study 2’s findings showed that 
emotion recognition may not fit neatly within the categories of either cognitive or social 
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ability, as relatively equal numbers of participants reported perceiving emotion recognition 
to be a cognitive or a social task. Thus, whereas processes such as memory and attention 
are usually categorised as cognitive functions (Frith, 2008; Pessoa, 2008), and skills such 
as empathy and relationship development are classified as social competencies (Allemand, 
Steiger, & Fend, 2015), emotion recognition might fit best somewhere in between (i.e. 
social cognition). 
Given the present study’s findings, the categorisation of sociocognitive tasks (such 
as emotion recognition) may be important. Study 3 showed that categorising emotion 
recognition as a cognitive task led older adults to feel concerned not only that their ability 
to perform well on the task would be affected by their age, but that the researcher would 
attribute their poor performance to their age. Therefore, although older adults’ emotion 
recognition was not affected, they experienced doubts about their own abilities and 
concerns that the researcher would be prejudiced against them. Whether these feelings of 
threat had any flow-on effects outside of the experiment is unclear, although perceived 
threats may affect attitudes towards the outgroup (including increased intolerance of 
outgroup members; Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2004), cause negative emotional responses 
(such as fear and resentment; Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009) and undermine group 
esteem (i.e. perceptions of the ingroup’s value, Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). 
Furthermore, feelings of stereotype threat in older adults may be related to decreased 
mental health, negative attitudes about stereotype-relevant domains, and disengagement 
from such domains (von Hippel et al., 2013; von Hippel, Kalokerinos, & Henry, 2015). As 
such, the current research findings highlight the importance of labelling tasks in a way that 
help older adults to feel comfortable and non-threatened while completing potentially 
difficult social cognitive tasks. Namely, it may be most beneficial to frame such tasks as 
assessing social, rather than cognitive, abilities. 
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The overlap and interrelation between cognitive and social abilities (and indeed, 
social cognitive abilities) give rise to another question: Do lay people fully understand 
what these terms mean? In Study 2, when participants were asked to consider whether a 
25-year-old or a 75-year-old adult would be more competent at completing cognitive tasks, 
they were provided with examples (“e.g., involving attention, problem-solving, and 
decision-making”). However, these processes are only a few of many that fall under the 
umbrella term of cognition. Therefore, Study 2’s findings relied somewhat on the 
assumption that participants understand what “cognitive” (and “social”) means. This 
limitation may also extend to Study 3, in which emotion recognition was framed as a 
cognitive or social task. It was assumed that participants understood these terms, and 
indeed, the effect of the framing manipulation on older adults’ threat concerns would 
suggest that they did have some understanding. However, it may have been beneficial to 
provide further explanation as to what cognitive and social abilities are. 
In addition, some other limitations present in the current research should be noted. 
In Study 1, which was conducted one-on-one with participants in a laboratory 
environment, two aspects of the methodology could have been problematic. Firstly, the 
researcher who conducted the first experiment was aged in her early twenties, meaning 
that her age alone could have subtly reminded older adults of their relative age and elicited 
thoughts about comparisons with younger adults. Secondly, older adults were recruited to 
Study 1 through a participant database comprising older people aged over 50 years, which 
may have increased the likelihood that older adults knew their age was a significant aspect 
of the research aims. Both of these factors could have had the potential to prompt 
stereotype threat-like effects in older adults and consequently affect their emotion 
recognition performance. In Study 3, these limitations were addressed by conducting the 
experiment via Mechanical Turk instead of face-to-face, and avoiding giving any 
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indication (prior to the stereotype threat manipulation) that young and older adults were 
being compared. 
A limitation of both the first and the third studies is that, while age group 
identification was investigated as a potential moderator of stereotype threat, it was not 
possible to assess all other conceivable moderators of age-related stereotype threat on 
emotion recognition ability. It is possible that age-related stereotype threat did in fact 
affect the emotion recognition ability of certain older adults with particular dispositional 
features, but that effects were masked because these unknown personal characteristics 
were not measured. For instance, coping sense of humour (Ford et al., 2004), denial of 
stereotypes (Von Hippel et al., 2005), and defensive pessimism (Perry & Skitka, 2009) are 
some of the characteristics that have previously been shown to moderate effects of 
stereotype threat on stigmatised individuals. Consequently, future research should involve 
examining other moderators of stereotype threat and whether there are certain older 
individuals who are susceptible to negative effects of stereotype threat on emotion 
recognition ability. 
Finally, the third study did not involve an assessment of participants’ state anxiety, 
which has been previously shown to mediate the effects of stereotype threat on 
individuals’ task performance in some cases (e.g., Lu et al., 2015; Tempel & Neuman, 
2014). In Study 1, young participants not only experienced heightened stereotype threat, 
but also experienced increased anxiety in response to the stereotype threat manipulation 
(although this did not lead to any emotion recognition deficits). Measuring state anxiety in 
Study 3 would have helped to determine whether stereotype threat also caused older adults 
to experience increased anxiety alongside feelings of threat. Future studies should include 
state anxiety as a potential mediator of stereotype threat effects on older adults’ cognitive 
abilities. 
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Implications of the Current Thesis 
The present research provides some preliminary evidence that the recognition of 
emotions is one aspect of cognition that is resilient against stereotype threat. This finding 
has both negative and positive implications. With regard to negative implications, the 
present findings indicate that stereotype threat is not able to explain – either fully or 
partially – the differences that previous research have demonstrated between young and 
older adults’ ability to recognise emotions. In other words, the consistent empirical finding 
that older adults perform worse than young adults when recognising certain emotions 
(Gonçalves, 2018; Ruffman et al., 2008) is unlikely to have been inflated (at least, by 
stereotype threat). Thus, the age-related deficits seen in emotion recognition ability are 
likely better explained by one or a combination of theories, such as the general cognitive 
decline associated with normal aging, changes in cortical regions involved in emotion 
recognition, and/or a positivity effect (Ruffman et al., 2008).  
Given that stereotype threat cannot explain age-related differences in emotion 
recognition, any potential interventions to reduce age-related stereotype threat in the real 
world (such as removing reminders of negative aging stereotypes from a particular 
environment) would be unlikely to improve older adults’ ability to recognise other 
people’s emotions. Therefore, it is imperative that research continues to be conducted into 
the possible causes of age-related declines in emotion recognition, so that interventions 
may be designed to possibly prevent or lessen such declines. Despite the absence of a 
stereotype threat effect in the current research, the effects of negative aging stereotypes on 
other cognitive abilities have been well established (Lamont et al., 2015), and 
consequently, efforts should continue to be made to reduce ageism and prejudice against 
older adults. In spite of fears that ageism will never cease to exist (Butler, 1989, cited in 
Braithwaite, 2004), positive steps have been made towards reducing ageism, such as the 
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development and implementation of the Positive Education about Aging and Contact 
Experiences (PEACE) model (Levy, 2018). The model focuses on educating people about 
aging (including dispelling negative stereotypes of older adults) and encouraging positive 
intergenerational interactions. Lytle and Levy (2017) experimentally tested the application 
of the PEACE model, finding that, compared to a control condition, providing participants 
with factual information about aging and describing a positive relationship between a 
young adult and an older adult led to reduced negative attitudes towards older people. 
Thus, interventions using models such as PEACE may be promising. 
There are also positive implications of the current research. Firstly, the findings 
indicate that older adults’ knowledge of research aims and cues about age-related 
differences do not necessarily confound results in studies comparing older and younger 
adults’ emotion recognition ability. Thus, researchers can use recruitment advertisements 
that openly request older adults’ participation, or inform older adults that their emotion 
recognition abilities are being compared with young adults, without fear that stereotype 
threat will unfairly worsen older adults’ emotion recognition ability. On the whole, the 
current studies’ findings suggest that researchers can be relatively open with their 
participants about the aims of their research on age-related differences in emotion 
recognition ability. Nonetheless, in the interest of ensuring older adults feel comfortable 
during their completion of emotion recognition tasks, researchers may want to avoid using 
“cognitive” as a descriptor for emotion recognition, given that such a label led older adults 
in the present research to feel threatened. 
Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, the findings suggest that older adults’ 
capacity to recognise emotions expressed by their friends and family would be unlikely to 
be negatively affected by ageism, prejudice against older people, or aging stereotypes in 
their environment. In other words, even if older adults are exposed to subtle reminders of 
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negative aging stereotypes (such as a sign about dementia in a doctor’s office, or a 
billboard advertising hearing checks for the elderly), this may not intensify any emotion 
recognition deficits nor have any further impact on their ability to effectively engage in 
social interaction. This is especially encouraging in light of research demonstrating 
negative consequences of social deficits in older adults, such as greater cognitive decline 
(Evans et al., 2018; Kelly et al., 2017; Seeman et al., 2001; Zunzunegui et al., 2003), 
heightened risk of early mortality (Holt-Lunstad, Smith, Baker, Harris, & Stephenson, 
2015), and increased disability (Mendes de Leon, Glass, & Berkman, 2003). 
In conclusion, the current research was the first to investigate whether older adults’ 
recognition of emotions, a cognitive ability known to decline with age, is negatively 
affected by age-related stereotype threat. Three experiments provided evidence in support 
of the idea that emotion recognition may be one aspect of cognition that, unlike other 
cognitive abilities such as memory, is unaffected by stereotype threat. This might be 
because emotion recognition involves more reflexive, automatic processes as opposed to 
deliberate, controlled processes, making it less susceptible to cognitive load increases 
produced by stereotype threat. Consequently, the present study’s findings provide some 
evidence for the cognitive load hypothesis of stereotype threat. Despite the absence of 
negative stereotype threat effects on older adults’ emotion recognition, many other 
cognitive abilities are impaired by age-related stereotype threat. Consequently, 
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Information Sheets Provided to Participants in Study 1  
Participants were given different information sheets depending on the condition to 
which they were assigned. Prior to requesting that participants read the information sheets 
themselves, the experimenter read the aim of the project aloud to participants to reinforce 
the manipulation. 
 
1. Information sheet for ‘older threat’ condition. 
 
Human Ethics Committee Reference Number: D15/403 




Investigating Emotion Recognition Ability in Young and Older Adults 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project. Please read this information sheet 
carefully before deciding whether or not to participate. If you decide to participate, we 
thank you. If you decide not to take part there will be no disadvantage to you of any kind 
and we thank you for considering our request. 
What is the aim of the project? 
It is widely believed that the ability to recognise emotions declines with age. Therefore, 
the purpose of this study is to see whether older people do perform more poorly on 
emotion recognition tasks than young people. Both older and younger people will be 
taking part in this research. This work is being undertaken as part of the requirements for 
Lianne Atkinson’s PhD. 




We seek equal numbers of male and female undergraduate students (aged 18-30) recruited 
from the Psychology Participation Website or through psychology classes at the University 
of Otago, and people over 60 years of ages from a database of individuals who have 
volunteered to participate in research in the Psychology Department.  Participants must be 
New Zealand residents, and have no experience of head injury or neurological impairment. 
In total, we seek 60 young adults, and 60 older adults, with approximately equivalent 
numbers of males and females.  
Young adults recruited through Psychology classes: You will have the option of reporting 
on your experimental experiences for a small portion of class assessment. Older adults and 
young adults recruited through Psychology Participation Website:  You will be 
reimbursed $15 (young adults) to $20 (older adults) for your out-of-pocket and travel 
expenses.  
What does the study involve?  
Participants will complete a range of pen-and-paper and computer tasks. First, participants 
will be asked to complete a vision test, followed by 2-3 questionnaires about mood and 
cognitive ability. Subsequently, participants will be asked to complete a computer task that 
involves recognising emotions from facial expressions presented on the computer screen. 
This will take one visit that will last up to 60 minutes.  
What data or information will be collected and what use will be made of it?  
Our aim is to explore emotion recognition ability with our  interest  in  trends  over  large  
groups  of individuals rather than single  individuals. The data collected will be securely 
stored in such a way that only those directly involved in the project (i.e., the researchers) 
will have access to the data. The data will be stored on password-protected computers and 
data storage facilities. Data obtained as a result of the research will be retained for at least 
5 years in secure storage. Any personal information held on the participants may be 
destroyed at the completion of the research even though the data derived from the research 
will, in most cases, be kept for much longer or possibly indefinitely. 
Results of this project may be published, but any data included will be in no way linked to 
any specific participant; the data are collected and stored without any identifying 
information. You are most welcome to request a copy of the results of the project should 
you wish to. 
Can participants change their mind and withdraw from the project?  
You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time and without any 
disadvantage to yourself of any kind.  
 
 
What if participants have any questions?  
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free to 





Lianne Atkinson (PhD candidate)                                Dr. Janice Murray 
lianne.atkinson@otago.ac.nz                                      jmur@psy.otago.ac.nz 
027 844 4277                                                               03 479-8353 
 
 
This study has been approved by the Department stated above. However, if you have any 
concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the University of 
Otago Human Ethics Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 
03 479-8256). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated and you 








2. Information sheet for ‘young threat’ condition 
 
 
Human Ethics Committee Reference Number: D15/403 
 17 December 2015 
 
 
Investigating Emotion Recognition Ability in Young and Older Adults 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project. Please read this information sheet 
carefully before deciding whether or not to participate. If you decide to participate, we 
thank you. If you decide not to take part there will be no disadvantage to you of any kind 
and we thank you for considering our request. 
What is the aim of the project? 
It is widely believed that the ability to recognise emotions increases with age. Therefore, 
the purpose of this study is to see whether older people do perform better on emotion 
recognition tasks than young people. Both older and younger people will be taking part in 
this research. This work is being undertaken as part of the requirements for Lianne 
Atkinson’s PhD. 
What types of participants are being sought?  
We seek equal numbers of male and female undergraduate students (aged 18-30) recruited 
from the Psychology Participation Website or through psychology classes at the University 
of Otago, and people over 60 years of ages from a database of individuals who have 
volunteered to participate in research in the Psychology Department.  Participants must be 
New Zealand residents, and have no experience of head injury or neurological impairment. 
In total, we seek 60 young adults, and 60 older adults, with approximately equivalent 
numbers of males and females.  
Young adults recruited through Psychology classes: You will have the option of reporting 
on your experimental experiences for a small portion of class assessment. Older adults and 
young adults recruited through Psychology Participation Website:  You will be 
reimbursed $15 (young adults) to $20 (older adults) for your out-of-pocket and travel 
expenses.  




Participants will complete a range of pen-and-paper and computer tasks. First, participants 
will be asked to complete a vision test, followed by 2-3 questionnaires about mood and 
cognitive ability. Subsequently, participants will be asked to complete a computer task that 
involves recognising emotions from facial expressions presented on the computer screen. 
This will take one visit that will last up to 60 minutes.  
What data or information will be collected and what use will be made of it?  
Our aim is to explore emotion recognition ability with our  interest  in  trends  over  large  
groups  of individuals rather than single  individuals. The data collected will be securely 
stored in such a way that only those directly involved in the project (i.e., the researchers) 
will have access to the data. The data will be stored on password-protected computers and 
data storage facilities. Data obtained as a result of the research will be retained for at least 
5 years in secure storage. Any personal information held on the participants may be 
destroyed at the completion of the research even though the data derived from the research 
will, in most cases, be kept for much longer or possibly indefinitely. Results of this project 
may be published, but any data included will be in no way linked to any specific 
participant; the data are collected and stored without any identifying information. You are 
most welcome to request a copy of the results of the project should you wish to. 
Can participants change their mind and withdraw from the project?  
You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time and without any 
disadvantage to yourself of any kind.  
What if participants have any questions?  
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free to 
contact any of the following University of Otago Psychology Department staff members:  
 
Lianne Atkinson (PhD candidate)                                Dr. Janice Murray 
lianne.atkinson@otago.ac.nz                                      jmur@psy.otago.ac.nz 
027 844 4277                                                                479-8353 
 
This study has been approved by the Department stated above. However, if you have any 
concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the University of 
Otago Human Ethics Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 
03 479-8256). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated and you 




3. Information sheet for control condition 
 
 
Human Ethics Committee Reference Number: D15/403 
 17 December 2015 
 
 
Investigating Emotion Recognition Ability 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project. Please read this information sheet 
carefully before deciding whether or not to participate. If you decide to participate, we 
thank you. If you decide not to take part there will be no disadvantage to you of any kind 
and we thank you for considering our request. 
What is the aim of the project? 
The purpose of this study is to examine how we respond to emotional information in faces. 
Different types of people will be taking part in this research. This work is being 
undertaken as part of the requirements for Lianne Atkinson’s PhD. 
What types of participants are being sought?  
We seek 120 adults drawn from the university population, recruited from the Psychology 
Participation Website, and a database of individuals who have volunteered to participate in 
research in the Psychology Department.  Participants must be New Zealand residents, and 
have no experience of head injury or neurological impairment.  
Participants recruited through Psychology classes: You will have the option of reporting 
on your experimental experiences for a small portion of class assessment. Other 
participants:  You will be given monetary reimbursement for your out-of-pocket and 
travel expenses.  
What does the study involve?  
Participants will complete a range of pen-and-paper and computer tasks. First, participants 
will be asked to complete a vision test, followed by 2-3 questionnaires about mood and 
cognitive ability. Subsequently, participants will be asked to complete a computer task that 
involves recognising emotions from facial expressions presented on the computer screen. 
This will take one visit that will last up to 60 minutes.  




Our aim is to explore emotion recognition ability with our  interest  in  trends  over  large  
groups  of individuals rather than single  individuals. The data collected will be securely 
stored in such a way that only those directly involved in the project (i.e., the researchers) 
will have access to the data. The data will be stored on password-protected computers and 
data storage facilities. Data obtained as a result of the research will be retained for at least 
5 years in secure storage. Any personal information held on the participants may be 
destroyed at the completion of the research even though the data derived from the research 
will, in most cases, be kept for much longer or possibly indefinitely. 
Results of this project may be published, but any data included will be in no way linked to 
any specific participant; the data are collected and stored without any identifying 
information. 
You are most welcome to request a copy of the results of the project should you wish to. 
Can participants change their mind and withdraw from the project?  
You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time and without any 
disadvantage to yourself of any kind.  
What if participants have any questions?  
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free to 
contact any of the following University of Otago Psychology Department staff members:  
 
Lianne Atkinson (PhD candidate)                                Dr. Janice Murray 
lianne.atkinson@otago.ac.nz                                      jmur@psy.otago.ac.nz 
027 844 4277                                                                  479-8353 
 
This study has been approved by the Department stated above. However, if you have any 
concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the University of 
Otago Human Ethics Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 
03 479-8256). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated and you 







Consent Form for Study 1 
Following provision of the information sheets, participants were required to read 








I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is about.  
All my questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  I have had the opportunity to 
discuss this study and I understand that I am free to request further information at any 
stage.  
 
I know that:  
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary;  
2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without any disadvantage;  
3. Personal identifying information, including questionnaires, will be destroyed at the 
conclusion of the project but any raw data on which the results of the project 
depend will be retained in secure storage for at least five years;   
4. Students from Psychology Classes: Participants will have the option of reporting on 
their experimental experience for a small portion of class assessment. Other 
participants: Participants will be given compensation for travel and out-of-pocket 
expenses in the form of monetary compensation or petrol or book vouchers. 
5. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University 
of Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to 






I agree to take part in this project. 
   
Full name (please print) ……………………………………… 
Signature of participant ………………………………………    Date ……………………  
 
Researchers: Lianne Atkinson (0278444277) and Dr Janice Murray (03 479 8353)  
 
Project explained by ………………………………………………………..  
Project role ………………………………………………………………….  








Initial Demographics Questions Asked in Study 2 
Participants answered the following demographic questions by either selecting one 




In order to take part in this experiment, you must meet certain requirements. Please 
answer the following questions to check whether you are eligible. (Note: None of these 
answers will be shared with anybody else, and will be kept completely anonymous). 
 
1. Which age group do you belong to? 
  Under 18 
  18 – 30  
  30 – 40 
  40 – 49 
  50 – 64  
  65+ 
 
2. What is your date of birth? (dd/mm/yyyy) 
______________________ 





4. What is your ethnicity? 
______________________ 





6. Are you proficient in the English language? 
  Yes, English is my first language 
  English is not my first language, but I am proficient/fluent in it 
  No, I am not proficient in the English language 
 
7. Are you currently on any medication? If yes, what medication? 
  Yes     ______________________ 
  No 
 
8. Are you currently, or have you ever suffered from neurological problems (e.g., 
dementia, Alzheimer’s, epilepsy, brain damage)? If yes, what problems have you 
experienced? 
 





Participants who, according to their responses to these questions, were eligible for 
the study were told, “You are eligible for this study. Please continue on to read the 
information sheet.” Those who were ineligible were told, “You are not eligible for this 
particular study. Please make sure you do not submit the HIT through MTurk. Thank you 







Information About Study 2 Presented to Participants 
The following information was provided prior to Study 2 commencing. 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project. Please read this information 
sheet carefully before deciding whether or not to participate. If you decide to participate, 
we thank you. If you decide not to take part, there will be no disadvantage to you of any 
kind and we thank you for considering our request. 
What is the aim of the project? 
The purpose of this study is to examine what people’s beliefs are about aging, and 
also how we respond to emotional information in faces. This work is being undertaken as 
part of the requirements for Lianne Atkinson’s PhD. 
What types of participants are being sought?  
We seek young and older adults for this research.  Participants must be proficient 
English speakers and have no experience of head injury or neurological impairment. You 
will be reimbursed a small amount for your time and inconvenience.  
What does the study involve?  
Participants will complete a range of questionnaires about aging and competencies 
of different age groups, anxiety and depression, and demographic information. 
Subsequently, participants will be asked to complete a short computer task that involves 
recognising emotions from short video clips. On average, this will take around 20-30 
minutes.  




Our aim is to explore emotion recognition ability with our interest in trends over 
large groups of individuals rather than single individuals. The data collected will be securely 
stored in such a way that only those directly involved in the project (i.e., the researchers) 
will have access to the data. The data will be stored on password-protected computers and 
data storage facilities. Data obtained as a result of the research will be retained for at least 
5 years in secure storage. Any personal information held on the participants may be 
destroyed at the completion of the research even though the data derived from the research 
will, in most cases, be kept for much longer or possibly indefinitely.  
Results of this project may be published, but any data included will be in no way 
linked to any specific participant; the data are collected and stored without any identifying 
information. You are most welcome to request a copy of the results of the project should 
you wish to. 
Can participants change their mind and withdraw from the project?  
You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time and without any 
disadvantage to yourself of any kind.  
What if participants have any questions?  
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel 
free to contact any of the following University of Otago Psychology Department staff 
members:  








This study has been approved by the Department stated above. However, if you have any concerns 
about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the University of Otago Human Ethics 
Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph +64-3-479-8256). Any issues 






Consent Form Presented to Participants in Study 2  
After being presented with information about the study, the following information 
was provided to participants and consent was required before proceeding to the main 
survey. 
 
Before beginning the survey, please read each of the following statements, and then 
indicate your consent if you understand and agree with them: 
 
1.  I have read the information sheet (above) concerning the project and understand 
what it is about. All my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I 
understand that I am free to request further information at any stage. 
2.  My participation in the project is entirely voluntary. 
3. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without any disadvantage. 
4.  Personal information will be destroyed at the conclusion of the project, but any 
raw data on which the results of the project depend will be retained in secure 
storage for five years, after which they will be destroyed. 
5.  The results of the project may be published and will be available in the library but 
every attempt will be made to preserve my anonymity. 
 
Please indicate your consent. 







Questionnaire to Explore Age-Related Stereotypes in Study 2 
The following questionnaire was based on the questions asked in Swift et al.’s 
(2013) study. The original questions asked in their study were retained, with further target 
items added. For each task domain, participants were asked to respond by selecting one of 
the following: Adults aged 25, No difference, or Adults aged 75. 
 
Age-related stereotypes questionnaire 
Please consider the following areas of competence. For each domain, please indicate the 
group that you think would be more competent: adults aged 25, adults aged 75, or both 
would perform equally well. 
 
1. Solving crossword puzzles 
2. Being polite 
3. Driving 
4. Social interaction* 
5. Understanding others’ viewpoints* 
6. Learning new skills 
7. Using the internet* 
8. Settling arguments 
9. Making financial decisions 
10. Recognising emotions in others’ faces* 
11. Being creative 
12. Understanding how someone is feeling or what they are thinking* 




14. Completing cognitive tasks (e.g., involving attention, problem-solving, and decision-
making)* 
15. Understanding others’ emotional body language* 
16. Completing memory tasks* 
17. Imparting knowledge and wisdom* 
18. Completing computer tasks* 
19. Completing a running race* 
20. Looking after children 
21. Having a healthy diet 
22. Managing staff 
23. Taking directions from a supervisor 
24. Baking a cake* 
25. Recognising the emotion in others’ tone of voice* 









Percentage of Participants Who Selected Either “Adults Aged 25”, “No Difference”, or 
“Adults Aged 75” as Most Competent in Various Domains, for Each Participant Age 





Percentage of participants who 
selected “adults aged 25”, “no 
difference” or “adults aged 75” 
Chi-square test of 
goodness of fit 









18-30 32.5 43.9 23.6 X
2(2, N = 
123) = 7.66 .022 
50-64 23.4 50.6 26.0 X
2(2, N = 
154) = 20.94 
< 
.001 
65+ 28.7 55.2 16.1 X
2(2, N = 




ages) 27.9 50.2 21.9 
X2(2, N = 




18-30 18.7 56.1 25.2 X
2(2, N = 
123) = 29.46 
< 
.001 
50-64 1.9 39.6 58.4 X
2(2, N = 
154) = 76.46 
< 
.001 
65+ 2.8 39.9 57.3 X
2(2, N = 




ages) 7.1 44.5 48.3 
X2(2, N = 




18-30 88.6 11.4 0 X
2(2, N = 
123) = 171.56 
< 
.001 
50-64 69.5 20.8 9.7 X
2(2, N = 
154) = 93.36 
< 
.001 
65+ 66.4 25.9 7.7 X
2(2, N = 




ages) 74 19.8 6.2 
X2(2, N = 





18-30 41.5 51.2 7.3 X
2(2, N = 
123) = 39.22 
< 
.001 
50-64  30.5 54.5 14.9 X
2(2, N = 
154) = 36.79 
< 
.001 
65+ 18.2 67.1 14.7 X
2(2, N = 




ages) 29.5 57.9 12.6 
X2(2, N = 









18-30 43.1 35.0 22.0 X
2(2, N = 
123) = 8.39 .015 
50-64 14.3 38.3 47.4 X
2(2, N = 
154) = 27.05 
< 
.001 
65+ 12.6 38.5 49.0 X
2(2, N = 




ages) 22.1 37.4 40.5 
X2(2, N = 





18-30 88.6 9.8 1.6 X
2(2, N = 
123) = 170.39 
< 
.001 
50-64 79.9 19.5 0.6 X
2(2, N = 
154) = 158.27 
< 
.001 
65+ 72.7 24.5 2.8 X
2(2, N = 




ages) 80 18.3 1.7 
X2(2, N = 





18-30 91.9 6.5 1.6 X
2(2, N = 
123) = 190.1 
< 
.001 
50-64 88.3 11.0 0.6 X
2(2, N = 
154) = 211.96 
< 
.001 
65+ 71.3 27.3 1.4 X
2(2, N = 




ages) 83.6 15.2 1.2 
X2(2, N = 





18-30 11.4 44.7 43.9 X
2(2, N = 
123) = 26.68 
< 
.001 
50-64 3.2 32.5 64.3 X
2(2, N = 
154) = 86.12 
< 
.001 
65+ 2.1 39.2 58.7 X
2(2, N = 




ages) 5.2 38.3 56.4 
X2(2, N = 






18-30 4.9 37.4 57.7 X
2(2, N = 
123) = 52.44 
< 
.001 
50-64 4.5 24.7 70.8 X
2(2, N = 
154) = 106.53 
< 
.001 
65+ 7.7 36.4 55.9 X
2(2, N = 




ages) 5.7 32.4 61.9 
X2(2, N = 






18-30 10.6 56.1 33.3 X
2(2, N = 
123) = 38.24 
< 
.001 
50-64 5.2 45.5 49.4 X
2(2, N = 
154) = 55.22 
< 
.001 
65+ 4.2 51.7 44.1 X
2(2, N = 




ages) 6.4 50.7 42.9 
X2(2, N = 
420) = 140.70 
< 
.001 
Being creative 18-30 47.2 52.0 0.8 X
2(2, N = 






50-64 32.5 64.3 3.2 X
2(2, N = 
154) = 86.12 
< 
.001 
65+ 26.6 71.3 2.1 X
2(2, N = 




ages) 34.8 63.1 2.1 
X2(2, N = 








18-30 17.1 59.3 23.6 X
2(2, N = 
123) = 38.24 
< 
.001 
50-64 3.2 42.2 54.5 X
2(2, N = 
154) = 66.25 
< 
.001 
65+ 4.2 49.7 46.2 X
2(2, N = 




ages) 7.6 49.8 42.6 
X2(2, N = 





18-30 6.5 44.7 48.8 X
2(2, N = 
123) = 40.15 
< 
.001 
50-64 3.2 45.5 51.3 X
2(2, N = 
154) = 63.52 
< 
.001 
65+ 1.4 45.5 53.1 X
2(2, N = 




ages) 3.6 45.2 51.2 
X2(2, N = 











18-30 69.1 28.5 2.4 X
2(2, N = 
123) = 83.32 
< 
.001 
50-64 56.5 37.7 5.8 X
2(2, N = 
154) = 60.56 
< 
.001 
65+ 53.1 40.6 6.3 X
2(2, N = 




ages) 59.0 36.0 5.0 
X2(2, N = 







18-30 11.4 68.3 20.3 X
2(2, N = 
123) = 69.12 
< 
.001 
50-64 11.7 48.7 39.6 X
2(2, N = 
154) = 34.38 
< 
.001 
65+ 4.2 47.6 48.3 X
2(2, N = 




ages) 9.0 54.0 36.9 
X2(2, N = 





18-30 84.6 13.0 2.4 X
2(2, N = 
123) = 147.27 
< 
.001 
50-64 83.8 13.6 2.6 
X2(2, N = 




65+ 77.6 19.6 2.8 X
2(2, N = 




ages) 81.9 15.5 2.6 
X2(2, N = 
420) = 456.30 
< 
.001 
18-30 3.3 16.3 80.5 X
2(2, N = 









50-64 3.9 7.8 88.3 X
2(2, N = 
154) = 209.82 
< 
.001 
65+ 0.7 18.2 81.1 X
2(2, N = 




ages) 2.6 13.8 83.6 







18-30 90.2 7.3 2.4 X
2(2, N = 
123) = 179.71 
< 
.001 
50-64 82.5 17.5 0 X
2(2, N = 
154) = 174.62 
< 
.001 
65+ 70.6 27.3 2.1 X
2(2, N = 




ages) 80.7 17.9 1.4 
X2(2, N = 





18-30 91.1 8.1 0.8 X
2(2, N = 
123) = 185.42 
< 
.001 
50-64 95.5 4.5 0 X
2(2, N = 
154) = 268.18 
< 
.001 
65+ 93.7 2.8 3.5 X
2(2, N = 




ages) 93.6 5.0 1.4 
X2(2, N = 





18-30 22.8 48.8 28.5 X
2(2, N = 
123) = 13.81 .001 
50-64 31.2 45.5 23.4 X
2(2, N = 
154) = 11.58 .003 
65+ 31.5 48.3 20.3 X
2(2, N = 




ages) 28.8 47.4 23.8 
X2(2, N = 





18-30 19.5 66.7 13.8 X
2(2, N = 
123) = 62.1 
< 
.001 
50-64 7.1 61.0 31.8 X
2(2, N = 
154) = 67.26 
< 
.001 
65+ 5.6 65.0 29.4 X
2(2, N = 




ages) 10.2 64.0 25.7 
X2(2, N = 





18-30 26.8 56.1 17.1 X
2(2, N = 
123) = 30.44 
< 
.001 
50-64 16.9 47.4 35.7 X
2(2, N = 
154) = 21.91 
< 
.001 
65+ 18.2 44.8 37.1 X
2(2, N = 




ages) 20.2 49.0 30.7 
X2(2, N = 




directions 18-30 46.3 48.8 4.9 
X2(2, N = 







supervisor 50-64 33.1 42.2 24.7 
X2(2, N = 
154) = 7.10 .029 
65+ 23.8 55.9 20.3 X
2(2, N = 




ages) 33.8 48.8 17.4 
X2(2, N = 
420) = 62.27 
< 
.001 
Baking a cake 
18-30 12.2 69.1 18.7 X
2(2, N = 
123) = 71.61 
< 
.001 
50-64 7.8 72.7 19.5 X
2(2, N = 
154) = 110.70 
< 
.001 
65+ 2.8 69.9 27.3 X
2(2, N = 




ages) 7.4 70.7 21.9 
X2(2, N = 




the emotion in 
others’ tone of 
voice 
18-30 9.8 69.1 21.1 X
2(2, N = 
123) = 73.22 
< 
.001 
50-64 2.6 55.2 42.2 X
2(2, N = 
154) = 69.36 
< 
.001 
65+ 0 55.2 44.8 X
2(2, N = 




ages) 3.8 59.3 36.9 
X2(2, N = 
420) = 196.30 
< 
.001 
Notes. Percentages presented in bold are the highest within each participant age group 
(significance level of p < .05). Where the second-highest percentage is statistically 







Initial Eligibility Questions Asked in Study 3 
Participants answered the following two questions by selecting one of multiple 
possible responses.  
 
Eligibility questions 
In order to take part in this experiment, you must meet certain requirements. Please 
answer the following questions to check whether you are eligible. (Note: None of these 
answers will be shared with anybody else, and will be kept completely anonymous). 
 
1. Which age group do you belong to? 
  Under 18 
  18 – 30  
  30 – 49 
  50 – 64  
  65+ 






Participants who were eligible for the study were informed, “You are eligible for 
this study. Please continue on to read the information sheet.” Those who were ineligible 
were told, “You are not eligible for this particular study. Please make sure you do not 







Stereotype Threat Manipulation Employed in Study 3 
Participants were provided with differing descriptions of the aim of the study 
(displayed below), depending which condition they were assigned to (cognitive, social, or 
control).  
 
1. Description of aim provided to participants in the ‘cognitive’ condition 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project. Please read the information on this page 
and the next page carefully before deciding whether or not to participate. If you decide to 
participate, we thank you. If you decide not to take part there will be no disadvantage to 
you of any kind and we thank you for considering our request. 
What is the aim of the project and what will be involved? 
The purpose of this study is to examine people’s cognitive ability at different ages. 
Cognitive abilities help us to perform many different tasks involving perception, attention, 
problem-solving, and decision-making. In this study, young adults' (aged 18-30) and 
older adults' (aged over 65) performance on cognitive tasks will be compared.  
In addition to these cognitive tasks, participants will answer some questions about 
demographic information, anxiety, and depression. On average, the survey will take 
around 20-30 minutes. 
 
2. Description of aim provided to participants in the ‘social’ condition 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project. Please read the information on this page 
and the next page carefully before deciding whether or not to participate. If you decide to 
participate, we thank you. If you decide not to take part there will be no disadvantage to 
you of any kind and we thank you for considering our request. 
What is the aim of the project and what will be involved? 
The purpose of this study is to examine people’s social ability at different ages. Social 
abilities help us to interact with friends, family, and strangers, and understand how other 
people are feeling. In this study, young adults' (aged 18-30) and older adults' (aged 
over 65) performance on social tasks will be compared.  
In addition to these social tasks, participants will answer some questions about 
demographic information, anxiety, and depression. On average, the survey will take 






3. Description of aim provided to participants in the control condition 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project. Please read the information on this page 
and the next page carefully before deciding whether or not to participate. If you decide to 
participate, we thank you. If you decide not to take part there will be no disadvantage to 
you of any kind and we thank you for considering our request. 
What is the aim of the project and what will be involved? 
The purpose of this study is to examine people’s ability on various tasks. Different types 
of people will be taking part in this research. The tasks include answering some 
demographic questions, a questionnaire about anxiety, stress, and depression, and defining 
the emotion being expressed by an actor in a video.  





Later, after participants signed the consent form, the stereotype threat manipulation 
was further reinforced by telling those in the ‘cognitive’ condition that “the following 
tasks will assess your cognitive ability”, telling those in the ‘social’ condition that “the 
following tasks will assess your social ability”, and telling those in the control condition 






Remainder of Study Description for Study 3 
After participants were provided with descriptions of the study aims (depending on 
the condition to which they were assigned), all participants were provided with the 
following additional information. 
 
What data or information will be collected and what use will be made of it?  
The data collected will be securely stored in such a way that only those directly involved 
in the project (i.e., the researchers) will have access to the data. The data will be stored on 
password-protected computers and data storage facilities. Data obtained as a result of the 
research will be retained for at least 5 years in secure storage. Any personal information 
held on the participants may be destroyed at the completion of the research even though 
the data derived from the research will, in most cases, be kept for much longer or possibly 
indefinitely. 
Results of this project may be published, but any data included will be in no way linked to 
any specific participant; the data are collected and stored without any identifying 
information. You are most welcome to request a copy of the results of the project should 
you wish to. This work is being undertaken as part of the requirements for Lianne 
Atkinson’s PhD.  
What if participants have any questions?  
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free to 
contact any of the following University of Otago Psychology Department staff members:  
 
Lianne Atkinson (PhD candidate) 
lianne.atkinson@otago.ac.nz 
+64-3-479-5489 







This study has been approved by the Department stated above. However, if you have any 
concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the University of 
Otago Human Ethics Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 
+64-3-479-8256). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated and 






Consent Form for Study 3 
The following consent form was provided to participants in Study 3. They were 
required to indicate their consent before continuing on to the rest of the survey. 
 
Before beginning the survey, please read each of the following statements, and then 
indicate your consent if you understand and agree with them: 
 
1. I have read the information concerning the project and understand what it is about. All 
my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I understand that I am free to request 
further information at any stage. 
2. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary. 
3. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without any disadvantage. 
4. Personal information will be destroyed at the conclusion of the project, but any raw data 
on which the results of the project depend will be retained in secure storage for five years, 
after which they will be destroyed. 
5. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the library but every 
attempt will be made to preserve my anonymity. 
 
Please indicate your consent. 







Demographics Questions Asked in Study 3 
Participants answered the following demographic questions by either selecting one 
of multiple possible responses or by typing their answer in a blank field.  
 
Demographics questions 
Please answer the following demographic questions. 
 
1. What is your age (in years)? 
______________________ 
2. What is your ethnicity? 
______________________ 
5. What is your highest level of education? 
______________________ 
6. Are you proficient in the English language? 
  Yes, English is my first language 
  English is not my first language, but I am proficient/fluent in it 
  No, I am not proficient in the English language 
 
7. Are you currently on any medication? If yes, what medication? 
  Yes     ______________________ 
  No 
 
8. Are you currently, or have you ever suffered from neurological problems (e.g., 
dementia, Alzheimer’s, epilepsy, brain damage)? If yes, what problems have you 
experienced? 
 
  Yes     ______________________ 
  No 
 
 
